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Editors’ Introduction
Here we are again, and it feels only a few short days since we published 16.1 when,
in fact, some months have passed. I think this re ects our ever-busy state of being
as weeks disappear all too quickly.
This edition is what our Editor, Fiza Lee Winter, calls a “mixed bag,” insomuch as
there is not a theme per se, other than engagement with the study of genocide and
with it a hopeful step towards its prevention. But with this bunching of content
comes possibilities, as noted in the edition’s eclecticism of voice, perspective, and
genre.
To begin, I would like to draw your attention to the roundtable discussion about
one of our own editor’s books, Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide (2017) by
Douglas Irvin-Erickson. This submission speaks to our varied backgrounds,
revealing many avenues of scholarly re ection and opinion. The roundtable takes
us in all directions yet is grounded by a discussion about Lemkin and his legacy
(and the myth of his legacy), including re ections on the Genocide Convention
with its strengths, weaknesses, and its problematic enforcement.
As a response to Irvin-Erickson’s book, Dirk Moses poses the question of whether
Irvin-Erickson “thinks a new intellectual history of genocide needs transcend the
assumption about its humanization of domestic and international affairs.” Moses
speaks on, as he phrases it, the impotence of international institutions and the
complication of stateless peoples when considering the Genocide Convention.
Sarah Federman shows how Irvin-Erickson’s approach to Lemkin diverts from
other histories and she poses several pertinent questions about the Genocide
Convention. Scott Straus also poses questions while delving into the relevance of
Lemkin to the study of genocide and, more pointedly, whether Lemkin’s opinions
about genocide have relevance given his complex involvement in advocation and
how this might have undermined some of his intellectual integrity. Lastly, Max
Pensky speaks to similar complexities, drawing on a quote from Hannah Arendt to
question the legitimacy of international law and, in turn, the relevance of Lemkin
himself with regard to the Convention’s legacy.
Responding to discussants, Irvin-Erickson displays his passion for the topic, in
doing so proving his ability to put pen to paper. His responses to those partaking
in the roundtable give considerable insight into Lemkin and his legacy. My thanks
go to our book editor, JoAnn DiGeorgio-Lutz, who spent hours collating the
roundtable material—it is no easy task corralling a group of academics and getting
them to keep to some semblance of editorial rulebook.
I would also like to draw your attention to the essay by Professor René
Lemarchand. An important contributor to our community of genocide scholars for
some decades, Lemarchand takes this opportunity to re ect on his journey as an
academic who was at the forefront of understanding violence in the countries of
Rwanda and Burundi. While the history he writes about is interesting, the essay
takes us on a personal journey, and he explains how that journey shaped his career.
This is a remarkable essay in that we are privy to the contemplations of one of our
esteemed colleagues who looks back on an esteemed career. Here, my thanks go to
our Arts and Literature Editor, Sabah Carrim, for approaching Professor Lemarchand,
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and to the author himself who kindly accepted the invitation to re ect on his years
of study. Through his essay we come to understand Lemarchand and his personal
drive as much as we are, once again, made aware of his scholarly expertise.
We are also fortunate to publish an article by long-standing IAGS colleague
Deborah Mayersen who, again, changes research direction (last time I worked with
Deborah she published an essay on graphic novels). This time she investigates
modes of resistance during the Hamidian massacres, crimes that were committed
in the lead-up to the Armenian genocide. Mayersen discusses some of the obvious
forms of resistant by local Armenians, such as a call to arms, yet includes forms of
resistance that are complicated and have themselves been the topic of much
debate, such as suicide and religious conversion.
Sean Sidky’s submission offers insight into the education of the Holocaust, and his
essay is aimed at pedagogical practitioners in our eld. Sidky looks at the
employment of victim and survivor voices, and how best to incorporate these into
the classroom. Using an example of a teaching tool he developed from his
experience at the 2021 Curt C. and Else Silberman Seminar, organized by the
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), Sidky reveals pedagogical
approaches available to help students (and educators) navigate these dif cult
memories once they have been collected on lm.
Together, this “mixed bag” re ects the vast array of voices and opinions that we
encounter when studying genocide, and with that I leave you to read and
contemplate.
Kirril Shields
Editor-in-Chief, GSP
***
The editorial team wishes to thank all the authors in this edition of GSP, and
believe the content mirrors the ongoing quest of scholars and practitioners to study
genocide and, in doing so, help to understand and thereby prevent the crime. In
this edition, we welcome new voices to GSP, and we are pleased to publish some
more established voices. We think readers will enjoy the eclecticism of the edition
and hope this diversity inspires others to submit similarly thought-provoking
articles and essays.
Jeff Bachman
Daniel Bultmann
Sabah Carrim
JoAnn DiGeorgio-Lutz
Shannon Fyfe
Deon Janice
Douglas Irvin-Erickson
Roland Moerland
Kirril Shields
Fiza Lee Winter
The Editorial Board, GSP
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The Apex of Biographical Intellectual History
by A. Dirk Moses
Scholarship on the origins of the genocide concept has advanced considerably over the past
twenty years with the rediscovery of Lemkin’s unpublished papers in various US libraries and
archives. Access to these papers spawned a revival of interest in the founder of the genocide
concept, leading to many publications on the subject in which intellectual history and Lemkin’s
biography were conceived as coterminous.1 None of them is as signi cant as Douglas IrvinErickson’s Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide. No-one has mined those papers as
assiduously, placed him in various intellectual contexts so convincingly, nor made important
links between Lemkin’s published texts on topics seemingly unrelated to genocide, like
international money transfers. These, Lemkin showed, were integral to the Nazi modality of
predatory, indeed destructive occupations of conquered nations and their economies.
In my brief commentary, I ask Irvin-Erickson, six years since his book appeared,
whether he thinks a new intellectual history of genocide needs transcend the assumption about
its humanization of domestic and international affairs. For whether in international armed
con ict like the Korean and Vietnam Wars, or the domestic convulsions of the Chinese Great
Leap Forward and the secessionist civil wars in Nigeria (1967–1970) and Pakistan (1971), not to
mention the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia (1975–1979), and the Balkan con agration and
Rwandan Genocide of the 1990s, the astonishing extent of civilian destruction since 1948 makes
a mockery of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide
(UNGC). That it is nonetheless a major steppingstone in the development of civilian protection,
culminating in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2000) and the
Responsibility to Protect norm (2005), is the conventional liberal view. The civil wars in South

1

In chronological order: Steven L. Jacobs, “Genesis of the Concept of Genocide According to its Author from the
Original Sources,” Human Rights Review 3, no. 2 (2002), 98–103; special issue of Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 4
(2005), reprinted in Dominik Shaller and Jürgen Zimmerer, eds., The Origins of Genocide: Raphael Lemkin as a
Historian of Mass Violence (New York: Routledge, 2009); Bartolomé Clavero, Genocide or Ethnocide, 1933–2007: How to
Make, Unmake and Remake Law with Words (Milan: Giuffrè Editore, 2008); John Cooper, Raphael Lemkin and the
Struggle for the Genocide Convention (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); A. Dirk Moses, “Raphael Lemkin,
Culture, and the Concept of Genocide,” in Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, ed. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk
Moses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 19–41; Agnieszka Bienczyk-Missala and Slawomir Debski, eds.,
Rafał Lemkin: A Hero of Humankind (Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2010); Raphael Lemkin, Totally
Unof cial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin, ed. Donna-Lee Frieze (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013);
special issue of Journal of Genocide Research 15, no. 3 (2013); Philippe Sands, East West Street: On the Origins of
Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity (New York: Knopf, 2016).
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Sudan and Yemen since 2013 and 2014 respectively, the Myanmar military’s expulsion of
Rohingya in 2017, the current conflict in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, and the Chinese
state’s mass incarceration and persecution of Uyghur citizens, suggest two alternative
conclusions.2
The rst is the impotence of international institutions in preventing and punishing
genocide, notwithstanding the agonistic triumphalism of liberal international rhetoric. Is
Lemkin partially to blame? Along with many anthropologists from the 1930s to the 1950s, he
repudiated the Nazi biological conception of race only to embrace a cultural version of it, along
with a hierarchical civilizationalism indexed to ideals of development and modernity.
Consequently, in de ning racism and genocide in terms of the discredited version of Nazi
empire in Europe, postwar liberals naturalized Western empires and modernizing states. With
Lemkin’s assistance, the United Nations (UN) also depoliticized the de nition of genocide by
distinguishing it from military necessity, thereby cordoning off armed con ict—both noninternational (colonial and civil war), or international—from the intended destruction of ethnic,
national, racial, or religious groups “as such,” as the UNGC puts it. It was thus all too easy for
states to claim that their violent repression of national liberation or secessionist movements, or
bombing of enemy cities, was not genocidal, but rather driven by security and military motives,
irrespective of how many civilian deaths they occasioned.3
The second conclusion is the continued existence of stateless races, nations, and
ethnicities, rather than solely states, as actors in international relations. They belie the tidy
relationship between nation and state embodied by the UN: each nation housed in a state, an
alignment that the self-determination of decolonization was supposed to complete, with
human rights replacing the minority rights formerly (selectively) protected by the League of
Nations.4 However, as the above cases indicate, while international armed conflict has
diminished compared to the first half of the twentieth century, non-international ones—civil
war and independence insurgencies—have increased because of the misalignment between
state borders and the peoples they contain.5 As before the UN Charter, the diasporic existence
of refugee populations and mass migration fuel “long distance nationalism” and the
transnational geopolitical imagination of “races” and even civilizations.6 Genocide appeals to
minorities and indigenous peoples as a standard to frame persecution in striving for selfdetermination.7
These two conclusions indicate that genocide, defined by the UNGC as systematic
attacks on racial, national, and ethnic groups on the grounds of identity alone, is implicated in
securitization and racialization processes in contrapuntal ways. On the one hand, its
proximity to the Holocaust (history’s largest race hate crime) means that states claim their
attacks on minorities do not violate the UNGC because security imperatives rather than racial
animus motivate them; on the other hand, their victims insist that they are victims of
genocidal racialization. The law that shields the perpetrator is also a rhetorical weapon of the
weak, meaning that the question of genocide is a structural feature of an incoherent global
order of stateless nations seeking political independence. This unresolvable tension was built
2

On the Tigray case, see the forum edited by Rachel Ibreck and Alex de Waal, “Introduction: Situating Ethiopia in
Genocide Debates,” Journal of Genocide Research 24, no. 1 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2021.1992920.
On the Uyghurs, see Jo-Smith Finley, “Why Scholars and Activists Increasingly Fear a Uyghur Genocide in
Xinjiang,” Journal of Genocide Research 23, no. 1 (2021), 348–370.
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This is an argument of my book, A. Dirk Moses, The Problems of Genocide: Permanent Security and the Language of
Transgression (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

4

Maivân Clech Lâm, At the Edge of the State: Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination (New Brunswick: Transaction,
2000).

5

Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, “World Politics: Continuity and Change Since 1945,” in The Oxford Handbook on the
United Nations, ed. Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3–40.

6

Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World (London: Verso, 1998), 58–74.
Brian Grodsky, “When Two Ambiguities Collide: The Use of Genocide in Self-Determination Drives,” Journal of
Genocide Research 14, no. 1 (2012), 1–27.
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into the concept by Lemkin and his successors. Necessarily, any analysis of these issues
revolves around him, since he coined the term and campaigned for its adoption. But to
appreciate how Lemkin could dream up this new word and why it eventually enjoyed
widespread popularity, it is necessary to understand the intellectual and political worlds he
inhabited. We have Douglas Irvin-Erickson to thank for expertly doing so in his important
book.
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Re ections & Questions
by Sarah Federman
Douglas Irvin-Erickson’s Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide has a sobering effect.
Perhaps others have shared my celebratory feelings about Lemkin’s successful introduction of
the word genocide and the subsequent inception of the United Nations (UN) Genocide
Convention. Lemkin’s efforts in the 1940s and beyond contributed to vernacularizing genocide
prevention and human rights discourse more broadly. As an individual, he had a dazzling
intellect, able not only to communicate seventeen languages, but to communicate and persuade
native speakers in these languages by drawing on their political, artistic, and spiritual
traditions. What a remarkable story about the power of commitment and persuasion to advance
global moral standards. Irvin-Erickson revives readers from this romantic rendition of Lemkin’s
story by outlining the gap between Lemkin’s aspirations and the nal convention itself.
Irvin-Erickson tells the story from a post-colonial vantage point, showing how
numerous states defanged the convention’s scope during the late 1940s to preserve the ability to
oppress and repress their own populations as desired. This included the U.S. and Canadian
desire to avoid outside intervention in their treatment of indigenous populations, and the U.S.
treatment of African Americans, experiencing segregation and unchecked brutality at the time.
Brazil sought to preserve its freedom to persecute political opposition. Other Western powers
feared the Convention, if too strongly worded, would interfere with colonial rule by
legitimizing African and other governments.
The heaviest hand on the Genocide Convention, and the strongest blow to those of us
guarding idealistic sentiments, was that of Josef Stalin. Stalin, with the help of USSR
Ambassador to the UN Andrey Vyshinsky, ravaged the early drafts ensuring nothing in the
convention would impede Stalin’s present and forthcoming purges, forms of terrorism, and the
use of gulags. The resulting document left states free to terrorize the humans within their
boundaries. They simply could not annihilate those outside of their borders.
Irvin-Erickson also tells the story from a gender perspective, one I never considered. He
rst illuminates the critical role that female delegates played in supporting Lemkin’s efforts to
outlaw genocide. While Lemkin did push prosecutors at Nuremberg to include sexual assault as
a category of German war crimes, for example, he did so only because he thought his concept of
genocide could be used to prosecute these crimes. Lemkin then misrepresents himself to
women’s NGOs at the UN, claiming he was an advocate for women’s rights at the Nuremberg
tribunals, when, really, he was using the prosecution of sexual violence as just another reason
why the Allies should use his concept of genocide. Irvin-Erickson then shows how Lemkin
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leveraged this support from women’s NGOs at the UN without necessarily advocating for their
concerns the way he led them to believe. This distorted our understanding of the role of sexual
assault in the Holocaust and in genocide more broadly. Rape was not included in the Genocide
Convention and was not considered a tool of genocidal warfare until the Bosnian Genocide
decades later.
Intellectual sobriety can leach us of some idealism, but in return prepares us better to
navigate the world as it is. Lemkin advanced the global commitment to genocide prevention as
far as he did because he understood the values and interests of each nation he lobbied. Master
negotiators commit to understanding their counterparts. For those who want the convention
and other human rights protection to expand further, we too must understand the history and
strategic statecraft at the convention’s inception. Irvin-Erickson helps us do just that.
I would like to ask Irvin-Erickson several questions to help me better understand the
past and how to move forward from here.
Would the UN Genocide Convention, as written, have prevented the Holocaust? To
clarify, I do not mean would the world care enough to act, but rather would the resulting
document hold under those circumstances? Or, alternatively, did the dilutions ensured by
Soviet lawyers and many other state delegates cripple it to the point where even Hitler could
have proceeded without running afoul of the law?
Another question relates to what interstate violence the Convention permits. You help
us see the vague boundaries of what constitutes genocide and whether it can occur in peace
time as well as war. If we interpret the Genocide Convention most broadly, what is left? Is selfdefence the only legitimate use of force between states? What happens, too, when Russia claims
Ukraine is its territory. Does this become an intrastate affair beyond the reach of the Genocide
Convention?
This next question stems from my interest in the role of corporations in genocide. We
see transnational corporations increasingly outsize and outpace many countries in which they
operate. Their resources and skilled legal teams enable them to lobby for more rights than
obligations, and skirt obligations when assigned. How does the history of the Convention and
the Nuremberg trials shape our treatment of these non-state actors?
Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright argued for the collective responsibility
to protect. She also believed in the importance of the International Criminal Court and other
judicial bodies that served to hold leaders accountable and expunge the collective. She was
concerned that holding everyone accountable in the aftermath of genocide would bring nations
to a standstill and perhaps impede resilience. I shared with Albright my confusion concerning
how we have collective responsibility to prevent genocide, but only consider individual
accountability for genocide. If genocide prevention requires collective action and genocide itself
mass participation, how then does accountability become singular. She said she did not know as
she had not considered that quandary. How might you resolve this conundrum? Is
accountability collective and, if so, how best to engage in that collective work?
Thank you for your thoughtful and timely contribution.
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The Limits of Lemkin
by Scott Straus
Douglas Irvin-Erickson has written an excellent book, lled with insight. The work is an
academic biography, one that situates Raphaël Lemkin within historical and intellectual context.
Irvin-Erickson excels in weaving Lemkin’s ideas into biographical developments in his life. The
reader grasps how Lemkin’s rst conceptualizations of genocide came into being, how those
ideas were situated within legal debates of the day, and how the reception of his ideas propelled
Lemkin to re ne, innovate, and resist. I learned a lot from the book, and I suspect that most
scholars of genocide will as well.
Irvin-Erickson is at his best in presenting the nuances of Lemkin’s thinking. The author
also makes a number of compelling arguments that deserve wide readership in the genocide
studies literature. One is that Lemkin unquestionably saw genocide as a transhistorical
phenomenon that was delinked from the Holocaust, or at least not always tied to it. Many
scholars of genocide will know that the Armenian genocide captured Lemkin’s imagination and
fury, and that his rst efforts at creating an international law against mass violence against
civilians was formulated before the Holocaust. Yet because the coinage and full articulation of
“genocide” was embedded in a book documenting Nazi crimes, some may surmise that the
Holocaust really was the main referent for the new term. Irvin-Erickson’s book dispels that
interpretation.
A second argument that Irvin-Erickson threads through the book was the importance of
culture in Lemkin’s thinking. I took away two main conclusions. First, Lemkin saw cultural
destruction as integral to genocide. Perpetrators destroyed groups, or attempted to, in part
through the destruction of intellectuals, religion, language, arts, and symbols. Second, a central
argument for the need for a convention on genocide concerned the intrinsic value of groups as
expressed through culture. Irvin-Erickson frames the issue around the concept of “cultural
autonomy,” in the sense that different groups have independent cultures and, if destroyed,
humanity loses something crucial.
I learned a great deal more from the book. Almost every chapter brought to light
revelations about Lemkin’s thinking, his struggles, his journeys, and his rivalries, real and
imagined. The book is well worth a read from scholars who teach Lemkin or want to
understand Lemkin’s thinking in nuanced and careful ways. I found the book really helpful, as I
prepared a lecture on the origins of the concept of genocide.
In the spirit of exchange, I want to raise several questions that the book provoked. One
question is: what place should Lemkin have in genocide studies? Clearly, Lemkin invented the
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term, and he developed a concept around the deliberate destruction of groups, which remains
the core idea for what genocide is. Yet as scholars in the eld we know that “genocide” remains
a contested concept. There remain serious differences in understanding what the term
encompasses and whether the term is primarily a legal, academic, or normative concept. Those
differences have shaped and constrained the eld of study since its beginnings, and continue to
do so.
The question is: should we turn to Lemkin to help to solve those problems? Many
scholars do. The problem is that different scholars see different Lemkins, so to speak, and thus
they emerge wielding Lemkin to defend different concepts of genocide. I come away from IrvinErickson’s book less convinced that we should look to Lemkin to nd a way out of the
conceptual differences. Lemkin was not always consistent. He also was an advocate. He wanted
there to be an international law against genocide, and he seemed willing at different stages in
his formulation and defense to articulate different arguments in order to advance that cause. It
is also possible that he was not always a clear thinker. After reading Irvin-Erickson’s thoughtful
account, I emerge an admirer of Lemkin—of his persistence and determination, as well as his
intellectual creativity. But I also do not nd him intellectually reliable, and hence I am not
convinced that deeper dives into his thinking will resolve the problems with the concept of
genocide. In other words, I am increasingly convinced that we should look beyond the
concept’s intellectual origins to understand it.
What should, for example, be the place of culture in understanding genocide? IrvinErickson defends Lemkin as having a non-essential understanding of culture and of groups. Yet
in reading more about Lemkin I remain perplexed as to what his views on culture were.
“Lemkin saw diversity as the wellspring of human creativity,” writes Irvin-Erickson in the
concluding paragraph. At one level, the point resonates—cultures are a source of diversity. But
what does this really mean? What is a group’s culture? Can a group be said to have a culture?
Lemkin’s views continue to strike me as being not being especially sophisticated on this
question.
The importance of groups (collectivities or cultures) is fundamental to the etymology
and conceptualization of genocide. In my work, I have made the argument that genocide is a
form of “group-selective” violence, and hence we can connect genocide to other forms of groupselective violence and distinguish it from both truly indiscriminate violence and individuallyselective violence. I believe my conceptualization is consistent with Lemkin’s coinage and
conceptualization of genocide as the deliberate destruction of groups.
But what kinds of groups fall under a genocide rubric? These questions remain
fundamental for the eld and have divided it since the Genocide Convention came into being. I
do not come away from this book—that is, from a deeper engagement with Lemkin—with clear
answers to these questions. If culture is central to group formation, and that is a justi cation for
having a law on genocide, should political groups (or other non-culture bearing groups) be
considered within a rubric on genocide? Should groups marked by a disability be considered
protected groups under the Convention? Should regional groups or gender groups? Do these
groups have a culture? I conclude from the book that Lemkin was not clear on these questions.
Another key question that Lemkin leaves me confused on: is destroying culture
equivalent to destroying groups? Even more fundamentally, what does it mean to destroy a
group? Irvin-Erickson is persuasive that culture is central to Lemkin’s thinking. But where I
remain unclear is whether cultural destruction is usually, or always, part of a group’s
destruction, but alongside other, more physical forms of destruction or whether cultural
destruction is suf cient for a process to be called genocide? This is not an idle question. The
issue has again resurfaced in relation to the Uyghur populations in China, and the question
remains central for the ways in which different indigenous and colonized people were treated
over long periods of time.
One last question that the book generated: what does the obligation to prevent, as
articulated in the Convention, mean? I was surprised that this question did not receive more
attention from Lemkin. I conclude from the book that Lemkin was somewhat naïve about the
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power of international law. He seemed to think that a law against genocide, and stated
commitments to prevent it, would engender state commitments. But the Convention is
deliberately vague on this question, and Lemkin did not develop a clear understanding—at
least judging from this book—on what prevention means and how it would take place.
I have argued over the years that ambiguities, hierarchies, and disagreements
embedded in the concept of genocide are signi cant limiting factors on the eld of genocide
studies. However, unlike some other scholars, I still think “genocide” is a useful concept, and I
think so because deliberate attempts to destroy groups is an empirical phenomenon in the
world. Genocide is a real form of violence. That statement does not absolve scholars of
wrestling with questions like: to what family of cases does genocide belong, what is a group,
what does group destruction mean, what kinds of groups are subjected to genocide, is the
concept an academic one to de ne types of violence, a normative one to signal terrible
outcomes, or a legal one bound by the Convention? I wish Lemkin could help us answer these
questions. Alas, after reading this book, I am not convinced he can. Maybe genocide studies
needs greater distance from Lemkin studies, or I stand to be corrected.
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The Marginal Man
by Max Pensky
In a line from The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt dismissed the signi cance of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, indirectly, the Genocide Convention as well. These
new, highly normative instruments of international law, Arendt wrote:
… were sponsored by marginal gures—by a few international
jurists without political experience or professional
philanthropists supported by the uncertain sentiments of
professional idealists. The groups they formed, the declarations
they issued show an uncanny similarity in language and
composition to that of societies for the prevention of cruelty to
animals. No statesman, no political gure of any importance
could possibly take them seriously…1
In her chapter on Arendt and Lemkin,2 political theorist Seyla Benhabib offers Arendt’s
quote to document both Arendt’s deep initial skepticism regarding the power of international
law to exert meaningful effects on the new constellation of mass political movements of the 20th
century. Among the “marginal gures” that Arendt scorns is almost certainly Raphaël Lemkin,
who in all likelihood Arendt had never met, even though their geographical and personal
spheres overlapped considerably.
Douglas Irvin-Erickson also offers this quote toward the end of his ne intellectual
biography, Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide. As the biography of a concept and a
historical constellation, and not just a man, Irvin-Erickson’s book joins the ranks of recent
studies exploring the remarkably speci c origins of the universalist norms that transformed
international law in the decades before, during and after the Second World War and the
Holocaust. These studies, including Benhabib’s recent work,3 Philippe Sands’ East-West Street:
On the Origins of “Genocide” and “Crimes Against Humanity”4 that explores the relation between
1

Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1951), 292.

2

Seyla Benhabib, Dignity in Adversity: Human Rights in Troubled Times (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 43.

3

Seyla Benhabib, Exile, Statelessness, and Migration: Playing Chess with History from Hannah Arendt to Isiah Berlin (New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2018).

4

Philippe Sands, East-West Street: On the Origins of “Genocide” and “Crimes Against Humanity” (New York: Vintage Books,
2016).
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neighbors and eventual adversaries Lemkin and Hersch Lauterpacht, and James Loef er’s
Rooted Cosmopolitans: Jews and Human Rights in the Twentieth Century,5 have provided us with
rich, concrete accounts of a small group of Jewish legal theorists and jurists, rooted in the
shifting and violent political universe of eastern Europe, in what was, alternately, East Prussia,
Poland, and Ukraine. Their experiences of marginalization and persecution, of cultural and
physical vulnerability under capricious political authority, and ultimately of the destruction of
their families and their world, appropriated the concepts and mechanisms of international law
with the goal of transforming a collection of treaties and customs, largely designed to lubricate
international commerce, into a demand for the protection of individuals from obliteration by
their own political authorities.
Better than any previous biography, Irvin-Erickson’s book is clear, adept and engaging
in reconstructing the political bargaining that, bit by bit, produced the text of the Genocide
Convention; a document that, depending on one’s point of view, is a singular leap forward in
the power and purpose of international law, a deeply problematic betrayal of Lemkin’s
motivation vision, or, most likely, a messy combination of both.
The post-Convention life of the genocide concept, as a result, has always been
peculiarly two-faced. A “narrow” legal de nition often appears so narrow as to be nearly
useless as the powerful legal response to state targeting of vulnerable groups, as we see most
evidently in the lofty evidentiary bar for special intent that the International Court of Justice
now sees as settled law, or the claim that China’s campaign to eradicate the Uighurs as a distinct
ethnic, national and religious group, lacking only the direct evidence of mass killing, does not
meet the legal threshold of genocide.
At the same time as this steady winnowing down of the reach and relevance of the legal
construct, of course, once the concept of genocide broke from its narrow legal channels, it
became so mainstreamed and broadened that it is now available to condemn and justify
everything from unprovoked attacks on Thanksgiving turkeys to national defense against
Russian paramilitaries in Donbas. What is increasingly hard to locate in this bipolar
development is precisely the sane and motivating middle ground, the promise of law as both
expression and enforcement of a global consensus that demands enforceable limits on state
power, that motivated both Lemkin and the rest of his cohort in the rst place.
Why did this happen? One low-hanging explanation is that Lemkin, like others, was
simply overcon dent in what law, and especially international law, could accomplish as the
“gentle civilizer of nations,” as Martti Kosenniemi6 put it in a classic study. Irvin-Erickson’s
detailed history of the concept of genocide makes this easy explanation harder, fortunately. The
legal route toward a global norm restraining sovereign attacks against a state’s own domestic
population never lost sight of the fact that norms, whether legal, moral, or otherwise, only exert
an effect on would-be perpetrators of atrocity crimes if the norm succeeds in catalyzing an
international political shift of values, priorities, and interests strong enough to change potential
genocidaire’s calculations of cost and bene t. For that, a new legal regime would need to be met
halfway, so to speak, by corresponding normative and institutional changes in international
politics. For a brief window stretching from the beginning of the 1990s to roughly the end of the
rst decade of the 2000s, that change seemed, with many reservations, to be taking place. For
many observers, it is now in full retreat.
Thus, while it is tempting to lay at least a part of the blame for the erosion of this lawdriven constellation of international atrocity prevention on the marginalization, the legalism,
and the insuf cient intimacy with the demands of Realpolitik characteristic of the founding
generation (those “few international jurists without political experience or professional
philanthropists supported by the uncertain sentiments of professional idealists,” as Arendt

5

James Loef er, Rooted Cosmopolitans: Jews and Human Rights in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2018).

6

Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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dismissively wrote), it is a temptation worth resisting, or at least seriously qualifying. As a
marginal gure, Lemkin was also marginalized from the kind of political engagement that
would no doubt have proven useful once his plan for legal protection of vulnerable groups had
to go through the sausage factory of international political bargaining. Irvin-Erickson’s book is
at its most informative and poignant as it reconstructs Lemkin’s gradual abandonment, through
a series of sometimes questionable compromises of what is arguably the core innovation of his
own conception of genocide: the recognition of state efforts to eradicate the cultural foundations
of national groups as a distinctive crime, regularly perpetrated, with catastrophic results, but
utterly excluded from domestic criminal legal systems due to the peculiarities of state
sovereignty.
Would Lemkin have had more success in preserving more of the most valuable
elements of his own conception of genocide if he had had more experience, stature, and access
(and, to be honest, native talent) as a political negotiator? Very possibly. But his very
marginality, as the book documents, actually had much to do with the impressive success that
Lemkin did in fact achieve. An international jurist from a small patch of hinterland lying
somewhere on the shifting border between Poland and Ukraine turned out to be perfectly
positioned to catalyze this most complex and contested of concepts. Change can be expected
from the margins most of all. And as the global community of genocide prevention practitioners
works to preserve what it can of the power of that concept, it is likely that similarly
marginalized actors, perhaps more than important political gures, will take the lead.
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What’s Raphaël Lemkin Got to do with Genocide Studies? A Conversation on Gender,
Culture, Economics, Categorical Violence, and Colonization with Professors Sarah Federman,
Dirk Moses, Max Pensky, and Scott Straus
by Douglas Irvin-Erickson
I would like to thank the editors of Genocide Studies and Prevention, especially JoAnn DiGeorgioLutz, for organizing this conversation and soliciting essays from such a highly distinguished
panel of experts. Thank you, in turn, to Sarah Federman, Dirk Moses, Max Pensky, and Scott
Straus for their generous reviews of my book, Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide. In my
response to each reviewer, I cover a lot of ground from my book—in the hope that this
conversation can be assigned in the classroom.
Lemkin: Founding Father, Great Man, Pioneer, Hero, Saint, or Prophet?
Alex Hinton has suggested that genocide scholars have constructed a narrative that Lemkin was
the founding father of genocide studies, and the prototypical genocide scholar, “academically
informed yet politically committed to this pressing social issue.”1 These narratives do not
situate genocide studies in the framework of Lemkin’s ideas. Instead, they reframe Lemkin in
the image of later generations of genocide scholars, who ascribed to Lemkin their own
predilections, persuasions, and politics.2 With this founding father narrative, Lemkin
hagiography comes to pass for Lemkin biography.3
Consider Samuel Totten and Henry Theriault’s recent college-level textbook The UN
Genocide Convention: An Introduction.4 On the rst page, the authors compare Lemkin to Susan B.
Anthony, Mahatma Gandhi, Eleanor Roosevelt, Martin Luther King Jr., and Nelson Mandela.
We are told that what distinguishes Lemkin from these other human rights heroes is that
Lemkin was able to single-handedly accomplish something important—the United Nations

1

Alexander Laban Hinton, “Critical Genocide Studies,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 (2012), 4–15.

2

A. Dirk Moses has done a brilliant job explaining this in A. Dirk Moses, The Problems of Genocide: Permanent Security and
the Language of Transgression (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

3

Benjamin Meiches and Jeff Benvenuto, “Between Hagiography and Wounded Attachment: Raphaël Lemkin and the
Study of Genocide,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 1 (2019), 2–10. For an excellent genealogical approach to
the representation and uses of Lemkin, see Benjamin Meiches, The Politics of Annihilation: A Genealogy of Genocide
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2019).

4

Samuel Totten and Henry Theriault, The United Nations Genocide Convention: An Introduction (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2020).
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Genocide Convention (UNGC)—whereas the others needed the help of social movements to do
their great deeds. This is a myth that persists in received scholarship.
As Max Pensky put it in his essay, Lemkin was a marginal gure during the diplomatic
negotiations over the UNGC, with poor instincts as a negotiator. Yet, the myth of “Lemkin the
great man” lives on (it is a great man tale, which leaves women out of the story). This is
unfortunate because, as Pensky put it, it was Lemkin’s marginality that led to his impressive
successes, forcing him to gin up a coalition of UN delegations representing small states and
former colonies, women and social democratic members of delegations from major powers, and
a global network of activists and lobbyists who ooded the of ces of their governments’
of cials and UN delegations with phone calls, telegrams, and letters pushing for a genocide
convention. The more one has access to formal channels of power, the less one needs a coalition
from the margins.
The forgotten “great man” motif is useful for scholars in genocide studies. Emphasizing
that Lemkin did great deeds in the 1940s that were not appreciated until the eld of genocide
studies gained visibility in the late 1990s and early 2000s, confers upon genocide studies an
arti cial importance and a global civilizing mission. This dubiously elevates the prevention of
genocide above other movements for liberation, peace, and justice—and places individual
scholars into Lemkin’s intellectual lineage.
A similar phenomenon occurs amongst scholars who specialize in particular cases of
genocide, ranging from the Holocaust to the Armenian, Ukrainian, Kazakh, and Polish cases,
cases of genocide against indigenous peoples, and colonial cases in the Americas and Africa. In
the literature on all these cases, we can nd scholars claiming Lemkin was rst (or most)
concerned with their case. That is because Lemkin had a disingenuous habit of telling diasporic
communities, survivor organizations, and advocacy groups that their case was really the case
that rst (or most) inspired him to come up with the idea of genocide. The archival record is
thus lled with notes Lemkin wrote saying that some dozen or so cases were his rst
inspiration. The consequence of this, Henry Theriault observed, is that many different
constituencies can now claim that Lemkin “invented” the idea of genocide in reference to the
particular case that their community cares about.5
This why I appreciate Straus’ essay and the questions he poses to me: he suggests
that genocide studies does not need Lemkin to be a vibrant, legitimate, and serious eld of
study. I agree with this. Furthermore, reducing the “great man” myth around Lemkin would
help ease the cottage industry of activist-scholar groups that seek to legitimize their particular
cases of interest by presenting Lemkin in a way that ts into their narratives. There are many
Lemkins:
• The Jewish Lemkins (plural—the left Zionist Lemkin, the
right Zionist Lemkin, the cosmopolitan Jewish Lemkin, the
Lemkin who pretended to be a cosmopolitan-universalist his
whole adult life so he could pass in a hostile and antisemitic
world);
• The Polish Lemkins (plural—the right Polish nationalist
Lemkin, the left Polish patriotic Lemkin, the a-political Polish
Lemkin, the internationalist Polish Lemkin, the Polish-Jewish
Lemkin, and the Jewish-Polish Lemkin);
• The Armenian suffering inspired Lemkin;
• The Ukrainian suffering inspired Lemkin;
• The Kazakh suffering inspired Lemkin;
• The Lithuanian suffering inspired Lemkin;

Henry Theriault, “Against the Grain: Critical Re ections on the State and Future of Genocide Scholarship,” Genocide
Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 (2012), 123–144.
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• The New York Lemkin (which can also be the Native
American suffering inspired Lemkin, or the anti-US Black
racist Lemkin, or the pro-US Black anti-racist Lemkin); and
• The anti-colonial Lemkin, not to be confused with the procolonial Lemkin.
The list goes on and on. What is interesting to me is that each version of Lemkin feels
like it is the authentic Lemkin to individual scholars in each of these camps. Why? Because each
community of scholars who adopts Lemkin as their own has their own narrative about who
Lemkin is, so that the gure of Lemkin they craft resonates with their politics, their programs,
their concerns, and even their aesthetics. (Surely this must be the real Lemkin, because it feels so
right!)
Until recently, one thing that kept getting left out of the “Lemkin belongs to us” battles
was Lemkin’s work with Arab and Muslim groups to document and prosecute what he called
the “world genocide of Muslims in the 1940s and 50s” that he said “followed the world
genocide of Jews in the 1930s and 40s.”6 I guess that never felt right to very many people. But,
you cannot ignore the record of Lemkin’s work to prosecute “a world genocide against
Muslims” that he carried out with the League of Arab Delegates from 1949 all the way through
the 1950s. That is also part of the real Lemkin. For what it is worth, the relationship between
Israeli studies and Lemkin studies has also been tenuous, at best, but well worth pursuing.7
None of this should prevent scholars from reading Lemkin to gain new perspectives on
their cases of interest. Ukrainian studies has been a good example as the “Lemkin Turn” has
inspired fruitful new avenues of inquiry.8 But none of these area studies or case-speci c elds
need to claim Lemkin as their own to be legitimate.
Nevertheless, communities of scholars will likely continue to re-interpret Lemkin to t
their own designs, long into the future. With this, the contradictions and uncertainties about
Lemkin as a historical gure will continue to be erased in favor of simple tales of the “true”
heroic Lemkin. Such is the nature of hagiography, to avoid nuance in favor of certainty, to
ignore context if context threatens moral consistency. In the spirit of muddying the waters and
calling it progress, I will respond to my colleagues’ questions by raising more questions, leaving
much unanswered.
Response to Professor Sarah Federman: On The Missing Voices in Diplomatic History and
Problems with Justice
I was not the rst to notice that colonization was central to Lemkin’s understanding of genocide
and the drafting of the UNGC. A. Dirk Moses, in particular, has been a leading gure here.
What struck me, however, was just how much members of the UN delegations from Western

6

See Daud Abdullah, “A Century of Cultural Genocide in Palestine,” in Cultural Genocide Law, Politics, and Global
Manifestations, ed. Jeffrey Bachman (London: Routledge, 2019), 227–245. Abdullah picks up on Lemkin’s concerns
about genocides committed against Muslims in the aftermaths of the British mandate systems—in Pakistan and
Palestine. In my book, I discuss Lemkin’s ambiguous position on “genocide in the holy lands,” as delegates in late
1947 and early 1948 debated whether genocide should be de ned in a way that would include the treatment of
Muslim and Arab Palestinians under the UN Resolution on the Partition of Palestine. Lemkin is careful never to
say anything on this. But his closest allies, in the negotiating rooms, were North African and Arab delegations that
wanted the de nition of genocide to cover much of the con icts that emerged with the partition of the holy lands.

7

Rotem Giladi has written a provocative and thoroughly researched book on the Jewish Israeli lawyers, Jacob Robinson
and Shabtai Rosenne, showing how they approached international law with disinterest, aversion, and hostility.
Giladi’s treatment of Lemkin gives us a fresh look at the con icts that arose between Lemkin and Israeli diplomats,
while providing a new take on Lemkin’s engagement with Israeli and Middle Eastern politics. See Rotem Giladi,
Jews, Sovereignty, and International Law: Ideology and Ambivalence in Early Israeli Legal Diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2021).
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For a discussion, see Douglas Irvin-Erickson, “The Construction and Destruction of Peoples, Nations, and Empire: The
Study of the Holodomor as Genocide,” in Genocide: The Power and Problems of a Concept, eds. Andrea Graziosi and
Frank Sysyn (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2022), 145–173.
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powers spoke plainly about their own governments’ interests in maintaining colonization and
using international humanitarian law as a means for this end. This included the Australian,
Brazilian, Canadian, French, South African, Swedish, US, and UK governments’ interests in
preventing the criminalization of apartheid, racial segregation, and other policies concerning
the forced assimilation and extermination of indigenous peoples and colonial subjects.
The delegates from these states, and many more, especially the USSR, wrote their own
atrocities out of the de nition of genocide during the drafting process.9 The UK, US, and France
were still colonial and imperial powers. The USSR was very much an empire.10 In 1946, when
the delegations from the great powers sat down to de ne and outlaw genocide, they wanted
nothing to do with outlawing a crime that Lemkin, in his 1944 book Axis Rule in Occupied
Europe, called an ancient practice and colonial process that was now being used as a common
technique of governance in the 20th century.
I felt this had been largely missed by scholars who rely on the UN travaux préparatoires
to tell the history of the UNGC (travaux préparatoires are the of cial documentation of
negotiations and discussions of the drafting of treaties and international laws).11 What many at
the UN said in private was different than what they said in the negotiating rooms, where record
keepers were busy keeping minutes. While I was writing my book, Anton Weiss-Wendt was
preparing his excellent study of the USSR and the UNGC, published in two volumes.12 What
struck me about Weiss-Wendt’s work (we read drafts of each other’s manuscripts as we were
writing) was how expertly he used Soviet sources to illuminate what was going on behind the
scenes on the Soviet side. These Soviet sources paint a different picture of the negotiations over
the UNGC than the UN documents, revealing Stalin and his UN ambassador Andrey
Vyshinksy’s heavy in uence over the wording of the nal draft of the UNGC. The Soviets saw
genocide, as Lemkin de ned it, as a tool for holding their empire together, but their diplomats
were too disciplined to let this slip into the of cial record.
As for the rest of the great powers, there are many blatantly racist comments to be
found in the of cial UN documents, and a healthy share of “white man’s burden” type of
language. But there is much more candor in unof cial sources about the “danger” of outlawing
genocide, and letting “brown people” or “backwards people” take over human rights
instruments.13 Washington, London, and Paris liked taking credit for defeating fascism in the
name of democracy, but they did not want to criminalize something Lemkin de ned in Axis
Rule as “a colonial process” of “destroying the national patterns of the oppressed and imposing
the national patterns of the oppressors.”14
These private conversations and correspondences—telegrams, sentence fragments
scribbled on napkins, messages typed on hotel stationary, notes written down after midnight
walks—give us different perspectives on the drafting of the UNGC than the travaux
9

Anton Weiss-Wendt, “Somebody Else’s Crime: The Drafting of the Genocide Convention as a Cold War Battle, 1946–
48,” in Genocide: The Power and Problems of a Concept, eds. Andrea Graziosi and Frank E. Sysyn (Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2022), 22–43.
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Mark von Hagen, “Wartime Occupation and Peacetime Alien Rule: ‘Notes and Materials’ toward a(n) (Anti-) (Post-)
Colonial History of Ukraine,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 34, no. 1–4 (2016), 153–194. More broadly, see Alexander
Motyl, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 68.

11

Nathan A. Kurz, “’Hide a Fact Rather than State It:’ The Holocaust, the 1940s Human Rights Surge, and the
Cosmopolitan Imperative of International Law,” Journal of Genocide Research 23, no. 1 (2021), 37–57. Kurz shows that
relying only on the of cial UN documents also minimizes the degree to which the German attempt to annihilate
European Jews shaped the debates on the convention, partially because UN note keepers did not register
discussions of Jewish suffering as worthy of documenting.
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See Anton Weiss-Wendt, A Rhetorical Crime: Genocide in the Geopolitical Discourse of the Cold War (New Brunswick,
Rutgers University Press, 2018); and see especially Anton Weiss-Wendt, The Soviet Union and the Gutting of the UN
Genocide Convention (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2017).
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International Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).
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préparatoires.15 Diplomacy is just as much about what happens in the negotiation room as what
happens outside of it. Where do the plans hatch, the plans for the motions and coordinated
votes that take a room by surprise? They hatch at dinner, over cocktails, coffee or tea, in hotel
rooms. Lemkin ascribed an almost magical quality to a green sofa in the delegates’ lounge
during the rst UN General Assembly in Lake Success, New York. The bar, however, he seemed
to hate, complaining about all the conversations over martinis that he was not invited to join. It
is funny: the bar and the lounge were only a few feet away, yet the social meaning of these two
spaces made all the difference for Lemkin.

Image 1. Sofas and chairs at the UN Delegate’s Lounge, Lake Success, NY.
Source: UN Online Archives

James Finkel has often told me, re ecting on a long and distinguished career in government, that modern
governments are not monolithic, and their policies are not made and carried out seamlessly. Rather, they can be
messy and sometimes, one branch (or of ce) competes with another to determine how the government should act.
It is through this mess of bureaucratic politics that state policy is made and carried out, and in these con icts
within government individuals really do matter. See three of Jim’s ne essays: James P. Finkel, “Atrocity
Prevention From Obama to Trump,” in Preventing Mass Atrocities: Policies and Practices, eds. Barbara Harf and Ted
Robert Gurr (London: Routledge, 2018), 113–134; James P. Finkel, “Beyond the Crossroads: Strengthening the US
Atrocity Prevention Board,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 2 (2015), 138–147; James P. Finkel, Atrocity
Prevention at the Crossroads: Assessing The President’s Atrocity Prevention Board After Two Years (Washington, DC: US
Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2014), accessed August 29, 2022, http://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20140904nkel-atrocity-preventionreport.pdf.
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Image 2. The bar at the UN Delegate’s Lounge, Lake Success, NY.
Source: UN Online Archives

It is at those same social gatherings, outside, not inside the meeting room, where one’s
friends catch wind of what is going to occur the following day in committee, and plan counter
measures. Over and again, Lemkin’s most ardent ally in this great game of rumors and schemes
and plans and counterplans, was the entire Egyptian delegation, followed by the Indian,
Pakistani, Saudi, and Filipino delegations, and his dear friends, the Chilean diplomat and poet
Gabriela Mistral, and the Chinese born novelist and diplomat Pearl Buck, who both worked
hard to maintain Chinese and Latin American support for the passage of the UNGC.
But not all of this backroom talk was bad. Ann Newland from New Zealand, Dana
Wilcox from Canada, and Herbert Evatt from Australia helped Lemkin identify sympathetic
individuals in other delegations, and circumvented their own governments’ early opposition to
the convention. American diplomats, namely the progressive and labor stalwart Adlai
Stevenson, a committed internationalist, helped Lemkin persuade in uential people in
Washington. Stevenson arranged for Lemkin to meet Eleanor Lansing Dulles, who convinced
her brothers Allen and John Foster Dulles to support the UNGC. John Foster Dulles had been an
important gure during the drafting of the UN Charter, and generally supported the UNGC as
a symbol of America’s international commitments. But, as soon as the US delegation signed the
UNGC in 1948, John Foster Dulles became a leading voice urging the US Senate not to ratify the
treaty. He most certainly is one of the statesmen whom Lemkin describes as “living in perpetual
sin with history” and “treating life like currency in a bank.”
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Gender and the Betrayal of the Women’s NGO’s
I want to thank Federman for calling attention to the gendered aspects of this story. It matters
that Lemkin knew the most ardent supporters of outlawing genocide in Western governments’
delegations were the women members of those delegations. Lemkin presented himself to them
as a longtime advocate of women’s rights by highlighting the instances in Axis Rule where he
documented German crimes consistent with what we would now call sexual violence and
gendered crimes. Women’s NGOs at the UN invited Lemkin to speak, often during women-only
meetings where survivors shared their experiences of sexual assault committed by German
soldiers. Without fail, Lemkin reminded these audiences that he tried to get the Allies at
Nuremberg to prosecute crimes he documented in Axis Rule, such as Germany issuing
payments to women who were raped by German soldiers to incentivize the birth of “children
with Germanic blood.” Federman is right to say explicitly what I merely implied in my book:
that Lemkin did not care that much about how sexual and gender-based violence t into the
eventual law against genocide. He just wanted the support of the women’s NGOs.
As Lemkin says in his autobiography, there would be no UNGC if it were not for the
women’s NGOs. For instance, it was US congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas, whom
Lemkin met in 1945, who rst introduced Lemkin to Adlai Stevenson on the US delegation. It
was only after Douglas convinced Stevenson of the merits of a law against genocide that
Stevenson opened the door to channels of in uence inside the US government, including the
Dulles family. With Stevenson’s introduction, Lemkin sent a telegram to the US Ambassador to
the UN, Warren Austin, urging him to support the convention so the US could present itself as
taking the lead in humanitarian affairs. Knowing that Austin was a “deeply religious”
Congregationalist Christian—a denomination with ties to the temperance, abolitionist, and
women’s suffrage reform movements in the US—Lemkin emphasized to him the progressive
aspects of a genocide convention and its importance for women’s rights (incidentally, Turkey
supported the UNGC as a symbol of its commitments to women’s rights). Lemkin’s persuasion
worked, and his ability to frame the convention within the tradition of progressivism won the
support the former president of the World Alliance of Women, Margery Corbett Ashby, who
organized a private gathering of women from around the world to discuss genocide.
In the opening days of the General Assembly in 1946, after Ashby’s women’s meeting,
Lemkin asked Ashby to introduce him to the chair of the Indian delegation, Vijaya Lakshmi
Pandit. India at the time was not yet technically free of British rule. Pandit was won over by
Lemkin’s idea that genocide was a colonial crime, and she gave Lemkin the fth and nal
signature he needed to bring a resolution to write a genocide convention to the oor of the
General Assembly for debate. Believing a genocide convention would uphold what “Gandhi
worked for,” Pandit claimed that Lemkin’s “concept of oneness” out of “many races and
creeds,” was a principle “we in India live by” and “our philosophers preached.”16
The nal de nition of genocide, in 1948, is largely a betrayal of these advocates’ goals.
While “forced removal of children” and “imposing measures intended to prevent births” were
included as acts of genocide in Article II of the convention, “forced impregnation” (an
unfortunate euphemism for rape), “forced marriage,” “prevention of marriage,” and “forced
divorce” were excluded. Let me be clear: forced abortions can be legally recognized acts of
genocide under the UNGC, but not rape. Ultimately, I found no answers as to why these aspects
of gendered violence did not make it into the nal text of the UNGC. Not a single document I
found could help me explain why preventing births made it to the negotiating table, but rape
did not. Not once did I ever nd any evidence that Lemkin pushed or advocated for forced
marriage or rape to be enumerated in the acts legally constituting genocide. Eliding this history
prevents honest conversations about why violence against women was erased from the legal
de nition of genocide. For what it is worth, it also shuts down conversation on the signi cant

Raphael Lemkin, Totally Unof cial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin, ed. Donna-Lee Frieze (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2013), 123–126.
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role the women’s NGOs played in pushing the convention onto the UN agenda in the
place.

rst

Corporate Responsibility, Economic Con ict, and Collective Justice
With regards to Federman’s question about how the history of the UNGC and the Nuremberg
trials shape our treatment of transnational corporations, I do not have a good answer. I would
love for someone who knows more about Franz Neumann to answer for me. Let me explain.
In 1942, Lemkin was hired as chief consultant on the US Board of Economic Warfare
and Foreign Economic Administration. Lemkin, at the time, was a well-known expert on
economic con ict and international nance law. He had just published, in 1939, a well-received
book in French on the way currency exchanges and international commerce caused con icts
between states, followed by a Swedish language book in 1941 on the way totalitarian regimes
laundered money and manipulated currency exchanges to undermine the economies of social
groups they sought to subjugate. At the Board of Economic Warfare, Lemkin befriended Franz
Neumann and met Otto Kirchheimer (and possibly Herbert Marcuse).
Holocaust scholars know Franz Neumann as the author of Behemoth, an early and
in uential study of the economic basis of the Nazi regime, and the Ph.D. advisor of Raul
Hilberg, one of the rst Holocaust scholars. Neumann’s book took seriously the role of
economic power in the evolution of the German government and the rise of Nazi terror. He
argued that the authoritarian nature of the Nazi regime was a façade, and the German
government used terror and violence for the advantage of arbitrary social groups. For example,
Neumann argued, the con scation of Jewish property primarily served the interests of large
capitalist companies such as the steel company Thyssen or the industrial conglomerate
Mannesmann.
Political theorists know Neumann, Kirschheimer, and Marcuse as social democratic
German Jewish social scientists who ed Germany in 1933 and contributed to the growth of
Critical Theory when they linked up with Max Horkheimer’s Institute for Social Research in
New York City.17 During the Second World War, Neumann, Kirchheimer, and Marcuse were
employed by the US government’s Research and Analysis Branch of the Of ce for Strategic
Services, and by 1942 Neumann and Lemkin were working together in the same of ce of the US
Board of Economic Warfare. At the beginning of the Nuremberg trials, US chief prosecutor
Robert Jackson relied heavily on the work of Neumann, Kirchheimer, Marcuse, and Lemkin to
understand the structure of the German government under Nazi administration.
I mention this because Neumann, Lemkin, and Aron Trainin—the same Trainin I will
discuss in my comments on Max Pensky’s essay—were the authors of the three most important
contemporaneous books used by the Nuremberg prosecutors as sources of facts and
documentation about German atrocities. All three were present for the Nuremberg trials and
in uential in their own way. So, I would love to see someone who knows more about Neumann
take up this question of Nuremberg and the legacy of corporate responsibility. Behemoth, a book
about the corporate and economic underpinnings of the horrors we now call the Holocaust,
played a major role in shaping the thinking of the prosecutors at the Nuremberg tribunals.
Lemkin, however, inverted Neumann’s thesis on the relationship between mass
violence and economic power. Where Neumann saw the destruction of peoples as a function of
economics, speci cally a corrupt relationship between a government that committed genocide
to enrich national industries that nanced the government, Lemkin instead saw economics as a
tool for the destruction of peoples (and, thus, punishable as an act of genocide).
This discussion of corporate responsibility leads to Federman’s questions of individual
and collective responsibility. She asks, if genocide prevention requires collective action and
genocide itself, mass participation, how then does accountability become singular? In other

Alexa Stiller, “The Mass Murder of the European Jews and the Concept of ‘Genocide’ in the Nuremberg Trials:
Reassessing Raphaël Lemkin’s Impact,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 1 (2019), 144–172.
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words, why do we punish individuals for the crime of genocide when genocide, so clearly, is a
social process requiring mass participation to carry out?
I do not have a good answer to this. Lemkin thought collectivities could be guilty of
genocide, but he believed legal responsibility should be individualized to avoid group
demonization. My personal sense is that collective accountability is important, but retributive
justice would be a poor mechanism for collective accountability. So, I would vote for restorative
justice processes, if we are talking about collective accountability for genocide.
In response to Federman’s question about whether the UNGC, as written, prevented the
Holocaust—I will take the bait and play around in counterfactual guesswork! No.
On the one hand, there was broad agreement amongst the great powers that genocide
should be de ned as closely as possible to the German case to prevent the law against genocide
from applying to the types of mass violence and oppression their governments could be
accused of committing. That is a sobering thought. They were explicit (in sources not found in
the travaux préparatoires) that they wanted to support a treaty outlawing this new idea of
genocide so they could show their domestic audiences that they cared about doing something
good for humanity in the wake of the war, but they did not want the treaty to cover their actions
or have mechanisms for enforcement. I am convinced, therefore, that efforts to cripple the
convention won out—something Max Pensky brings up in his essay, and Dirk Moses has
written about in The Problems of Genocide.
Response to Professor A. Dirk Moses: On Permanent Security and the Fallacy of the Political
Will Thesis
Dirk Moses asked me if a new intellectual history of genocide needs to transcend the
assumption about its humanization of domestic and international affairs?
Yes. But how? I think it begins by getting scholars to stop calling Lemkin the author of
the UNGC. He was not. Lemkin felt the nal de nition of genocide established by the UN treaty
was largely a betrayal of his most cherished principles, purposefully awed, and morally
compromised. While he kept up a brave face and publicly celebrated the UNGC, his private
writings express despair and disappointment. “The fact is that the rain of my work fell on a
fallow plain,” Lemkin wrote in his autobiography, “only this rain was a mixture of the blood
and tears of eight million innocent people throughout the world. Included also were the tears of
my parents and my friends.”18 When “the lights in Palais de Chaillot went out,” he wrote, “the
delegates shook hands hastily with one another and disappeared into the winter mists of
Paris.”19 The UNGC, he concluded, was now in the hands of the world’s politicians and
statesmen—people “who lived in perpetual sin with history” and could hardly be trusted with
“the lives of entire nations.”20
Furthermore, Lemkin was not consistent with anything, which makes it dif cult to
build a system of knowledge on his work—especially a system of humanitarian praxis. It is very
telling that, after 1948, Lemkin used his de nition of genocide from Axis Rule when he wrote his
social scienti c and historical manuscripts, and used the UN legal de nition when he was
making legal arguments. When he shamefully, publicly denounced Black Americans who
accused the US of genocide, Lemkin cited the legal de nition to assert their claims did not
amount to genocide.21 Yet, in his unpublished manuscripts on the history of genocide and
genocide in the social sciences, Lemkin supported the idea that genocide was committed against
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Lemkin, Totally Unof cial, 132.
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Ibid., 178.
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Ibid., 115.
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William Patterson, ed., We Charge Genocide: The Historic Petition to the United Nations for Relief from a Crime of the United
States Government Against the Negro People (New York: International Publishers, [1952] 1970). The book was a case
study in Lemkin’s system, and even included a robust study of the economics of genocide against Black
Americans. See Daniel E. Solomon, “The Black Freedom Movement and the Politics of the Anti-Genocide Norm in
the United States, 1951–1967,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 1 (2019), 130–143.
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Black Americans (from slavey to Jim Crow) by citing his de nition of genocide in Axis Rule. The
racist hypocrisy is clear. But it also tells me three things. First, Lemkin understood that the legal
de nition of genocide was different than his rst de nition of genocide. Second, he felt that his
de nition in Axis Rule was superior conceptually, but he knows it was not the law. And, third,
Lemkin changes his de nition depending on his audiences, picking and choosing de nitions of
genocide to t his purposes. This certainly undercuts a great deal of the notion that “genocide”
is a concrete, moral, and humanitarian category.
I would add one more thought in response to the question of “how do we transcend the
assumption about the UNGC’s humanization of domestic and international affairs.” While
many genocide scholars and anti-genocide activists uphold the UNGC as a kind of moral
document, Lemkin knew the convention was a product of post-war geopolitics. At the end of
the day, it was a treaty colonial powers could tolerate (and even use to advance their interests).
The implication is that if scholars adopt the legal de nition of genocide as their working
de nition of genocide, or even if they take the legal de nition as an ethical or moral concept,
they implicitly align their work with a concept that was designed to erase from its boundaries
the vast majority of the kinds of violence, repression, and oppression being committed by the
major powers at the time the convention was negotiated.22
I would agree with Moses, therefore, that the armed con icts, wars, and mass violence
of the 20th and 21st centuries make a mockery of the UNGC. I might have chosen a different
word than “mockery,” but I will take the bait and use the term. The conventional liberal view, as
Moses points out, is that the UNGC culminated in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court and the Responsibility to Protect norm in the early 2000s, and promoted a broad
expansion of human rights norms more generally. Progress all around, it would seem. So why
do they fail, and why does genocide still occur?
Stated crudely, the liberal-interventionalist argument suggests that the UNGC and the
body of relevant international treaties and laws (i.e., the Rome Statute) and multilateral
institutions (i.e., the ICC) are perfectly ne; the problem is those ckle policy makers and
unambitious civil servants who do not want to jeopardize their careers by taking morally right
actions to prevent genocide. In other words, the problem is political will. I do not think this is a
very compelling argument.23 The problem is not a lack of will.
As Moses has demonstrated in The Problems of Genocide, the victorious powers at the UN
constructed an international legal regime that normalized and legalized many different ways
that modern states kill people in the name of permanent security.24 It matters that Stalin was a
much more important and in uential co-author of the UNGC than Lemkin. And, the Soviets
were on the same page as the Americans when it came to what they wanted to achieve with the
UNGC: they wanted a law that could not be used against them and their allies, but could still be
used against their geopolitical adversaries.25 As Moses’ work has shown, the governments of
the Atlantic alliance and the Soviets then used the UNGC as moral cover when confronted by
human rights activists, minimizing their atrocities by pointing to their support for the UNGC
and comparing themselves favorably to the Nazis they defeated.
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The four main English language journals in genocide studies (Journal of Genocide Research, Genocide Studies and
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I furthermore agree with Moses’ argument that Lemkin played a role in naturalizing
Western empires and modernizing liberal states by repudiating the Nazi biological conception
of race and embracing a cultural version of this same idea. In this way, I do think the UNGC
become a handy way for Western liberals to claim their states’ violence and oppression was not
genocidal. Distinguishing armed con ict from genocide, and then declaring genocide a moral
evil, thus implies that armed con ict is a lesser evil (maybe even good). For example, the US
military’s mass murder of civilians with napalm and the use of experimental chemical weapons
the US Department of Defense intentionally added to defoliants to cause inherited genetic
mutations in plants, animals, and people, and then lied about when US soldiers started having
babies with birth defects—and the many other horrors unleashed during the United States’
imperial, predatory, and aggressive war in Vietnam—all of this could now be presented as good
(or at least not evil) when contrasted with the German killing of civilians with Zyklon B. We
now nd ourselves at an absurd formulation:
Q: Why is the German killing of civilians by cyanide-based
gasses evil, but not the American killing of civilians by sticky
ammable petroleum jellies and DNA-altering chemicals?
A: Oh, right. Because one was genocide and the other was not.
Yes, this makes a mockery of the UNGC.
I also agree with Moses that the UNGC rei es the idea that there is a tidy relationship
between nation and state. But I do not blame Lemkin. The whole UN Charter does that, as does
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In fact, I like Lemkin’s formulation of genocide in
Axis Rule. His de nition was simple, and easy to use if you are a social scientist. Genocide was a
“colonial process” with two phases: rst, the destruction of the national patterns of the oppressed, and
second, the imposition of the national patterns of the oppressor. No nation states there.
I do an exercise with my students where I show them an image of page 79 of Axis Rule,
juxtaposed with the UNGC. First, I have them talk about what Lemkin writes on page 79 of Axis
Rule:
This new word, coined by the author to denote an old practice
in its modern development, is made from the ancient Greek
word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide (killing), thus
corresponding in its formation to such words as tyrannicide,
homicide, infanticide, etc. Generally speaking, genocide does
not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation,
except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a
nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of
different actions aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of
annihilating the groups themselves ... Genocide is directed
against the national group as an entity, and the actions
involved are directed against individuals, not in their
individual capacity, but as members of the national group.
... Genocide has two phases: one, the destruction of the national
pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the
national pattern of the oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may
be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to
remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal of the
population and the colonization of the area by the oppressor’s
own nationals.
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Next, compare Axis Rule to the text of the UNGC:
Article I: The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under
international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.
Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately in icting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.
There is a lot you can pull out with your students. Just think about the breadth of
different types of oppression that could be included under the rubric of “destruction of national
patterns of the oppressed,” compared to the ve speci c acts of genocide enumerated in Article
II of the UNGC.
This is why rape is not an act of genocide, but preventing births is. (This led to the
famous determination in the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia that
rape was an act of genocide in so far as rape constituted serious bodily or mental harm, if that
harm was directly linked to an intention to destroy a protected group). I never found any
evidence of how and why the depravation of food and the con scation of property were excised
from the draft lists of possible acts of genocide. But they disappeared by mid-1947. For sure the
Soviets had a hand in this. Forced removal of civilians, deportations, and population transfers
were removed as acts of genocide because of such abuses were occurring in Syria, Lebanon, and
Palestine, and in the con icts that emerged in the aftermaths of the British mandate systems.
The US, Canada, and Sweden worried that forced removals might also apply to their handling
of indigenous peoples, and so their delegations were more than happy to exclude this as an act
of genocide. On and on it went.
While we are at it, notice that Article II establishes that genocide is a crime committed
against only four kinds of social groups—national, ethnical, racial, and religious groups.
Therefore, an attempt to destroy “in whole or in part” other types of social groups is not legally
genocide (such as LGBTQ+ people; economic groups like peasants, capitalists, and communists;
political groups; successionist insurgents or rebels; college students; people who like certain
kinds of music; or drug addicts). There were delegations at the UN who argued that it was
sometimes necessary to destroy whole groups—such as “backwards peoples” and “cannibals.”
The difference between the 1948 UN de nition and Lemkin’s de nition in Axis Rule
(written in early 1942 and published in 1944) appears stark when we parse what Lemkin meant
by “national groups.” The word “nation” in the UNGC is, almost as a rule, interpreted by
English language scholars and international lawyers in the spirit of the UN Charter and the
system of nation-states that de nes the UN system. But Lemkin’s idea of a nation was not the
idea of a nation that emerges from the legacies of the American and French revolution, which is
then established in English and French language political theory and everyday language.
(Lemkin’s idea of a nation was most certainly not the idea of a nation that emerged in German
political theory, either. He believed German Romanticism paved the way for the Holocaust).
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Lemkin’s idea of “nation” was largely synonymous with what we now call “social
groups” in today’s parlance. This de nition of nations is so broad that it would have included,
in Lemkin’s own words, “those who play at cards.” Lemkin, quite literally, believed that people
who shared similar tastes in art, people who were part of the same labor union, people who
gambled, all constituted national groups. Moreover, he believed that individuals belonged to
many nations at once, and that genocide could be committed without physically killing a single
individual, but rather by imposing types of repression and oppression intended to eradicate
different types of national patterns in a social or political community. Genocide, for Lemkin,
could even be constituted by a government’s attempt to eliminate criminals (his rst three
books discussed the way the Italian and Soviet penal system created the idea of enemy nations,
and in the USSR, the way this directed the force of the state towards the eradication of enemy
national patterns amongst the domestic population).26
Lemkin wanted a law to protect the broad foundation of plural, diverse, and tolerant
societies by outlawing an expansive array of state-backed (or state-tolerated) oppressive,
repressive, and coercive actions against almost any social group imaginable. What Lemkin
called genocide often went hand-in-hand with the violent processes that accompanied the
founding of nation-states. This is what excited delegates from formerly colonized and small
states, including India and Pakistan, who were busy accusing each other of committing
genocide, but supported the UNGC because they thought it would prevent a reoccurrence of
British-era horrors. This is what excited the women’s NGOs at the UN. But much of the violence
nation-states commit against their own populations was written out of the law which, yes,
naturalizes the kinds of violence states commit in the name of the security of their nation.
I want to conclude with Moses’ re ection that:
On the one hand, [genocide’s conceptual] proximity to the
Holocaust (history’s largest race hate crime) means that states
claim their attacks on minorities do not violate the UNGC
because security imperatives rather than racial animus
motivate them; on the other hand, their victims insist they are
victims on genocidal racialization. The law that shields the
perpetrator is also a rhetorical weapon of the weak, meaning
that the question of genocide is a structural feature of an
incoherent global order of stateless nations seeking political
independence. This unresolvable tension was built into the
concept by Lemkin and his successors.
I think this is the result of at least two competing forces during the UNGC drafting
process (there were more than two forces, of course). The rst was the delegations representing
powerful state actors who wanted a treaty that could not be used against them. The second was
the activists from an impressive collection of humanitarian movements and activist
communities who really did want a treaty that served the interests of the weak. What emerged
was a UNGC that turned out to be a powerful rhetorical tool for activist and survivor
communities, but an intentionally convoluted and largely unenforceable treaty.
Response to Professor Max Pensky: On the Law of International Commerce, Norms, and
Marginal People
Max Pensky re ects on the signi cance of “a small group of Jewish legal theorists and jurists”
that Lemkin was part of, who were “rooted in the shifting and violent political universe of
eastern Europe, in what was, alternately, East Prussia, Poland, and Ukraine.” He continues:

Rafał Lemkin, Kodeks Karny Republik Sowieckich (Warsaw: Wyd. Sem. Prawa kar., 1926); Rafał Lemkin, Kodeks Karny
Rosji Sowieckiej 1927 (Warsaw: Sklad Glowny w Ksiegarni F. Hoesicka, 1928); Rafał Lemkin, Kodeks Karny
Faszystowski Włochy (Warsaw: Nakladem Ksiegarni F. Hoesicka, 1929).
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“Their experiences of marginalization and persecution, of cultural and physical vulnerability
under capricious political authority, and ultimately of the destruction of their families and their
world, appropriated the concepts and mechanisms of international law with the goal of
transforming a collection of treaties and customs, largely designed to lubricate international
commerce, into a demand for the protection of individuals from obliteration by their own
political authorities.”
There are two parts of this observation I want to unpack. One is the Jewish intellectual,
social, cultural, and political foundations of this small group of international lawyers working
to establish a coherent system of international criminal justice—which included treaties to
establish international laws and international courts, and corresponding legislation within the
domestic architecture of states. The second is that the areas where these systems of international
criminal justice and international laws worked best was in the area commerce, trade, and travel.
You cannot have passports and currency exchange clearing houses without an implied system
of international law.
Yes, Lemkin was committed to the awed minority rights tradition of the League of
Nations—though he held some important reservations.
Yes, Lemkin was deeply concerned with the rise of violent, extremist, and totalitarian
regimes in Europe (from the political right and left), which employed unprecedented terror
upon civilians in the service of nationalist agendas.
Yes, by the late 1930s, Lemkin was a committed anti-colonialist who connected the
experience of minorities and oppressed peoples in Eastern Europe, especially Jewish people, to
the experience of people forced to live under the brutal conditions of colonial subjugation.
However, above all of this, Lemkin made a small fortune as a tax lawyer specializing in
international nancial law, and owned a thriving practice with individual and corporate clients
across Poland. He was also a well-regarded scholar of international economic and nance law,
who dabbled in minority protections and violence prevention as a side project. So, it always
made sense to me that in Lemkin’s work on genocide, we see him move seamlessly from
international commercial law to international laws protecting vulnerable peoples.
His 1933 formulation of “barbarity and vandalism” was the precursor to his idea of
genocide. (Barbarity referred to physical attacks on groups with the intention of destroying the
group; vandalism referred to attacks on the group’s cultural symbols and social institutions). In
the paper where he worked out these ideas, he frames barbarity and vandalism within a larger
conversation of international efforts to outlaw the spreading of vegetable contagions and
protecting underwater communication cables—matters of international commerce that terrorist
acts can disrupt.27
While writing Axis Rule, Lemkin explicitly synthesizes his ideas on barbarity and
vandalism into a new singular concept of genocide. The only major difference between his 1933
ideas and his idea of genocide is that he described barbarity and vandalism as acts, but he turns
genocide into a type of con ict. And, thus, he attempts to turn an entire type of con ict into a
crime. Con icts are, by de nition, social processes that involve lots of different kinds of acts.
To nd a way to criminalize an entire social process, Lemkin had to extend his work in
the 1920s and 1930s that dealt with preventing the domestic causes of international con icts
(including violent con icts) that arose from friction between nation-states’ competing systems
of nancial law that governed their respective nationals’ engagement in international
transactions. Lemkin applied these frameworks to his work on Soviet terror and nationalities
con icts, the rise of European totalitarianism, the legacies of colonization, the violence and
repression across Eastern Europe that targeted Jews and sought to shatter Jewish communities,
and the kinds of oppression against vulnerable and marginalized groups that de ned the
intertwined systems of state power and international nance. Then, in the late 1930s and early

Raphaël Lemkin, “Les Actes Constituant un Danger General (Interétatique) Considerés Comme Delits du Droit des
Gens,” in Actes de la Vème Conférence Internationale Pour l’Uni cation du Droit Pénal, Madrid 14–20 Octobre 1933, eds.
Jimenez de Asua et al., (Paris: A. Pedone, 1935), 48–56.
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1940s, Lemkin wrote two books on how totalitarian governments used economic policy to wage
con ict against groups they sought to socially annihilate.
The rst was published in France in 1939, after Poland was invaded by Germany and
the USSR. Lemkin was correcting the manuscript proofs as he was eeing to Sweden. When he
arrived, he lectured at the University of Stockholm on chapters from his newly published The
Regulation of International Payments: Comparative Law Treatises on Currencies, Clearing and Payment
Agreements, and Legal Con icts.28 Written in French, the book made Lemkin a well-known expert
on economic law and con ict. After learning Swedish in less than two months, Lemkin decided
he would write the follow-up volume in his new language. This book, Currency Exchanges and
Clearing House Regulations, analyzed the way totalitarian governments manipulated
international money laundering and currency exchange rates to level economic devastation on
peoples they sought to conquer or destroy.29 In Sweden, Lemkin also began collecting
documents on the German occupation of Europe that would form the basis of Axis Rule, which
he began writing in 1941 at Duke University in the US. Lemkin would transpose almost 30
pages of his French and Swedish books, in almost word for word translation, into his English
language book, Axis Rule. This is why, in 1942, Lemkin was hired as chief consultant on the US
Board of Economic Warfare and Foreign Economic Administration, and why he got along so
well with Franz Neumann.
What makes this background curious is that, by appropriating mechanisms of
international law that were “largely designed to lubricate international commerce,” and
applying them to efforts “to protect individuals from obliteration by their own political
authorities,” to borrow Pensky’s phrasing, Lemkin gets himself denounced as an enemy of the
Bolshevik Revolution in 1935 by none other than Stalin’s feared henchman who orchestrated the
show trials: Andrey Vishinsky.30 Vyshinsky, the procurator general of the Russian SFSR at the
time, read Lemkin’s 1933 paper and believed Lemkin’s grouping of barbarity and vandalism
with crimes such as terrorism, slavery, and spreading vegetable contagions was a ruse.
In the introduction of a book by Aron Trainin, Vyshinsky accused Lemkin of proposing
ideologically and politically motivated laws to target the Soviet Union under the pretense of
creating a neutral, apolitical body of uni ed international laws. The uni cation movement that
Lemkin was part of never mentioned actual struggles “with international crooks and charlatans
of any stripe, not the ght with the bandits like Al Capone,” Vyshinsky wrote, but instead
focused on abstract concepts like “terrorism.” The concept of terrorism these Western liberals
claimed to be ghting, he continued, “turned into the central problem of the bourgeois
uni cation [of international law] movement” because it created the basis for limiting state
sovereignty and “removing the state from its pedestal.” Vyshinsky went on to add that “no
evasions and intricacies of such uni ers as Lemkin, who tried again to disguise the true purpose
of the criminal interventionists with references to ‘vandalism’ and ‘barbarism,’ can mislead
anybody” because “the true meaning of the uni ers’ efforts is to legally and politically justify
the right of the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie to intervene in the internal affairs of any state,
under the pretext that they are concerned for the fate of ‘culture and civilization.’”31
In 1946, Lemkin found himself squaring off against Vyshinksy again, who was now the
Soviet ambassador to the UN. Lemkin primarily used the Czechoslovakian diplomat Jan
Masaryk, whom he befriended early on, as an intermediary between himself and Vyshinsky. But
that line of communication breaks down around 1947 when con icts between the Czechs and
28
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Soviets emerge over the Czech government’s announcement it would join the Marshall Plan
(that is when I stopped nding letters between Czech and Soviet diplomats on behalf of
Lemkin). And, in March 1948, Masaryk mysteriously fell off a balcony at the Czech foreign
ministry.32 Did Lemkin and Vyshinsky ever speak or communicate directly? I am not sure. The
Soviets had just assassinated his friend and made it look like a suicide—and now Lemkin had to
engage with a Soviet delegation at the UN whose lead ambassador had already denounced him
as a bourgeois enemy of the Soviet state.
This is what makes Penksy’s conversation on Lemkin’s marginality at the UN so
fascinating. Weiss-Wendt’s work has shown that the Soviets in 1946 saw Lemkin as an
unemployed has-been who could be ignored. Lemkin had slipped from being a central gure in
the realm of Eastern European international lawyers during the interwar years, to a marginal
gure at the UN where he did not represent a government—he just showed up and hung out by
the couches. But this marginality, as Pensky called it, turned out to be his greatest asset.
Norms & The Purpose of the Law
I want to use this to transition to Pensky’s comments about the norms of international law.
Lemkin was right about the importance of norms, and the Soviets should have taken him more
seriously. Pensky writes:
The legal route toward a global norm restraining sovereign
attacks against a state’s own domestic population never lost
sight of the fact that norms … only exert an effect on would-be
perpetrators … if the norm succeeds in catalyzing an
international political shift of values, priorities, and interests
strong enough to change potential genocidaire’s calculations of
cost and bene t … As a marginal gure, Lemkin was also
marginalized from the kind of political engagement that would
no doubt have proven useful once his plan for legal protection
of vulnerable groups had to go through the sausage factory of
international political bargaining.
I think this is a fantastic argument to make, which is why I quote it at length. I would
love for someone who is an expert on Russian schools of international law and legal practice to
take up this question. There is a dissertation hiding in plain sight here, which can link Lemkin’s
legal training to the Russian tradition of legalism, legal practice, and international law.
I am thinking now of Peter Holquist’s excellent work on what he calls “The Russian
Empire as a Civilized State,” which explores the paradox that the Russian empire was
domestically not even close to being governed by the rule of law; yet, from 1870 to 1917, it was
the Russian government that most championed the cause that states be brought under a system
of codi ed international law.33 Holquist has a brilliant analysis of how Russia conducted the
1877–79 Russo-Turkish War against the backdrop of their contemporaneous efforts to codify the
laws of war, and the curious ways norms of conduct make their way into state practice. In my
book, I wrote about how Lemkin was in uenced by of a number of Russian-led efforts in
international law (admittedly, without the sophistication of an expert on Russian legal
traditions). And I would make the argument (capriciously maybe) that, as a lawyer and jurist,
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The Marshall Plan was the US’s multimillion-dollar aid program for postwar Europe. Masaryk was the one who
formally indicated Czechoslovakia’s interest in participating late in 1947, and personally told the Soviets. In
February 1948, the Soviets were widely suspected as orchestrating a communist coup in Czechoslovakia, deposing
President Benes. Masaryk was one of the few non-communists who remained in government. On March 10, 1948,
Masaryk fell out of a third-story window at the Foreign Ministry, which the Communist dominated Czech
government ruled death by suicide.
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Lemkin was more indebted to Russian traditions of the law and legal practice than he was to
Western European traditions, especially British and American.
Lemkin viewed all law as intertwined with politics and power, so he did not see the
point in pretending the law could be independent. He also believed the power of the law was
that it was a pedagogical vector for inspiring critical re ection across a society (from common
folk to the rulers of states, and everyone in between), and thus the law was an agent for
provoking change to a society’s moral fabric. Lemkin explicitly compared international law in
the 20th century to poetry, literature, drama, paintings, sculpture, dance, music, the Jewish,
Christian, and Islamic holy texts, and religion more generally. The classes he taught at Yale
University law school drove his dean and his colleagues nuts, who complained in their
evaluations of his teaching that his law syllabus was mostly literature, history, and shallow
moral theory (they also complained that he spent more than an average professor’s annual
salary making international calls from the department telephone).
International law was no different than novels and the Bible, Lemkin believed, in the
sense that they were the creative products of humanity which people imbued with powerful
symbolic value. As such, religion, art, and international law did not re ect prior existing
universal moral truths, Lemkin wrote. They created them. So, if people create their own moral
systems, why not attempt to change the world’s moral system by creating a law that says
genocide is bad?
Lemkin is very clear that genocide was something that had been celebrated as
something good. It was not called genocide in the past—it was called victory, heroism, progress.
Lemkin even went so far as to argue that the Hebrew, Christian, and Islamic texts created
justi cations for genocide when it came to the elimination or destruction of god’s enemies or
non-believers. He saw international law, accompanied with anti-genocide movements in the
arts and literature, as the starting point for efforts to cause a normative shift against genocide in
world society. That was Lemkin’s theory of change.
In this sense, Lemkin had a lot in common with Vyshinsky, who was a great 20th
century innovator of murderous show trials, which were never supposed to be fair, but rather,
were highly choreographed dramatic demonstrations for public consumption. If Vyshinksy
wanted to use domestic law to teach Soviet functionaries, communist party members, and the
general population to never go against Stalin, then Lemkin wanted to use international law to
teach people around the world that genocide was a bad thing and should never be committed. I
think these two adversaries shared a legal theory—that the law’s one and only power was its
ability to create and reify norms.
Lemkin might have had a point. Between 1946 and 1947, the South African delegation
warned that the convention was “dangerous” where “backwards people” and “uncivilized
people” were concerned because it would acknowledge that the systems of government of
African peoples had an equal right to exist. The New Zealand delegation brought to the oor
their concerns that the genocide convention would criminalize the only appropriate way of
dealing with “cannibals.” The Brazilian delegation said outlawing genocide would be a
genocide against Latin Americans because it was Latin American culture to mass murder
political opponents. All of this can actually be found in the interstices of the UN travaux
préparatoires.
They said this stuff in committee meetings, openly. Why? Because there were no norms
in place against saying things like this. To some degree, this illustrates Lemkin’s point. In polite
society, you cannot say such things anymore. It is considered crude and rude, and one is
shunned. The only political gures who utter such statements, some 80 years after the passage
of the UNGC, are professional provocateurs who use these statements to create a sense that they
are alternatives to the status quo. Norms matter. Clearly, though, the UNGC did not exactly
create the kinds of world-wide anti-genocide norms that Lemkin thought it would. Pensky’s
observation here sets the stage for Straus’ question on whether Lemkin can help genocide
studies solve these and other problems with genocide.
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Response to Professor Scott Straus: On Culture and the Place of Lemkin in Genocide Studies
The legal de nition of genocide is so convoluted and narrow that it is almost impossible to
de ne anything, legally, as genocide, Pensky writes. Yet, the common uses of genocide are so
broad that anything can be a genocide. This opens the door for what Moses described as
victims’ groups appropriating the word genocide to present their experience of oppression as
serious and a legitimate concern for global civil society. “What’s increasingly hard to locate in
this bipolar development,” Penksy concludes, “is precisely the sane and motivating middle
ground, the promise of law as both expression and enforcement of a global consensus that
demands enforceable limits on state power, that motivated both Lemkin and the rest of his
cohort in the rst place.”
I think one possible option for a “sane middle ground” is Straus’ formulation of group
selective mass categorical violence, which (I think) he most clearly articulates in The Making and
Unmaking of Nations: War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa.34
The Problem of Violence
Straus’ concept allows us to connect genocide to other forms of group-selective violence and
think more broadly about genocide in a way Lemkin rst imagined. Lemkin was serious when
he told reporters during interviews that he is a member of many nations. Let me say this again,
Lemkin believed his de nition of nations would include social groups such as people who liked
playing particular card games, or belonged to labor unions, or liked certain kinds of art and
poetry. I think Straus’ conceptualization of group-selective categorical mass violence would
correspond almost directly to Lemkin’s notion in Axis Rule that genocide was the destruction of
nations (where nations basically signi ed any social group). Lemkin’s and Straus’ formulations,
therefore, allow us to talk about genocides of people with disabilities and genocides against
political parties, whereas the UNGC does not.
That is important. Today, none of the following would be genocide, legally, because the
targeted social groups are not one of the four protected groups:
• An attempt by a state or non-state actor to eradicate LGBTQ+
people from society;35
• An attempt by a political party in power to commit mass
murder against opposition party members and eliminate the
party;36
• A counter insurgency campaign against terrorists that
includes the disappearance, mass torture, and murder of
peasants;37 or,
• A campaign by national police to eradicate a country’s drug
addicts.38
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While there is no international law against “selective mass categorical violence,” readers who are interested to see
how Straus operationalizes his concept in the practice of genocide prevention can check out Scott Straus,
Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention (Washington, DC: US Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2016),
accessed September 30, 2022, https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/reports-and-resources/
fundamentals-of-genocide-and-mass-atrocity-prevention.
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The scholars I cited for each of these bullet points either bend over backwards to make
their case “ t” the legal de nition, or they simply use a different de nition of genocide. I think
“group-selective mass categorical violence” gets us to a better place than the legal de nition of
genocide because it would let us bring together all these cases.
There is another area where Straus and Lemkin come together. When I re-read The
Making and Unmaking of Nations before teaching it this summer, I noticed how Straus’ rich
descriptions of founding narratives resembled Lemkin’s discussions of the importance of
political language in his draft of his un nished manuscript Introduction to the Study of Genocide in
the Social Sciences—especially when Lemkin writes about how a population can come to view
genocide as a moral good when everyday people start incorporating into their own speech the
derogatory language of elites and leaders, who use this language to create support for the wars
they want to ght.
Still, there are two areas where Straus departs from Lemkin. The rst has to do with
what amounts to destruction. Straus considers genocide to be a type of violence—violence that
is group selective (as opposed to indiscriminate killing), group-destructive (rather than
coercive), and large-scale and sustained. Lemkin considers genocide to be a type of con ict that
does not necessarily have to include direct violence. Straus, therefore, is able to zero-in on the
way leaders and elites, who direct group speci c mass violence, pursue genocide as a policy
choice, targeting speci c groups whom they view as dangerous, unable to coopt, or
uncontrollable. Lemkin is not able to do this. Genocide, for Straus, is therefore an outcome of an
escalatory process, which is intertwined dynamically with countless other con icts in a society
or polity. It would follow that genocide prevention, in Straus’ thinking, is about nding
openings for de-escalation in the context of these other con icts.39
When you read Lemkin’s draft manuscripts on genocide and the social sciences, you get
the sense that Lemkin would have de ned as genocide everything that Straus refers to as the
escalatory con icts that set the stage for genocide. This is a consequence of Lemkin’s notion that
genocide was not a type of violence aimed at the destruction of social groups, but a type of
con ict aimed at the destruction of social groups that sometimes was violent. Therefore, when
Lemkin talks about genocide prevention, he is talking about preventing things like mass
murder and, at the same time, preventing things like the destruction of a group’s artistic
creations and the banning of books. The upside of Lemkin’s formulation of genocide is that it
lets us contemplate the wide breath of repression and violence that are involved in long-term
systems of oppression, spanning what Johann Galtung termed direct violence, structural
violence, and cultural violence.40 The downside is that it makes it extremely dif cult to think
about preventing violence, speci cally, because Lemkin presents the causes of genocidal
violence as the same as the causes of other forms of genocidal oppression—such as the changing
of street names, the expropriation of wealth, the use of derogatory names, or the banning
wedding ceremonies.
The Problem of Culture
Finally, Straus points out, one of the fundamental issues that divides genocide studies is the
question of culture. I would agree that Lemkin “was not always a clear thinker,” and we are not
going to resolve this problem by a deep dive into his thinking. So, let us take a deep dive into
his thinking—and let us see how many readers I manage to confuse.
There is this idea out there that the UNGC is important because it protects “culture
bearing groups.” But this phrase was not used by the UN delegates and advocacy NGOs until
late 1947, when it was used to justify one of many compromises to the de nition of genocide. At
the time, the UK was close to successfully killing the entire idea of a genocide convention, and
the US had just succeeded in establishing a narrative that there were two types of genocide,
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physical genocide and cultural genocide, so they could excise the “cultural” bit from the text of
the UNGC under the pretext that “cultural genocide” was less important than “physical
genocide” (and thus prevent the UNGC from applying to the forced assimilation of American
Indians).
As with most things in politics, philosophical justi cations are invented after decisions
have been made. The idea that the UNGC should only protect so-called “culture bearing
groups” turned out to be a convenient excuse that many delegations used to explain why they
cut political groups and economic groups from the list of protected groups. For the US
delegation, it was a handy way of justifying why they wanted to remove things related to
“cultural genocide” from the UNGC—arguing that if “culture bearing groups” were protected,
then there was no need to protect culture.
At the same time, the term “culture bearing groups” allowed humanitarian advocates to
also claim victory in what was otherwise a defeat. Lemkin went along for the ride and adopts
this phrase “culture bearing groups,” using it in his writings between 1947 and 1948 (we can
still nd it in Lemkin’s writings published in 1949). This phrase then gets locked into received
scholarship, especially by scholars who take the travaux préparatoires at face value. From here,
the phrase “culture bearing groups” takes on a life of its own in genocide studies. It is likely
here to stay. I think this is unfortunate.
If Straus is asking me, personally, if political groups (or other so called “non-culture
bearing groups”) should be considered within a rubric on genocide—then my answer is “yes.”
Let me explain. I do not think there is such a thing as culture-bearing groups because I do not
think there is such a thing as “cultural groups” in the rst place. Likewise, I do not think that
any particular group can have one culture, nor do I think individuals can be reduced to culture,
and I certainly do not think “a culture” can be represented by any individual.
If readers are now accusing me of obliterating the concept of culture and turning it into
a completely meaningless word, that would be a fair but inaccurate accusation. I think the
concept of culture, as with the concepts of race and ethnicity, and even the concept of identity,
are steeped in the history of Western modernity. These are not universally accepted or
transhistorical ideas (even though scholars who use these concepts apply them universally and
transhistorically in their academic work). This is why, during genocide prosecutions the ICTR,
the Cambodia war crimes tribunal, and national courts of Argentina all had to try and gure out
what really makes a group an ethnic, national, or religious group. These ideas have histories,
and I am always suspicious of attempts to naturalize these concepts and turn them into
universal human categories.41
Our word “culture” in contemporary English comes from the Middle English usage
denoting the cultivation of land. Middle English borrowed it from the Latin verb cultura,
meaning “to grow” (which is why we use the word culture to describe the growing of bacteria
in yogurt and lab plates). This turned into our current understanding of culture—in the sense of
“manifestations of human intellectual achievement regarded collectively” especially in “the
customs, arts, social institutions, and achievements of a particular nation, people, or other social
group”—because of the in uence of the German Romantic philosopher, Johann Gottfried
Herder. Herder viewed human societies as having their own unique transhistorical traits, or
cultures, that could grow and ourish over time if nurtured properly, or wax, then wane, and
die but never mix (Herder was reviled by Lemkin, who accused the 19th century philosopher of

If I were challenged on this, I would cite Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2006). Yes, Straus uses the category of ethnic group to describe Hutu and Tutsi groups,
when the term doesn’t t neatly into the schema of Bantu languages. However, Straus shows us that what he calls
“ethnicity” or “ethnic con ict” is different in Rwandan local contexts than “ethnicity” and “ethnic con icts”
elsewhere. This is what allows Straus to demonstrate quite clearly that ethnicity drops into a background condition
of the genocide, even though Western observers are primed to see ethnicity as the primary condition. For Straus,
fear, insecurity, and intra-ethnic intimidation (and their local variations) matter much more—and even here these
are conditioned by Rwanda’s state effectiveness, geography, and population density.
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setting the stage for Nazism, despite having some good ideas such as cultural tolerance that the
Nazis ignored).
If I am forced to associate myself with a de nition culture, then I will pick what Clifford
Geertz termed the “webs of meaning” in which we are all suspended. But if we de ne culture
the way Geertz de nes culture, then “destroying” a culture is impossible and the entire logic of
genocide as cultural destruction is non-sensical (however, that does not stop the perpetrators of
genocide from thinking that they want to destroy a culture, and then causing a whole bunch of
suffering and harm as they try to carry out this non-sensical task).
Straus thus asks me: “Should groups marked by a disability be considered protected
groups under the Convention? Should regional groups or gender groups? Do these groups have
a culture? I conclude from the book that Lemkin was not clear on these questions.”
My responses: Yes, I think they should be included. Do they have “a culture”? Maybe,
but that should not matter. And, nally, yes, Lemkin was not clear.
I would advocate for any group-speci c categorical violence to be considered genocide.
This frees us from the symphisian task of trying to gure out what groups are truly human
universal types of groups, and it saves us from the yucky project of trying to rank groups in
importance. Given the diversity of human social life across time and around the world—from
hunter-gather societies and nomads to whatever you would call the global network of pre-teens
who play Minecraft—I do not think we can actually name any kind of social group that is truly
universal. But we know that humans do form social groups. So, why not just say, as Straus and
Lemkin do, that genocide is an attempt to destroy any social group? That way we can be sure
our concept of genocide would also apply to some hellish hypothetical attempt to obliterate
video game players as a group.
The Problem of Culture in Lemkin’s Thought
If we are talking about culture in Lemkin’s thought, things get messy. First, Lemkin did see
cultural destruction as integral to genocide. But he did not call the destruction of culture
genocide, except when cultural destruction was used as a means of destroying a nation. Why?
Because he thought culture was the thing that held nations together.
Confused yet?
Let us go deeper. Lemkin also says the loss of a culture can be a good thing if the
culture is antiquated and does not meet the needs of a nation in the modern world. Across his
writings on Latin American and African cases, Lemkin often considers the disintegration of
culture as progress, not genocide, because he thought cultural change was necessary for saving
nations that were colonized. In fact, Lemkin says, the point of preserving the basis of cultural
diversity is so we can allow people to experience different cultures and therefore be inspired to
change their own nations’ cultures.
Confused yet?
Now, at the same time, Lemkin does not consider it a bad thing if national groups cease
to exist either. Remember, he de nes nations as just about any social group we can think of.
Therefore, nations are always coming and going and changing. What Lemkin wants to prevent
is intentional efforts to destroy nations, because he sees this type of oppression as an assault on
the world’s cultural diversity, and a lack of cultural diversity leads to depravations, hardships,
and suffering of all kinds.
Confused yet?
Lemkin clearly understood, as Straus writes, that perpetrators destroyed groups, or
attempted to, in part through the destruction of intellectuals, religion, language, arts, and
symbols. But, as Straus points out, a central argument for the need for a UNGC concerned the
intrinsic value of groups as expressed through culture. However, Lemkin never offers a
de nition of culture—besides saying that culture is what holds nations together.
Then, Lemkin gives us a pastiche of popular anthropological theories of his day to
explain how culture holds nations together (without ever de ning culture). He starts off
borrowing from the Polish Anthropologist Bronisław Malinowsky, then slowly borrowing from
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Ruth Benedict. But he does not seem to understand these two Anthropologists have very
different understandings of what culture is, what it does, and how you can know culture. This
is a problem if culture rests at the center of your theory of genocide, and you are arguing that
nations should be protected in order to protect their unique culture. It is an unworkable system.
What is more, this makes Lemkin feel like a conservative communitarian, reducing individuals’
selves to the sum of their identities, and locating the good of individuals lives in cultural
communities (which he cannot de ne, by the way, but he still feels it is there). I think this speaks
to Moses’ point that Lemkin repudiated the Nazi biological conception of race only to have
embraced a cultural version of this same idea.
Things get even more confused when Lemkin allows his de nition of nations to blend
into his de nition of culture. This prevents Lemkin from thinking clearly about the relationship
between social groups and culture. As a result, Lemkin cannot articulate a clear theory of why
he thinks genocide is such a bad thing—beyond self-evident claims that genocide causes people
to suffer and destroys cultural diversity. Straus asks, therefore: “At one level, the point resonates
—cultures are a source of diversity. But what does this really mean? What is a group’s culture?
Can a group be said to have a culture? Lemkin’s views continue to strike me as being not being
especially sophisticated on this question.”
I think Straus’ point is the right point to make. Let me sketch out Lemkin’s system. Pay
attention to the circular logic that arises in points 5 and 6:
1. Nations are basically any social group.
2. Culture is what holds the nation together.
- Lemkin talks about the culture of lawyers, the culture
of the ancient Assyrians, the culture of gamblers, the
culture of magazine readers, and so forth.
3. Destroying culture is one way you destroy a nation
(because a nation needs a culture to be held together).
4. Destroying a nation always results in the loss of that
nation’s culture.
- i.e., a genocide against the Jazz nation results in the
destruction of Jazz culture.
5. Destroying culture is bad because it causes individuals
from targeted nations much suffering, as their social world
becomes more and more impoverished.
- i.e., the destruction of Jazz culture deprives people of
the Jazz nation of Jazz culture.
- Did you spot the circular logic right there? Lemkin’s
system is a closed loop, which any social scientist or
theorist will tell you results from an inability to create
clear de nitional boundaries between key concepts.
6. Destroying nations is bad because it causes cultural loss,
and cultural loss impoverishes world civilization (our
collective humanity) of that culture’s gifts.
- More circular reasoning.
7. Therefore, nations should be protected so we can preserve
cultural diversity and thereby give every individual in the
world an opportunity to join new nations, if they want, or
enjoy the fruits of their contact with other nations, which
can inspire new ideas and new ways of looking at the
world.
8. Genocide, by destroying nations, makes the world less
culturally diverse, and therefore leads to intellectual and
artistic stagnation and prevents cultural change.
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- Points 7 and 8 are self-evident, and implied by the
circular logic of points 5 and 6.
As Max Pensky said on a Zoom call with me a few weeks ago, Lemkin was most
certainly not a philosopher and constantly tied himself into knots when he tried to wade into
theory. This is one such knot. There is no getting out of this one (it is circular logic after all!).
What Place Should Lemkin Have in Genocide Studies?
Lemkin certainly belongs in the pantheon of major 20th-century human rights gures. But
Lemkin should not be turned into a sacred founder- gure of genocide studies. I think we can
look to Lemkin to understand what was at stake as the meaning of genocide changed. For
example, Daniel Feierstein has used Lemkin’s ideas to place genocide into a sociological
framework that is sensitive to the relationship between group speci c mass violence and other
social con ict processes.42 I nd that a fruitful endeavor.
Relatedly, I think that reading Lemkin can help genocide scholars understand what is at
stake if we adopt the legal de nition of genocide without understanding how the UNGC
drafting process changed the meaning of the term. And, Lemkin’s writings can be a source of
critical re ection, pointing genocide scholars towards new lines of research. For example,
genocide scholars have all but forgotten Lemkin’s writings on economics and con ict. Reading
Lemkin’s writings before Axis Rule can help us ask why genocide studies has ignored questions
of economics for decades. I think one possible reason is that any hint of a connection between
economic con ict and group destruction was scrubbed from the UNGC, as the Soviets and
Americans wanted to reserve a right to wage war on economic groups and to conduct economic
warfare. This set in motion a long pattern of genocide scholars overlooking the intersection of
economics and group destruction, under an assumption that genocide was a national, racial,
ethnic, religious, social, cultural, and even political phenomenon—not economic.43
Final Thoughts
I have gone on too long. In my defense, I needed to reply thoughtfully to four provocative and
careful reviews of my work—in a way that would allow people who have not read my book to
follow along.
Sarah, Dirk, Max, and Scott: I have read and admired your work over the years. Thank
you for all your contributions to our eld. I have appreciated this opportunity to take up your
questions, and I hope our readers nd this exchange worthwhile.

42

Daniel Feierstein, Genocide as Social Practice: Reorganizing Society under the Nazis and Argentina’s Military Juntas (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2014).
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See Charles H. Anderton and Jurgen Brauer, eds., Economic Aspects of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their
Preventions (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016). The editors’ introduction explains (politely) that the academic
literature on the economic aspects of genocide has been all but non-existent up until the publication of their
volume. Anderton and Brauer then chart a path for how we can bring economic thinking—and the discipline
Economics—into genocide studies. For what it is worth, I have always felt Mark Levene’s two-volume The Crisis of
Genocide (Oxford University Press, 2014) stands out in the eld because he takes seriously questions of economic
history and economic thinking to explain how genocide becomes integral to 20th century global political economy,
and the economies of nation states as the international system turns into a global system. Levene, too, has to leave
the UNGC de nition behind in order to get there.
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The Apex of Biographical Intellectual History
by A. Dirk Moses
Scholarship on the origins of the genocide concept has advanced considerably over the
past twenty years with the rediscovery of Lemkin’s unpublished papers in various US
libraries and archives. Access to these papers spawned a revival of interest in the founder
of the genocide concept, leading to many publications on the subject in which intellectual
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history and Lemkin’s biography were conceived as coterminous.1 None of them is as signi cant
as Douglas Irvin-Erickson’s Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide. No-one has mined those
papers as assiduously, placed him in various intellectual contexts so convincingly, nor made
important links between Lemkin’s published texts on topics seemingly unrelated to genocide,
like international money transfers. These, Lemkin showed, were integral to the Nazi modality
of predatory, indeed destructive occupations of conquered nations and their economies.
In my brief commentary, I ask Irvin-Erickson, six years since his book appeared,
whether he thinks a new intellectual history of genocide needs transcend the assumption about
its humanization of domestic and international affairs. For whether in international armed
con ict like the Korean and Vietnam Wars, or the domestic convulsions of the Chinese Great
Leap Forward and the secessionist civil wars in Nigeria (1967–1970) and Pakistan (1971), not to
mention the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia (1975–1979), and the Balkan con agration and
Rwandan Genocide of the 1990s, the astonishing extent of civilian destruction since 1948 makes
a mockery of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide
(UNGC). That it is nonetheless a major steppingstone in the development of civilian protection,
culminating in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2000) and the
Responsibility to Protect norm (2005), is the conventional liberal view. The civil wars in South
Sudan and Yemen since 2013 and 2014 respectively, the Myanmar military’s expulsion of
Rohingya in 2017, the current con ict in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, and the Chinese state’s
mass incarceration and persecution of Uyghur citizens, suggest two alternative conclusions.2
The rst is the impotence of international institutions in preventing and punishing
genocide, notwithstanding the agonistic triumphalism of liberal international rhetoric. Is
Lemkin partially to blame? Along with many anthropologists from the 1930s to the 1950s, he
repudiated the Nazi biological conception of race only to embrace a cultural version of it, along
with a hierarchical civilizationalism indexed to ideals of development and modernity.
Consequently, in de ning racism and genocide in terms of the discredited version of Nazi
empire in Europe, postwar liberals naturalized Western empires and modernizing states. With
Lemkin’s assistance, the United Nations (UN) also depoliticized the de nition of genocide by
distinguishing it from military necessity, thereby cordoning off armed con ict—both noninternational (colonial and civil war), or international—from the intended destruction of ethnic,
national, racial, or religious groups “as such,” as the UNGC puts it. It was thus all too easy for
states to claim that their violent repression of national liberation or secessionist movements, or
bombing of enemy cities, was not genocidal, but rather driven by security and military motives,
irrespective of how many civilian deaths they occasioned.3
The second conclusion is the continued existence of stateless races, nations, and
ethnicities, rather than solely states, as actors in international relations. They belie the tidy

1

In chronological order: Steven L. Jacobs, “Genesis of the Concept of Genocide According to its Author from the
Original Sources,” Human Rights Review 3, no. 2 (2002), 98–103; special issue of Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 4
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Historian of Mass Violence (New York: Routledge, 2009); Bartolomé Clavero, Genocide or Ethnocide, 1933–2007: How to
Make, Unmake and Remake Law with Words (Milan: Giuffrè Editore, 2008); John Cooper, Raphael Lemkin and the
Struggle for the Genocide Convention (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); A. Dirk Moses, “Raphael Lemkin,
Culture, and the Concept of Genocide,” in Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, ed. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk
Moses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 19–41; Agnieszka Bienczyk-Missala and Slawomir Debski, eds.,
Rafał Lemkin: A Hero of Humankind (Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2010); Raphael Lemkin, Totally
Unof cial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin, ed. Donna-Lee Frieze (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013);
special issue of Journal of Genocide Research 15, no. 3 (2013); Philippe Sands, East West Street: On the Origins of
Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity (New York: Knopf, 2016).
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Genocide Debates,” Journal of Genocide Research 24, no. 1 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2021.1992920.
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Xinjiang,” Journal of Genocide Research 23, no. 1 (2021), 348–370.
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relationship between nation and state embodied by the UN: each nation housed in a state, an
alignment that the self-determination of decolonization was supposed to complete, with
human rights replacing the minority rights formerly (selectively) protected by the League of
Nations.4 However, as the above cases indicate, while international armed conflict has
diminished compared to the first half of the twentieth century, non-international ones—civil
war and independence insurgencies—have increased because of the misalignment between
state borders and the peoples they contain.5 As before the UN Charter, the diasporic existence
of refugee populations and mass migration fuel “long distance nationalism” and the
transnational geopolitical imagination of “races” and even civilizations.6 Genocide appeals to
minorities and indigenous peoples as a standard to frame persecution in striving for selfdetermination.7
These two conclusions indicate that genocide, defined by the UNGC as systematic
attacks on racial, national, and ethnic groups on the grounds of identity alone, is implicated in
securitization and racialization processes in contrapuntal ways. On the one hand, its
proximity to the Holocaust (history’s largest race hate crime) means that states claim their
attacks on minorities do not violate the UNGC because security imperatives rather than racial
animus motivate them; on the other hand, their victims insist that they are victims of
genocidal racialization. The law that shields the perpetrator is also a rhetorical weapon of the
weak, meaning that the question of genocide is a structural feature of an incoherent global
order of stateless nations seeking political independence. This unresolvable tension was built
into the concept by Lemkin and his successors. Necessarily, any analysis of these issues
revolves around him, since he coined the term and campaigned for its adoption. But to
appreciate how Lemkin could dream up this new word and why it eventually enjoyed
widespread popularity, it is necessary to understand the intellectual and political worlds he
inhabited. We have Douglas Irvin-Erickson to thank for expertly doing so in his important
book.
***
Re ections & Questions
by Sarah Federman
Douglas Irvin-Erickson’s Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide has a sobering effect.
Perhaps others have shared my celebratory feelings about Lemkin’s successful introduction of
the word genocide and the subsequent inception of the United Nations (UN) Genocide
Convention. Lemkin’s efforts in the 1940s and beyond contributed to vernacularizing genocide
prevention and human rights discourse more broadly. As an individual, he had a dazzling
intellect, able not only to communicate seventeen languages, but to communicate and persuade
native speakers in these languages by drawing on their political, artistic, and spiritual
traditions. What a remarkable story about the power of commitment and persuasion to advance
global moral standards. Irvin-Erickson revives readers from this romantic rendition of Lemkin’s
story by outlining the gap between Lemkin’s aspirations and the nal convention itself.
Irvin-Erickson tells the story from a post-colonial vantage point, showing how
numerous states defanged the convention’s scope during the late 1940s to preserve the ability to
oppress and repress their own populations as desired. This included the U.S. and Canadian
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desire to avoid outside intervention in their treatment of indigenous populations, and the U.S.
treatment of African Americans, experiencing segregation and unchecked brutality at the time.
Brazil sought to preserve its freedom to persecute political opposition. Other Western powers
feared the Convention, if too strongly worded, would interfere with colonial rule by
legitimizing African and other governments.
The heaviest hand on the Genocide Convention, and the strongest blow to those of us
guarding idealistic sentiments, was that of Josef Stalin. Stalin, with the help of USSR
Ambassador to the UN Andrey Vyshinsky, ravaged the early drafts ensuring nothing in the
convention would impede Stalin’s present and forthcoming purges, forms of terrorism, and the
use of gulags. The resulting document left states free to terrorize the humans within their
boundaries. They simply could not annihilate those outside of their borders.
Irvin-Erickson also tells the story from a gender perspective, one I never considered. He
rst illuminates the critical role that female delegates played in supporting Lemkin’s efforts to
outlaw genocide. While Lemkin did push prosecutors at Nuremberg to include sexual assault as
a category of German war crimes, for example, he did so only because he thought his concept of
genocide could be used to prosecute these crimes. Lemkin then misrepresents himself to
women’s NGOs at the UN, claiming he was an advocate for women’s rights at the Nuremberg
tribunals, when, really, he was using the prosecution of sexual violence as just another reason
why the Allies should use his concept of genocide. Irvin-Erickson then shows how Lemkin
leveraged this support from women’s NGOs at the UN without necessarily advocating for their
concerns the way he led them to believe. This distorted our understanding of the role of sexual
assault in the Holocaust and in genocide more broadly. Rape was not included in the Genocide
Convention and was not considered a tool of genocidal warfare until the Bosnian Genocide
decades later.
Intellectual sobriety can leach us of some idealism, but in return prepares us better to
navigate the world as it is. Lemkin advanced the global commitment to genocide prevention as
far as he did because he understood the values and interests of each nation he lobbied. Master
negotiators commit to understanding their counterparts. For those who want the convention
and other human rights protection to expand further, we too must understand the history and
strategic statecraft at the convention’s inception. Irvin-Erickson helps us do just that.
I would like to ask Irvin-Erickson several questions to help me better understand the
past and how to move forward from here.
Would the UN Genocide Convention, as written, have prevented the Holocaust? To
clarify, I do not mean would the world care enough to act, but rather would the resulting
document hold under those circumstances? Or, alternatively, did the dilutions ensured by
Soviet lawyers and many other state delegates cripple it to the point where even Hitler could
have proceeded without running afoul of the law?
Another question relates to what interstate violence the Convention permits. You help
us see the vague boundaries of what constitutes genocide and whether it can occur in peace
time as well as war. If we interpret the Genocide Convention most broadly, what is left? Is selfdefence the only legitimate use of force between states? What happens, too, when Russia claims
Ukraine is its territory. Does this become an intrastate affair beyond the reach of the Genocide
Convention?
This next question stems from my interest in the role of corporations in genocide. We
see transnational corporations increasingly outsize and outpace many countries in which they
operate. Their resources and skilled legal teams enable them to lobby for more rights than
obligations, and skirt obligations when assigned. How does the history of the Convention and
the Nuremberg trials shape our treatment of these non-state actors?
Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright argued for the collective responsibility
to protect. She also believed in the importance of the International Criminal Court and other
judicial bodies that served to hold leaders accountable and expunge the collective. She was
concerned that holding everyone accountable in the aftermath of genocide would bring nations
to a standstill and perhaps impede resilience. I shared with Albright my confusion concerning
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how we have collective responsibility to prevent genocide, but only consider individual
accountability for genocide. If genocide prevention requires collective action and genocide itself
mass participation, how then does accountability become singular. She said she did not know as
she had not considered that quandary. How might you resolve this conundrum? Is
accountability collective and, if so, how best to engage in that collective work?
Thank you for your thoughtful and timely contribution.
***
The Limits of Lemkin
by Scott Straus
Douglas Irvin-Erickson has written an excellent book, lled with insight. The work is an
academic biography, one that situates Raphaël Lemkin within historical and intellectual context.
Irvin-Erickson excels in weaving Lemkin’s ideas into biographical developments in his life. The
reader grasps how Lemkin’s rst conceptualizations of genocide came into being, how those
ideas were situated within legal debates of the day, and how the reception of his ideas propelled
Lemkin to re ne, innovate, and resist. I learned a lot from the book, and I suspect that most
scholars of genocide will as well.
Irvin-Erickson is at his best in presenting the nuances of Lemkin’s thinking. The author
also makes a number of compelling arguments that deserve wide readership in the genocide
studies literature. One is that Lemkin unquestionably saw genocide as a transhistorical
phenomenon that was delinked from the Holocaust, or at least not always tied to it. Many
scholars of genocide will know that the Armenian genocide captured Lemkin’s imagination and
fury, and that his rst efforts at creating an international law against mass violence against
civilians was formulated before the Holocaust. Yet because the coinage and full articulation of
“genocide” was embedded in a book documenting Nazi crimes, some may surmise that the
Holocaust really was the main referent for the new term. Irvin-Erickson’s book dispels that
interpretation.
A second argument that Irvin-Erickson threads through the book was the importance of
culture in Lemkin’s thinking. I took away two main conclusions. First, Lemkin saw cultural
destruction as integral to genocide. Perpetrators destroyed groups, or attempted to, in part
through the destruction of intellectuals, religion, language, arts, and symbols. Second, a central
argument for the need for a convention on genocide concerned the intrinsic value of groups as
expressed through culture. Irvin-Erickson frames the issue around the concept of “cultural
autonomy,” in the sense that different groups have independent cultures and, if destroyed,
humanity loses something crucial.
I learned a great deal more from the book. Almost every chapter brought to light
revelations about Lemkin’s thinking, his struggles, his journeys, and his rivalries, real and
imagined. The book is well worth a read from scholars who teach Lemkin or want to
understand Lemkin’s thinking in nuanced and careful ways. I found the book really helpful, as I
prepared a lecture on the origins of the concept of genocide.
In the spirit of exchange, I want to raise several questions that the book provoked. One
question is: what place should Lemkin have in genocide studies? Clearly, Lemkin invented the
term, and he developed a concept around the deliberate destruction of groups, which remains
the core idea for what genocide is. Yet as scholars in the eld we know that “genocide” remains
a contested concept. There remain serious differences in understanding what the term
encompasses and whether the term is primarily a legal, academic, or normative concept. Those
differences have shaped and constrained the eld of study since its beginnings, and continue to
do so.
The question is: should we turn to Lemkin to help to solve those problems? Many
scholars do. The problem is that different scholars see different Lemkins, so to speak, and thus
they emerge wielding Lemkin to defend different concepts of genocide. I come away from Irvin-
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Erickson’s book less convinced that we should look to Lemkin to nd a way out of the
conceptual differences. Lemkin was not always consistent. He also was an advocate. He wanted
there to be an international law against genocide, and he seemed willing at different stages in
his formulation and defense to articulate different arguments in order to advance that cause. It
is also possible that he was not always a clear thinker. After reading Irvin-Erickson’s thoughtful
account, I emerge an admirer of Lemkin—of his persistence and determination, as well as his
intellectual creativity. But I also do not nd him intellectually reliable, and hence I am not
convinced that deeper dives into his thinking will resolve the problems with the concept of
genocide. In other words, I am increasingly convinced that we should look beyond the
concept’s intellectual origins to understand it.
What should, for example, be the place of culture in understanding genocide? IrvinErickson defends Lemkin as having a non-essential understanding of culture and of groups. Yet
in reading more about Lemkin I remain perplexed as to what his views on culture were.
“Lemkin saw diversity as the wellspring of human creativity,” writes Irvin-Erickson in the
concluding paragraph. At one level, the point resonates—cultures are a source of diversity. But
what does this really mean? What is a group’s culture? Can a group be said to have a culture?
Lemkin’s views continue to strike me as being not being especially sophisticated on this
question.
The importance of groups (collectivities or cultures) is fundamental to the etymology
and conceptualization of genocide. In my work, I have made the argument that genocide is a
form of “group-selective” violence, and hence we can connect genocide to other forms of groupselective violence and distinguish it from both truly indiscriminate violence and individuallyselective violence. I believe my conceptualization is consistent with Lemkin’s coinage and
conceptualization of genocide as the deliberate destruction of groups.
But what kinds of groups fall under a genocide rubric? These questions remain
fundamental for the eld and have divided it since the Genocide Convention came into being. I
do not come away from this book—that is, from a deeper engagement with Lemkin—with clear
answers to these questions. If culture is central to group formation, and that is a justi cation for
having a law on genocide, should political groups (or other non-culture bearing groups) be
considered within a rubric on genocide? Should groups marked by a disability be considered
protected groups under the Convention? Should regional groups or gender groups? Do these
groups have a culture? I conclude from the book that Lemkin was not clear on these questions.
Another key question that Lemkin leaves me confused on: is destroying culture
equivalent to destroying groups? Even more fundamentally, what does it mean to destroy a
group? Irvin-Erickson is persuasive that culture is central to Lemkin’s thinking. But where I
remain unclear is whether cultural destruction is usually, or always, part of a group’s
destruction, but alongside other, more physical forms of destruction or whether cultural
destruction is suf cient for a process to be called genocide? This is not an idle question. The
issue has again resurfaced in relation to the Uyghur populations in China, and the question
remains central for the ways in which different indigenous and colonized people were treated
over long periods of time.
One last question that the book generated: what does the obligation to prevent, as
articulated in the Convention, mean? I was surprised that this question did not receive more
attention from Lemkin. I conclude from the book that Lemkin was somewhat naïve about the
power of international law. He seemed to think that a law against genocide, and stated
commitments to prevent it, would engender state commitments. But the Convention is
deliberately vague on this question, and Lemkin did not develop a clear understanding—at
least judging from this book—on what prevention means and how it would take place.
I have argued over the years that ambiguities, hierarchies, and disagreements
embedded in the concept of genocide are signi cant limiting factors on the eld of genocide
studies. However, unlike some other scholars, I still think “genocide” is a useful concept, and I
think so because deliberate attempts to destroy groups is an empirical phenomenon in the
world. Genocide is a real form of violence. That statement does not absolve scholars of
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wrestling with questions like: to what family of cases does genocide belong, what is a group,
what does group destruction mean, what kinds of groups are subjected to genocide, is the
concept an academic one to de ne types of violence, a normative one to signal terrible
outcomes, or a legal one bound by the Convention? I wish Lemkin could help us answer these
questions. Alas, after reading this book, I am not convinced he can. Maybe genocide studies
needs greater distance from Lemkin studies, or I stand to be corrected.
***
The Marginal Man
by Max Pensky
In a line from The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt dismissed the signi cance of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, indirectly, the Genocide Convention as well. These
new, highly normative instruments of international law, Arendt wrote:
… were sponsored by marginal gures—by a few international
jurists without political experience or professional
philanthropists supported by the uncertain sentiments of
professional idealists. The groups they formed, the declarations
they issued show an uncanny similarity in language and
composition to that of societies for the prevention of cruelty to
animals. No statesman, no political gure of any importance
could possibly take them seriously…8
In her chapter on Arendt and Lemkin,9 political theorist Seyla Benhabib offers Arendt’s
quote to document both Arendt’s deep initial skepticism regarding the power of international
law to exert meaningful effects on the new constellation of mass political movements of the 20th
century. Among the “marginal gures” that Arendt scorns is almost certainly Raphaël Lemkin,
who in all likelihood Arendt had never met, even though their geographical and personal
spheres overlapped considerably.
Douglas Irvin-Erickson also offers this quote toward the end of his ne intellectual
biography, Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide. As the biography of a concept and a
historical constellation, and not just a man, Irvin-Erickson’s book joins the ranks of recent
studies exploring the remarkably speci c origins of the universalist norms that transformed
international law in the decades before, during and after the Second World War and the
Holocaust. These studies, including Benhabib’s recent work,10 Philippe Sands’ East-West Street:
On the Origins of “Genocide” and “Crimes Against Humanity”11 that explores the relation
between neighbors and eventual adversaries Lemkin and Hersch Lauterpacht, and James
Loef er’s Rooted Cosmopolitans: Jews and Human Rights in the Twentieth Century,12 have provided
us with rich, concrete accounts of a small group of Jewish legal theorists and jurists, rooted in
the shifting and violent political universe of eastern Europe, in what was, alternately, East
Prussia, Poland, and Ukraine. Their experiences of marginalization and persecution, of cultural
and physical vulnerability under capricious political authority, and ultimately of the destruction

8

Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1951), 292.

9

Seyla Benhabib, Dignity in Adversity: Human Rights in Troubled Times (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 43.

10

Seyla Benhabib, Exile, Statelessness, and Migration: Playing Chess with History from Hannah Arendt to Isiah Berlin (New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2018).

11

Philippe Sands, East-West Street: On the Origins of “Genocide” and “Crimes Against Humanity” (New York: Vintage
Books, 2016).

12

James Loef er, Rooted Cosmopolitans: Jews and Human Rights in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2018).
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of their families and their world, appropriated the concepts and mechanisms of international
law with the goal of transforming a collection of treaties and customs, largely designed to
lubricate international commerce, into a demand for the protection of individuals from
obliteration by their own political authorities.
Better than any previous biography, Irvin-Erickson’s book is clear, adept and engaging
in reconstructing the political bargaining that, bit by bit, produced the text of the Genocide
Convention; a document that, depending on one’s point of view, is a singular leap forward in
the power and purpose of international law, a deeply problematic betrayal of Lemkin’s
motivation vision, or, most likely, a messy combination of both.
The post-Convention life of the genocide concept, as a result, has always been
peculiarly two-faced. A “narrow” legal de nition often appears so narrow as to be nearly
useless as the powerful legal response to state targeting of vulnerable groups, as we see most
evidently in the lofty evidentiary bar for special intent that the International Court of Justice
now sees as settled law, or the claim that China’s campaign to eradicate the Uighurs as a distinct
ethnic, national and religious group, lacking only the direct evidence of mass killing, does not
meet the legal threshold of genocide.
At the same time as this steady winnowing down of the reach and relevance of the legal
construct, of course, once the concept of genocide broke from its narrow legal channels, it
became so mainstreamed and broadened that it is now available to condemn and justify
everything from unprovoked attacks on Thanksgiving turkeys to national defense against
Russian paramilitaries in Donbas. What is increasingly hard to locate in this bipolar
development is precisely the sane and motivating middle ground, the promise of law as both
expression and enforcement of a global consensus that demands enforceable limits on state
power, that motivated both Lemkin and the rest of his cohort in the rst place.
Why did this happen? One low-hanging explanation is that Lemkin, like others, was
simply overcon dent in what law, and especially international law, could accomplish as the
“gentle civilizer of nations,” as Martti Kosenniemi13 put it in a classic study. Irvin-Erickson’s
detailed history of the concept of genocide makes this easy explanation harder, fortunately. The
legal route toward a global norm restraining sovereign attacks against a state’s own domestic
population never lost sight of the fact that norms, whether legal, moral, or otherwise, only exert
an effect on would-be perpetrators of atrocity crimes if the norm succeeds in catalyzing an
international political shift of values, priorities, and interests strong enough to change potential
genocidaire’s calculations of cost and bene t. For that, a new legal regime would need to be met
halfway, so to speak, by corresponding normative and institutional changes in international
politics. For a brief window stretching from the beginning of the 1990s to roughly the end of the
rst decade of the 2000s, that change seemed, with many reservations, to be taking place. For
many observers, it is now in full retreat.
Thus, while it is tempting to lay at least a part of the blame for the erosion of this lawdriven constellation of international atrocity prevention on the marginalization, the legalism,
and the insuf cient intimacy with the demands of Realpolitik characteristic of the founding
generation (those “few international jurists without political experience or professional
philanthropists supported by the uncertain sentiments of professional idealists,” as Arendt
dismissively wrote), it is a temptation worth resisting, or at least seriously qualifying. As a
marginal gure, Lemkin was also marginalized from the kind of political engagement that
would no doubt have proven useful once his plan for legal protection of vulnerable groups had
to go through the sausage factory of international political bargaining. Irvin-Erickson’s book is
at its most informative and poignant as it reconstructs Lemkin’s gradual abandonment, through
a series of sometimes questionable compromises of what is arguably the core innovation of his
own conception of genocide: the recognition of state efforts to eradicate the cultural foundations
of national groups as a distinctive crime, regularly perpetrated, with catastrophic results, but

Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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utterly excluded from domestic criminal legal systems due to the peculiarities of state
sovereignty.
Would Lemkin have had more success in preserving more of the most valuable
elements of his own conception of genocide if he had had more experience, stature, and access
(and, to be honest, native talent) as a political negotiator? Very possibly. But his very
marginality, as the book documents, actually had much to do with the impressive success that
Lemkin did in fact achieve. An international jurist from a small patch of hinterland lying
somewhere on the shifting border between Poland and Ukraine turned out to be perfectly
positioned to catalyze this most complex and contested of concepts. Change can be expected
from the margins most of all. And as the global community of genocide prevention practitioners
works to preserve what it can of the power of that concept, it is likely that similarly
marginalized actors, perhaps more than important political gures, will take the lead.
***
What’s Raphaël Lemkin Got to do with Genocide Studies? A Conversation on Gender,
Culture, Economics, Categorical Violence, and Colonization with Professors Sarah Federman,
Dirk Moses, Max Pensky, and Scott Straus
by Douglas Irvin-Erickson
I would like to thank the editors of Genocide Studies and Prevention, especially JoAnn DiGeorgioLutz, for organizing this conversation and soliciting essays from such a highly distinguished
panel of experts. Thank you, in turn, to Sarah Federman, Dirk Moses, Max Pensky, and Scott
Straus for their generous reviews of my book, Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide. In my
response to each reviewer, I cover a lot of ground from my book—in the hope that this
conversation can be assigned in the classroom.
Lemkin: Founding Father, Great Man, Pioneer, Hero, Saint, or Prophet?
Alex Hinton has suggested that genocide scholars have constructed a narrative that Lemkin was
the founding father of genocide studies, and the prototypical genocide scholar, “academically
informed yet politically committed to this pressing social issue.”14 These narratives do not
situate genocide studies in the framework of Lemkin’s ideas. Instead, they reframe Lemkin in
the image of later generations of genocide scholars, who ascribed to Lemkin their own
predilections, persuasions, and politics.15 With this founding father narrative, Lemkin
hagiography comes to pass for Lemkin biography.16
Consider Samuel Totten and Henry Theriault’s recent college-level textbook The UN
Genocide Convention: An Introduction.17 On the rst page, the authors compare Lemkin to Susan
B. Anthony, Mahatma Gandhi, Eleanor Roosevelt, Martin Luther King Jr., and Nelson Mandela.
We are told that what distinguishes Lemkin from these other human rights heroes is that
Lemkin was able to single-handedly accomplish something important—the United Nations
Genocide Convention (UNGC)—whereas the others needed the help of social movements to do
their great deeds. This is a myth that persists in received scholarship.
As Max Pensky put it in his essay, Lemkin was a marginal gure during the diplomatic
negotiations over the UNGC, with poor instincts as a negotiator. Yet, the myth of “Lemkin the
14

Alexander Laban Hinton, “Critical Genocide Studies,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 (2012), 4–15.

15

A. Dirk Moses has done a brilliant job explaining this in A. Dirk Moses, The Problems of Genocide: Permanent Security
and the Language of Transgression (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

16

Benjamin Meiches and Jeff Benvenuto, “Between Hagiography and Wounded Attachment: Raphaël Lemkin and the
Study of Genocide,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 1 (2019), 2–10. For an excellent genealogical approach to
the representation and uses of Lemkin, see Benjamin Meiches, The Politics of Annihilation: A Genealogy of Genocide
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2019).
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Samuel Totten and Henry Theriault, The United Nations Genocide Convention: An Introduction (Toronto: University of
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great man” lives on (it is a great man tale, which leaves women out of the story). This is
unfortunate because, as Pensky put it, it was Lemkin’s marginality that led to his impressive
successes, forcing him to gin up a coalition of UN delegations representing small states and
former colonies, women and social democratic members of delegations from major powers, and
a global network of activists and lobbyists who ooded the of ces of their governments’
of cials and UN delegations with phone calls, telegrams, and letters pushing for a genocide
convention. The more one has access to formal channels of power, the less one needs a coalition
from the margins.
The forgotten “great man” motif is useful for scholars in genocide studies. Emphasizing
that Lemkin did great deeds in the 1940s that were not appreciated until the eld of genocide
studies gained visibility in the late 1990s and early 2000s, confers upon genocide studies an
arti cial importance and a global civilizing mission. This dubiously elevates the prevention of
genocide above other movements for liberation, peace, and justice—and places individual
scholars into Lemkin’s intellectual lineage.
A similar phenomenon occurs amongst scholars who specialize in particular cases of
genocide, ranging from the Holocaust to the Armenian, Ukrainian, Kazakh, and Polish cases,
cases of genocide against indigenous peoples, and colonial cases in the Americas and Africa. In
the literature on all these cases, we can nd scholars claiming Lemkin was rst (or most)
concerned with their case. That is because Lemkin had a disingenuous habit of telling diasporic
communities, survivor organizations, and advocacy groups that their case was really the case
that rst (or most) inspired him to come up with the idea of genocide. The archival record is
thus lled with notes Lemkin wrote saying that some dozen or so cases were his rst
inspiration. The consequence of this, Henry Theriault observed, is that many different
constituencies can now claim that Lemkin “invented” the idea of genocide in reference to the
particular case that their community cares about.18
This why I appreciate Straus’ essay and the questions he poses to me: he suggests
that genocide studies does not need Lemkin to be a vibrant, legitimate, and serious eld of
study. I agree with this. Furthermore, reducing the “great man” myth around Lemkin would
help ease the cottage industry of activist-scholar groups that seek to legitimize their particular
cases of interest by presenting Lemkin in a way that ts into their narratives. There are many
Lemkins:
• The Jewish Lemkins (plural—the left Zionist Lemkin, the
right Zionist Lemkin, the cosmopolitan Jewish Lemkin, the
Lemkin who pretended to be a cosmopolitan-universalist his
whole adult life so he could pass in a hostile and antisemitic
world);
• The Polish Lemkins (plural—the right Polish nationalist
Lemkin, the left Polish patriotic Lemkin, the a-political Polish
Lemkin, the internationalist Polish Lemkin, the Polish-Jewish
Lemkin, and the Jewish-Polish Lemkin);
• The Armenian suffering inspired Lemkin;
• The Ukrainian suffering inspired Lemkin;
• The Kazakh suffering inspired Lemkin;
• The Lithuanian suffering inspired Lemkin;
• The New York Lemkin (which can also be the Native
American suffering inspired Lemkin, or the anti-US Black
racist Lemkin, or the pro-US Black anti-racist Lemkin); and
• The anti-colonial Lemkin, not to be confused with the procolonial Lemkin.

Henry Theriault, “Against the Grain: Critical Re ections on the State and Future of Genocide Scholarship,” Genocide
Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 (2012), 123–144.
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The list goes on and on. What is interesting to me is that each version of Lemkin feels
like it is the authentic Lemkin to individual scholars in each of these camps. Why? Because each
community of scholars who adopts Lemkin as their own has their own narrative about who
Lemkin is, so that the gure of Lemkin they craft resonates with their politics, their programs,
their concerns, and even their aesthetics. (Surely this must be the real Lemkin, because it feels so
right!)
Until recently, one thing that kept getting left out of the “Lemkin belongs to us” battles
was Lemkin’s work with Arab and Muslim groups to document and prosecute what he called
the “world genocide of Muslims in the 1940s and 50s” that he said “followed the world
genocide of Jews in the 1930s and 40s.”19 I guess that never felt right to very many people. But,
you cannot ignore the record of Lemkin’s work to prosecute “a world genocide against
Muslims” that he carried out with the League of Arab Delegates from 1949 all the way through
the 1950s. That is also part of the real Lemkin. For what it is worth, the relationship between
Israeli studies and Lemkin studies has also been tenuous, at best, but well worth pursuing.20
None of this should prevent scholars from reading Lemkin to gain new perspectives on
their cases of interest. Ukrainian studies has been a good example as the “Lemkin Turn” has
inspired fruitful new avenues of inquiry.21 But none of these area studies or case-speci c elds
need to claim Lemkin as their own to be legitimate.
Nevertheless, communities of scholars will likely continue to re-interpret Lemkin to t
their own designs, long into the future. With this, the contradictions and uncertainties about
Lemkin as a historical gure will continue to be erased in favor of simple tales of the “true”
heroic Lemkin. Such is the nature of hagiography, to avoid nuance in favor of certainty, to
ignore context if context threatens moral consistency. In the spirit of muddying the waters and
calling it progress, I will respond to my colleagues’ questions by raising more questions, leaving
much unanswered.
Response to Professor Sarah Federman: On The Missing Voices in Diplomatic History and
Problems with Justice
I was not the rst to notice that colonization was central to Lemkin’s understanding of genocide
and the drafting of the UNGC. A. Dirk Moses, in particular, has been a leading gure here.
What struck me, however, was just how much members of the UN delegations from Western
powers spoke plainly about their own governments’ interests in maintaining colonization and
using international humanitarian law as a means for this end. This included the Australian,
Brazilian, Canadian, French, South African, Swedish, US, and UK governments’ interests in
preventing the criminalization of apartheid, racial segregation, and other policies concerning
the forced assimilation and extermination of indigenous peoples and colonial subjects.

19

See Daud Abdullah, “A Century of Cultural Genocide in Palestine,” in Cultural Genocide Law, Politics, and Global
Manifestations, ed. Jeffrey Bachman (London: Routledge, 2019), 227–245. Abdullah picks up on Lemkin’s concerns
about genocides committed against Muslims in the aftermaths of the British mandate systems—in Pakistan and
Palestine. In my book, I discuss Lemkin’s ambiguous position on “genocide in the holy lands,” as delegates in late
1947 and early 1948 debated whether genocide should be de ned in a way that would include the treatment of
Muslim and Arab Palestinians under the UN Resolution on the Partition of Palestine. Lemkin is careful never to
say anything on this. But his closest allies, in the negotiating rooms, were North African and Arab delegations that
wanted the de nition of genocide to cover much of the con icts that emerged with the partition of the holy lands.

20

Rotem Giladi has written a provocative and thoroughly researched book on the Jewish Israeli lawyers, Jacob Robinson
and Shabtai Rosenne, showing how they approached international law with disinterest, aversion, and hostility.
Giladi’s treatment of Lemkin gives us a fresh look at the con icts that arose between Lemkin and Israeli diplomats,
while providing a new take on Lemkin’s engagement with Israeli and Middle Eastern politics. See Rotem Giladi,
Jews, Sovereignty, and International Law: Ideology and Ambivalence in Early Israeli Legal Diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2021).
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For a discussion, see Douglas Irvin-Erickson, “The Construction and Destruction of Peoples, Nations, and Empire:
The Study of the Holodomor as Genocide,” in Genocide: The Power and Problems of a Concept, eds. Andrea Graziosi
and Frank Sysyn (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2022), 145–173.
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The delegates from these states, and many more, especially the USSR, wrote their own
atrocities out of the de nition of genocide during the drafting process.22 The UK, US, and
France were still colonial and imperial powers. The USSR was very much an empire.23 In 1946,
when the delegations from the great powers sat down to de ne and outlaw genocide, they
wanted nothing to do with outlawing a crime that Lemkin, in his 1944 book Axis Rule in
Occupied Europe, called an ancient practice and colonial process that was now being used as a
common technique of governance in the 20th century.
I felt this had been largely missed by scholars who rely on the UN travaux préparatoires
to tell the history of the UNGC (travaux préparatoires are the of cial documentation of
negotiations and discussions of the drafting of treaties and international laws).24 What many at
the UN said in private was different than what they said in the negotiating rooms, where record
keepers were busy keeping minutes. While I was writing my book, Anton Weiss-Wendt was
preparing his excellent study of the USSR and the UNGC, published in two volumes.25 What
struck me about Weiss-Wendt’s work (we read drafts of each other’s manuscripts as we were
writing) was how expertly he used Soviet sources to illuminate what was going on behind the
scenes on the Soviet side. These Soviet sources paint a different picture of the negotiations over
the UNGC than the UN documents, revealing Stalin and his UN ambassador Andrey
Vyshinksy’s heavy in uence over the wording of the nal draft of the UNGC. The Soviets saw
genocide, as Lemkin de ned it, as a tool for holding their empire together, but their diplomats
were too disciplined to let this slip into the of cial record.
As for the rest of the great powers, there are many blatantly racist comments to be
found in the of cial UN documents, and a healthy share of “white man’s burden” type of
language. But there is much more candor in unof cial sources about the “danger” of outlawing
genocide, and letting “brown people” or “backwards people” take over human rights
instruments.26 Washington, London, and Paris liked taking credit for defeating fascism in the
name of democracy, but they did not want to criminalize something Lemkin de ned in Axis
Rule as “a colonial process” of “destroying the national patterns of the oppressed and imposing
the national patterns of the oppressors.”27
These private conversations and correspondences—telegrams, sentence fragments
scribbled on napkins, messages typed on hotel stationary, notes written down after midnight
walks—give us different perspectives on the drafting of the UNGC than the travaux

22

Anton Weiss-Wendt, “Somebody Else’s Crime: The Drafting of the Genocide Convention as a Cold War Battle, 1946–
48,” in Genocide: The Power and Problems of a Concept, eds. Andrea Graziosi and Frank E. Sysyn (Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2022), 22–43.
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Mark von Hagen, “Wartime Occupation and Peacetime Alien Rule: ‘Notes and Materials’ toward a(n) (Anti-) (Post-)
Colonial History of Ukraine,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 34, no. 1–4 (2016), 153–194. More broadly, see Alexander
Motyl, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 68.

24

Nathan A. Kurz, “’Hide a Fact Rather than State It:’ The Holocaust, the 1940s Human Rights Surge, and the
Cosmopolitan Imperative of International Law,” Journal of Genocide Research 23, no. 1 (2021), 37–57. Kurz shows that
relying only on the of cial UN documents also minimizes the degree to which the German attempt to annihilate
European Jews shaped the debates on the convention, partially because UN note keepers did not register
discussions of Jewish suffering as worthy of documenting.
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See Anton Weiss-Wendt, A Rhetorical Crime: Genocide in the Geopolitical Discourse of the Cold War (New Brunswick,
Rutgers University Press, 2018); and see especially Anton Weiss-Wendt, The Soviet Union and the Gutting of the UN
Genocide Convention (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2017).
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I have always thought the de nitive book on this matter is Roland Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of
International Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).
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préparatoires.28 Diplomacy is just as much about what happens in the negotiation room as what
happens outside of it. Where do the plans hatch, the plans for the motions and coordinated
votes that take a room by surprise? They hatch at dinner, over cocktails, coffee or tea, in hotel
rooms. Lemkin ascribed an almost magical quality to a green sofa in the delegates’ lounge
during the rst UN General Assembly in Lake Success, New York. The bar, however, he seemed
to hate, complaining about all the conversations over martinis that he was not invited to join. It
is funny: the bar and the lounge were only a few feet away, yet the social meaning of these two
spaces made all the difference for Lemkin.

Image 1. Sofas and chairs at the UN Delegate’s Lounge, Lake Success, NY.
Source: UN Online Archives

James Finkel has often told me, re ecting on a long and distinguished career in government, that modern
governments are not monolithic, and their policies are not made and carried out seamlessly. Rather, they can be
messy and sometimes, one branch (or of ce) competes with another to determine how the government should act.
It is through this mess of bureaucratic politics that state policy is made and carried out, and in these con icts
within government individuals really do matter. See three of Jim’s ne essays: James P. Finkel, “Atrocity
Prevention From Obama to Trump,” in Preventing Mass Atrocities: Policies and Practices, eds. Barbara Harf and Ted
Robert Gurr (London: Routledge, 2018), 113–134; James P. Finkel, “Beyond the Crossroads: Strengthening the US
Atrocity Prevention Board,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 2 (2015), 138–147; James P. Finkel, Atrocity
Prevention at the Crossroads: Assessing The President’s Atrocity Prevention Board After Two Years (Washington, DC: US
Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2014), accessed August 29, 2022, http://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20140904nkel-atrocity-preventionreport.pdf.
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Image 2. The bar at the UN Delegate’s Lounge, Lake Success, NY.
Source: UN Online Archives

It is at those same social gatherings, outside, not inside the meeting room, where one’s
friends catch wind of what is going to occur the following day in committee, and plan counter
measures. Over and again, Lemkin’s most ardent ally in this great game of rumors and schemes
and plans and counterplans, was the entire Egyptian delegation, followed by the Indian,
Pakistani, Saudi, and Filipino delegations, and his dear friends, the Chilean diplomat and poet
Gabriela Mistral, and the Chinese born novelist and diplomat Pearl Buck, who both worked
hard to maintain Chinese and Latin American support for the passage of the UNGC.
But not all of this backroom talk was bad. Ann Newland from New Zealand, Dana
Wilcox from Canada, and Herbert Evatt from Australia helped Lemkin identify sympathetic
individuals in other delegations, and circumvented their own governments’ early opposition to
the convention. American diplomats, namely the progressive and labor stalwart Adlai
Stevenson, a committed internationalist, helped Lemkin persuade in uential people in
Washington. Stevenson arranged for Lemkin to meet Eleanor Lansing Dulles, who convinced
her brothers Allen and John Foster Dulles to support the UNGC. John Foster Dulles had been an
important gure during the drafting of the UN Charter, and generally supported the UNGC as
a symbol of America’s international commitments. But, as soon as the US delegation signed the
UNGC in 1948, John Foster Dulles became a leading voice urging the US Senate not to ratify the
treaty. He most certainly is one of the statesmen whom Lemkin describes as “living in perpetual
sin with history” and “treating life like currency in a bank.”
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Gender and the Betrayal of the Women’s NGO’s
I want to thank Federman for calling attention to the gendered aspects of this story. It matters
that Lemkin knew the most ardent supporters of outlawing genocide in Western governments’
delegations were the women members of those delegations. Lemkin presented himself to them
as a longtime advocate of women’s rights by highlighting the instances in Axis Rule where he
documented German crimes consistent with what we would now call sexual violence and
gendered crimes. Women’s NGOs at the UN invited Lemkin to speak, often during women-only
meetings where survivors shared their experiences of sexual assault committed by German
soldiers. Without fail, Lemkin reminded these audiences that he tried to get the Allies at
Nuremberg to prosecute crimes he documented in Axis Rule, such as Germany issuing
payments to women who were raped by German soldiers to incentivize the birth of “children
with Germanic blood.” Federman is right to say explicitly what I merely implied in my book:
that Lemkin did not care that much about how sexual and gender-based violence t into the
eventual law against genocide. He just wanted the support of the women’s NGOs.
As Lemkin says in his autobiography, there would be no UNGC if it were not for the
women’s NGOs. For instance, it was US congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas, whom
Lemkin met in 1945, who rst introduced Lemkin to Adlai Stevenson on the US delegation. It
was only after Douglas convinced Stevenson of the merits of a law against genocide that
Stevenson opened the door to channels of in uence inside the US government, including the
Dulles family. With Stevenson’s introduction, Lemkin sent a telegram to the US Ambassador to
the UN, Warren Austin, urging him to support the convention so the US could present itself as
taking the lead in humanitarian affairs. Knowing that Austin was a “deeply religious”
Congregationalist Christian—a denomination with ties to the temperance, abolitionist, and
women’s suffrage reform movements in the US—Lemkin emphasized to him the progressive
aspects of a genocide convention and its importance for women’s rights (incidentally, Turkey
supported the UNGC as a symbol of its commitments to women’s rights). Lemkin’s persuasion
worked, and his ability to frame the convention within the tradition of progressivism won the
support the former president of the World Alliance of Women, Margery Corbett Ashby, who
organized a private gathering of women from around the world to discuss genocide.
In the opening days of the General Assembly in 1946, after Ashby’s women’s meeting,
Lemkin asked Ashby to introduce him to the chair of the Indian delegation, Vijaya Lakshmi
Pandit. India at the time was not yet technically free of British rule. Pandit was won over by
Lemkin’s idea that genocide was a colonial crime, and she gave Lemkin the fth and nal
signature he needed to bring a resolution to write a genocide convention to the oor of the
General Assembly for debate. Believing a genocide convention would uphold what “Gandhi
worked for,” Pandit claimed that Lemkin’s “concept of oneness” out of “many races and
creeds,” was a principle “we in India live by” and “our philosophers preached.”29
The nal de nition of genocide, in 1948, is largely a betrayal of these advocates’ goals.
While “forced removal of children” and “imposing measures intended to prevent births” were
included as acts of genocide in Article II of the convention, “forced impregnation” (an
unfortunate euphemism for rape), “forced marriage,” “prevention of marriage,” and “forced
divorce” were excluded. Let me be clear: forced abortions can be legally recognized acts of
genocide under the UNGC, but not rape. Ultimately, I found no answers as to why these aspects
of gendered violence did not make it into the nal text of the UNGC. Not a single document I
found could help me explain why preventing births made it to the negotiating table, but rape
did not. Not once did I ever nd any evidence that Lemkin pushed or advocated for forced
marriage or rape to be enumerated in the acts legally constituting genocide. Eliding this history
prevents honest conversations about why violence against women was erased from the legal
de nition of genocide. For what it is worth, it also shuts down conversation on the signi cant

Raphael Lemkin, Totally Unof cial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin, ed. Donna-Lee Frieze (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2013), 123–126.
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role the women’s NGOs played in pushing the convention onto the UN agenda in the
place.

rst

Corporate Responsibility, Economic Con ict, and Collective Justice
With regards to Federman’s question about how the history of the UNGC and the Nuremberg
trials shape our treatment of transnational corporations, I do not have a good answer. I would
love for someone who knows more about Franz Neumann to answer for me. Let me explain.
In 1942, Lemkin was hired as chief consultant on the US Board of Economic Warfare
and Foreign Economic Administration. Lemkin, at the time, was a well-known expert on
economic con ict and international nance law. He had just published, in 1939, a well-received
book in French on the way currency exchanges and international commerce caused con icts
between states, followed by a Swedish language book in 1941 on the way totalitarian regimes
laundered money and manipulated currency exchanges to undermine the economies of social
groups they sought to subjugate. At the Board of Economic Warfare, Lemkin befriended Franz
Neumann and met Otto Kirchheimer (and possibly Herbert Marcuse).
Holocaust scholars know Franz Neumann as the author of Behemoth, an early and
in uential study of the economic basis of the Nazi regime, and the Ph.D. advisor of Raul
Hilberg, one of the rst Holocaust scholars. Neumann’s book took seriously the role of
economic power in the evolution of the German government and the rise of Nazi terror. He
argued that the authoritarian nature of the Nazi regime was a façade, and the German
government used terror and violence for the advantage of arbitrary social groups. For example,
Neumann argued, the con scation of Jewish property primarily served the interests of large
capitalist companies such as the steel company Thyssen or the industrial conglomerate
Mannesmann.
Political theorists know Neumann, Kirschheimer, and Marcuse as social democratic
German Jewish social scientists who ed Germany in 1933 and contributed to the growth of
Critical Theory when they linked up with Max Horkheimer’s Institute for Social Research in
New York City.30 During the Second World War, Neumann, Kirchheimer, and Marcuse were
employed by the US government’s Research and Analysis Branch of the Of ce for Strategic
Services, and by 1942 Neumann and Lemkin were working together in the same of ce of the US
Board of Economic Warfare. At the beginning of the Nuremberg trials, US chief prosecutor
Robert Jackson relied heavily on the work of Neumann, Kirchheimer, Marcuse, and Lemkin to
understand the structure of the German government under Nazi administration.
I mention this because Neumann, Lemkin, and Aron Trainin—the same Trainin I will
discuss in my comments on Max Pensky’s essay—were the authors of the three most important
contemporaneous books used by the Nuremberg prosecutors as sources of facts and
documentation about German atrocities. All three were present for the Nuremberg trials and
in uential in their own way. So, I would love to see someone who knows more about Neumann
take up this question of Nuremberg and the legacy of corporate responsibility. Behemoth, a book
about the corporate and economic underpinnings of the horrors we now call the Holocaust,
played a major role in shaping the thinking of the prosecutors at the Nuremberg tribunals.
Lemkin, however, inverted Neumann’s thesis on the relationship between mass
violence and economic power. Where Neumann saw the destruction of peoples as a function of
economics, speci cally a corrupt relationship between a government that committed genocide
to enrich national industries that nanced the government, Lemkin instead saw economics as a
tool for the destruction of peoples (and, thus, punishable as an act of genocide).
This discussion of corporate responsibility leads to Federman’s questions of individual
and collective responsibility. She asks, if genocide prevention requires collective action and
genocide itself, mass participation, how then does accountability become singular? In other

Alexa Stiller, “The Mass Murder of the European Jews and the Concept of ‘Genocide’ in the Nuremberg Trials:
Reassessing Raphaël Lemkin’s Impact,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 1 (2019), 144–172.
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words, why do we punish individuals for the crime of genocide when genocide, so clearly, is a
social process requiring mass participation to carry out?
I do not have a good answer to this. Lemkin thought collectivities could be guilty of
genocide, but he believed legal responsibility should be individualized to avoid group
demonization. My personal sense is that collective accountability is important, but retributive
justice would be a poor mechanism for collective accountability. So, I would vote for restorative
justice processes, if we are talking about collective accountability for genocide.
In response to Federman’s question about whether the UNGC, as written, prevented the
Holocaust—I will take the bait and play around in counterfactual guesswork! No.
On the one hand, there was broad agreement amongst the great powers that genocide
should be de ned as closely as possible to the German case to prevent the law against genocide
from applying to the types of mass violence and oppression their governments could be
accused of committing. That is a sobering thought. They were explicit (in sources not found in
the travaux préparatoires) that they wanted to support a treaty outlawing this new idea of
genocide so they could show their domestic audiences that they cared about doing something
good for humanity in the wake of the war, but they did not want the treaty to cover their actions
or have mechanisms for enforcement. I am convinced, therefore, that efforts to cripple the
convention won out—something Max Pensky brings up in his essay, and Dirk Moses has
written about in The Problems of Genocide.
Response to Professor A. Dirk Moses: On Permanent Security and the Fallacy of the Political
Will Thesis
Dirk Moses asked me if a new intellectual history of genocide needs to transcend the
assumption about its humanization of domestic and international affairs?
Yes. But how? I think it begins by getting scholars to stop calling Lemkin the author of
the UNGC. He was not. Lemkin felt the nal de nition of genocide established by the UN treaty
was largely a betrayal of his most cherished principles, purposefully awed, and morally
compromised. While he kept up a brave face and publicly celebrated the UNGC, his private
writings express despair and disappointment. “The fact is that the rain of my work fell on a
fallow plain,” Lemkin wrote in his autobiography, “only this rain was a mixture of the blood
and tears of eight million innocent people throughout the world. Included also were the tears of
my parents and my friends.”31 When “the lights in Palais de Chaillot went out,” he wrote, “the
delegates shook hands hastily with one another and disappeared into the winter mists of
Paris.”32 The UNGC, he concluded, was now in the hands of the world’s politicians and
statesmen—people “who lived in perpetual sin with history” and could hardly be trusted with
“the lives of entire nations.”33
Furthermore, Lemkin was not consistent with anything, which makes it dif cult to
build a system of knowledge on his work—especially a system of humanitarian praxis. It is very
telling that, after 1948, Lemkin used his de nition of genocide from Axis Rule when he wrote his
social scienti c and historical manuscripts, and used the UN legal de nition when he was
making legal arguments. When he shamefully, publicly denounced Black Americans who
accused the US of genocide, Lemkin cited the legal de nition to assert their claims did not
amount to genocide.34 Yet, in his unpublished manuscripts on the history of genocide and
genocide in the social sciences, Lemkin supported the idea that genocide was committed against
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Lemkin, Totally Unof cial, 132.
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Ibid., 178.
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William Patterson, ed., We Charge Genocide: The Historic Petition to the United Nations for Relief from a Crime of the United
States Government Against the Negro People (New York: International Publishers, [1952] 1970). The book was a case
study in Lemkin’s system, and even included a robust study of the economics of genocide against Black
Americans. See Daniel E. Solomon, “The Black Freedom Movement and the Politics of the Anti-Genocide Norm in
the United States, 1951–1967,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 1 (2019), 130–143.
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Black Americans (from slavey to Jim Crow) by citing his de nition of genocide in Axis Rule. The
racist hypocrisy is clear. But it also tells me three things. First, Lemkin understood that the legal
de nition of genocide was different than his rst de nition of genocide. Second, he felt that his
de nition in Axis Rule was superior conceptually, but he knows it was not the law. And, third,
Lemkin changes his de nition depending on his audiences, picking and choosing de nitions of
genocide to t his purposes. This certainly undercuts a great deal of the notion that “genocide”
is a concrete, moral, and humanitarian category.
I would add one more thought in response to the question of “how do we transcend the
assumption about the UNGC’s humanization of domestic and international affairs.” While
many genocide scholars and anti-genocide activists uphold the UNGC as a kind of moral
document, Lemkin knew the convention was a product of post-war geopolitics. At the end of
the day, it was a treaty colonial powers could tolerate (and even use to advance their interests).
The implication is that if scholars adopt the legal de nition of genocide as their working
de nition of genocide, or even if they take the legal de nition as an ethical or moral concept,
they implicitly align their work with a concept that was designed to erase from its boundaries
the vast majority of the kinds of violence, repression, and oppression being committed by the
major powers at the time the convention was negotiated.35
I would agree with Moses, therefore, that the armed con icts, wars, and mass violence
of the 20th and 21st centuries make a mockery of the UNGC. I might have chosen a different
word than “mockery,” but I will take the bait and use the term. The conventional liberal view, as
Moses points out, is that the UNGC culminated in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court and the Responsibility to Protect norm in the early 2000s, and promoted a broad
expansion of human rights norms more generally. Progress all around, it would seem. So why
do they fail, and why does genocide still occur?
Stated crudely, the liberal-interventionalist argument suggests that the UNGC and the
body of relevant international treaties and laws (i.e., the Rome Statute) and multilateral
institutions (i.e., the ICC) are perfectly ne; the problem is those ckle policy makers and
unambitious civil servants who do not want to jeopardize their careers by taking morally right
actions to prevent genocide. In other words, the problem is political will. I do not think this is a
very compelling argument.36 The problem is not a lack of will.
As Moses has demonstrated in The Problems of Genocide, the victorious powers at the UN
constructed an international legal regime that normalized and legalized many different ways
that modern states kill people in the name of permanent security.37 It matters that Stalin was a
much more important and in uential co-author of the UNGC than Lemkin. And, the Soviets
were on the same page as the Americans when it came to what they wanted to achieve with the
UNGC: they wanted a law that could not be used against them and their allies, but could still be
used against their geopolitical adversaries.38 As Moses’ work has shown, the governments of
the Atlantic alliance and the Soviets then used the UNGC as moral cover when confronted by
human rights activists, minimizing their atrocities by pointing to their support for the UNGC
and comparing themselves favorably to the Nazis they defeated.
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I think this argument emerges from three books: Irvin-Erickson (2017); Moses (2021); Weiss-Wendt (2022).
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The four main English language journals in genocide studies (Journal of Genocide Research, Genocide Studies and
Prevention, Genocide Studies International, and Holocaust and Genocide Studies) and a good number of related journals
(such as Global Responsibility to Protect) are lled with examples of the “the problem is political will” thesis. Curious
readers can simply type “political will” into the search bar on these journal’s websites and judge for themselves.
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Jeff Bachman has shown how the permanent ve members of the UN Security Council—China, France, Russia, UK
and US—have exploited the UNGC to isolate themselves from the reach of the law; he contends the P-5 should be
understood as “outlaw states.” See Jeffrey S. Bachman, The Politics of Genocide: From the Genocide Convention to the
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This should not surprise diplomatic historians because the US and USSR, adversaries in the Cold War, routinely
collaborated to put down threats to the international system from which they derived their power. The diplomatic
history of the UNGC was an early example.
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I furthermore agree with Moses’ argument that Lemkin played a role in naturalizing
Western empires and modernizing liberal states by repudiating the Nazi biological conception
of race and embracing a cultural version of this same idea. In this way, I do think the UNGC
become a handy way for Western liberals to claim their states’ violence and oppression was not
genocidal. Distinguishing armed con ict from genocide, and then declaring genocide a moral
evil, thus implies that armed con ict is a lesser evil (maybe even good). For example, the US
military’s mass murder of civilians with napalm and the use of experimental chemical weapons
the US Department of Defense intentionally added to defoliants to cause inherited genetic
mutations in plants, animals, and people, and then lied about when US soldiers started having
babies with birth defects—and the many other horrors unleashed during the United States’
imperial, predatory, and aggressive war in Vietnam—all of this could now be presented as good
(or at least not evil) when contrasted with the German killing of civilians with Zyklon B. We
now nd ourselves at an absurd formulation:
Q: Why is the German killing of civilians by cyanide-based
gasses evil, but not the American killing of civilians by sticky
ammable petroleum jellies and DNA-altering chemicals?
A: Oh, right. Because one was genocide and the other was not.
Yes, this makes a mockery of the UNGC.
I also agree with Moses that the UNGC rei es the idea that there is a tidy relationship
between nation and state. But I do not blame Lemkin. The whole UN Charter does that, as does
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In fact, I like Lemkin’s formulation of genocide in
Axis Rule. His de nition was simple, and easy to use if you are a social scientist. Genocide was a
“colonial process” with two phases: rst, the destruction of the national patterns of the oppressed, and
second, the imposition of the national patterns of the oppressor. No nation states there.
I do an exercise with my students where I show them an image of page 79 of Axis Rule,
juxtaposed with the UNGC. First, I have them talk about what Lemkin writes on page 79 of Axis
Rule:
This new word, coined by the author to denote an old practice
in its modern development, is made from the ancient Greek
word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide (killing), thus
corresponding in its formation to such words as tyrannicide,
homicide, infanticide, etc. Generally speaking, genocide does
not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation,
except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a
nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of
different actions aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of
annihilating the groups themselves ... Genocide is directed
against the national group as an entity, and the actions
involved are directed against individuals, not in their
individual capacity, but as members of the national group.
... Genocide has two phases: one, the destruction of the national
pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the
national pattern of the oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may
be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to
remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal of the
population and the colonization of the area by the oppressor’s
own nationals.
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Next, compare Axis Rule to the text of the UNGC:
Article I: The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under
international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.
Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately in icting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.
There is a lot you can pull out with your students. Just think about the breadth of
different types of oppression that could be included under the rubric of “destruction of national
patterns of the oppressed,” compared to the ve speci c acts of genocide enumerated in Article
II of the UNGC.
This is why rape is not an act of genocide, but preventing births is. (This led to the
famous determination in the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia that
rape was an act of genocide in so far as rape constituted serious bodily or mental harm, if that
harm was directly linked to an intention to destroy a protected group). I never found any
evidence of how and why the depravation of food and the con scation of property were excised
from the draft lists of possible acts of genocide. But they disappeared by mid-1947. For sure the
Soviets had a hand in this. Forced removal of civilians, deportations, and population transfers
were removed as acts of genocide because of such abuses were occurring in Syria, Lebanon, and
Palestine, and in the con icts that emerged in the aftermaths of the British mandate systems.
The US, Canada, and Sweden worried that forced removals might also apply to their handling
of indigenous peoples, and so their delegations were more than happy to exclude this as an act
of genocide. On and on it went.
While we are at it, notice that Article II establishes that genocide is a crime committed
against only four kinds of social groups—national, ethnical, racial, and religious groups.
Therefore, an attempt to destroy “in whole or in part” other types of social groups is not legally
genocide (such as LGBTQ+ people; economic groups like peasants, capitalists, and communists;
political groups; successionist insurgents or rebels; college students; people who like certain
kinds of music; or drug addicts). There were delegations at the UN who argued that it was
sometimes necessary to destroy whole groups—such as “backwards peoples” and “cannibals.”
The difference between the 1948 UN de nition and Lemkin’s de nition in Axis Rule
(written in early 1942 and published in 1944) appears stark when we parse what Lemkin meant
by “national groups.” The word “nation” in the UNGC is, almost as a rule, interpreted by
English language scholars and international lawyers in the spirit of the UN Charter and the
system of nation-states that de nes the UN system. But Lemkin’s idea of a nation was not the
idea of a nation that emerges from the legacies of the American and French revolution, which is
then established in English and French language political theory and everyday language.
(Lemkin’s idea of a nation was most certainly not the idea of a nation that emerged in German
political theory, either. He believed German Romanticism paved the way for the Holocaust).
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Lemkin’s idea of “nation” was largely synonymous with what we now call “social
groups” in today’s parlance. This de nition of nations is so broad that it would have included,
in Lemkin’s own words, “those who play at cards.” Lemkin, quite literally, believed that people
who shared similar tastes in art, people who were part of the same labor union, people who
gambled, all constituted national groups. Moreover, he believed that individuals belonged to
many nations at once, and that genocide could be committed without physically killing a single
individual, but rather by imposing types of repression and oppression intended to eradicate
different types of national patterns in a social or political community. Genocide, for Lemkin,
could even be constituted by a government’s attempt to eliminate criminals (his rst three
books discussed the way the Italian and Soviet penal system created the idea of enemy nations,
and in the USSR, the way this directed the force of the state towards the eradication of enemy
national patterns amongst the domestic population).39
Lemkin wanted a law to protect the broad foundation of plural, diverse, and tolerant
societies by outlawing an expansive array of state-backed (or state-tolerated) oppressive,
repressive, and coercive actions against almost any social group imaginable. What Lemkin
called genocide often went hand-in-hand with the violent processes that accompanied the
founding of nation-states. This is what excited delegates from formerly colonized and small
states, including India and Pakistan, who were busy accusing each other of committing
genocide, but supported the UNGC because they thought it would prevent a reoccurrence of
British-era horrors. This is what excited the women’s NGOs at the UN. But much of the violence
nation-states commit against their own populations was written out of the law which, yes,
naturalizes the kinds of violence states commit in the name of the security of their nation.
I want to conclude with Moses’ re ection that:
On the one hand, [genocide’s conceptual] proximity to the
Holocaust (history’s largest race hate crime) means that states
claim their attacks on minorities do not violate the UNGC
because security imperatives rather than racial animus
motivate them; on the other hand, their victims insist they are
victims on genocidal racialization. The law that shields the
perpetrator is also a rhetorical weapon of the weak, meaning
that the question of genocide is a structural feature of an
incoherent global order of stateless nations seeking political
independence. This unresolvable tension was built into the
concept by Lemkin and his successors.
I think this is the result of at least two competing forces during the UNGC drafting
process (there were more than two forces, of course). The rst was the delegations representing
powerful state actors who wanted a treaty that could not be used against them. The second was
the activists from an impressive collection of humanitarian movements and activist
communities who really did want a treaty that served the interests of the weak. What emerged
was a UNGC that turned out to be a powerful rhetorical tool for activist and survivor
communities, but an intentionally convoluted and largely unenforceable treaty.
Response to Professor Max Pensky: On the Law of International Commerce, Norms, and
Marginal People
Max Pensky re ects on the signi cance of “a small group of Jewish legal theorists and jurists”
that Lemkin was part of, who were “rooted in the shifting and violent political universe of
eastern Europe, in what was, alternately, East Prussia, Poland, and Ukraine.” He continues:

Rafał Lemkin, Kodeks Karny Republik Sowieckich (Warsaw: Wyd. Sem. Prawa kar., 1926); Rafał Lemkin, Kodeks Karny
Rosji Sowieckiej 1927 (Warsaw: Sklad Glowny w Ksiegarni F. Hoesicka, 1928); Rafał Lemkin, Kodeks Karny
Faszystowski Włochy (Warsaw: Nakladem Ksiegarni F. Hoesicka, 1929).
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“Their experiences of marginalization and persecution, of cultural and physical vulnerability
under capricious political authority, and ultimately of the destruction of their families and their
world, appropriated the concepts and mechanisms of international law with the goal of
transforming a collection of treaties and customs, largely designed to lubricate international
commerce, into a demand for the protection of individuals from obliteration by their own
political authorities.”
There are two parts of this observation I want to unpack. One is the Jewish intellectual,
social, cultural, and political foundations of this small group of international lawyers working
to establish a coherent system of international criminal justice—which included treaties to
establish international laws and international courts, and corresponding legislation within the
domestic architecture of states. The second is that the areas where these systems of international
criminal justice and international laws worked best was in the area commerce, trade, and travel.
You cannot have passports and currency exchange clearing houses without an implied system
of international law.
Yes, Lemkin was committed to the awed minority rights tradition of the League of
Nations—though he held some important reservations.
Yes, Lemkin was deeply concerned with the rise of violent, extremist, and totalitarian
regimes in Europe (from the political right and left), which employed unprecedented terror
upon civilians in the service of nationalist agendas.
Yes, by the late 1930s, Lemkin was a committed anti-colonialist who connected the
experience of minorities and oppressed peoples in Eastern Europe, especially Jewish people, to
the experience of people forced to live under the brutal conditions of colonial subjugation.
However, above all of this, Lemkin made a small fortune as a tax lawyer specializing in
international nancial law, and owned a thriving practice with individual and corporate clients
across Poland. He was also a well-regarded scholar of international economic and nance law,
who dabbled in minority protections and violence prevention as a side project. So, it always
made sense to me that in Lemkin’s work on genocide, we see him move seamlessly from
international commercial law to international laws protecting vulnerable peoples.
His 1933 formulation of “barbarity and vandalism” was the precursor to his idea of
genocide. (Barbarity referred to physical attacks on groups with the intention of destroying the
group; vandalism referred to attacks on the group’s cultural symbols and social institutions). In
the paper where he worked out these ideas, he frames barbarity and vandalism within a larger
conversation of international efforts to outlaw the spreading of vegetable contagions and
protecting underwater communication cables—matters of international commerce that terrorist
acts can disrupt.40
While writing Axis Rule, Lemkin explicitly synthesizes his ideas on barbarity and
vandalism into a new singular concept of genocide. The only major difference between his 1933
ideas and his idea of genocide is that he described barbarity and vandalism as acts, but he turns
genocide into a type of con ict. And, thus, he attempts to turn an entire type of con ict into a
crime. Con icts are, by de nition, social processes that involve lots of different kinds of acts.
To nd a way to criminalize an entire social process, Lemkin had to extend his work in
the 1920s and 1930s that dealt with preventing the domestic causes of international con icts
(including violent con icts) that arose from friction between nation-states’ competing systems
of nancial law that governed their respective nationals’ engagement in international
transactions. Lemkin applied these frameworks to his work on Soviet terror and nationalities
con icts, the rise of European totalitarianism, the legacies of colonization, the violence and
repression across Eastern Europe that targeted Jews and sought to shatter Jewish communities,
and the kinds of oppression against vulnerable and marginalized groups that de ned the
intertwined systems of state power and international nance. Then, in the late 1930s and early

Raphaël Lemkin, “Les Actes Constituant un Danger General (Interétatique) Considerés Comme Delits du Droit des
Gens,” in Actes de la Vème Conférence Internationale Pour l’Uni cation du Droit Pénal, Madrid 14–20 Octobre 1933, eds.
Jimenez de Asua et al., (Paris: A. Pedone, 1935), 48–56.
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1940s, Lemkin wrote two books on how totalitarian governments used economic policy to wage
con ict against groups they sought to socially annihilate.
The rst was published in France in 1939, after Poland was invaded by Germany and
the USSR. Lemkin was correcting the manuscript proofs as he was eeing to Sweden. When he
arrived, he lectured at the University of Stockholm on chapters from his newly published The
Regulation of International Payments: Comparative Law Treatises on Currencies, Clearing and Payment
Agreements, and Legal Con icts.41 Written in French, the book made Lemkin a well-known expert
on economic law and con ict. After learning Swedish in less than two months, Lemkin decided
he would write the follow-up volume in his new language. This book, Currency Exchanges and
Clearing House Regulations, analyzed the way totalitarian governments manipulated
international money laundering and currency exchange rates to level economic devastation on
peoples they sought to conquer or destroy.42 In Sweden, Lemkin also began collecting
documents on the German occupation of Europe that would form the basis of Axis Rule, which
he began writing in 1941 at Duke University in the US. Lemkin would transpose almost 30
pages of his French and Swedish books, in almost word for word translation, into his English
language book, Axis Rule. This is why, in 1942, Lemkin was hired as chief consultant on the US
Board of Economic Warfare and Foreign Economic Administration, and why he got along so
well with Franz Neumann.
What makes this background curious is that, by appropriating mechanisms of
international law that were “largely designed to lubricate international commerce,” and
applying them to efforts “to protect individuals from obliteration by their own political
authorities,” to borrow Pensky’s phrasing, Lemkin gets himself denounced as an enemy of the
Bolshevik Revolution in 1935 by none other than Stalin’s feared henchman who orchestrated the
show trials: Andrey Vishinsky.43 Vyshinsky, the procurator general of the Russian SFSR at the
time, read Lemkin’s 1933 paper and believed Lemkin’s grouping of barbarity and vandalism
with crimes such as terrorism, slavery, and spreading vegetable contagions was a ruse.
In the introduction of a book by Aron Trainin, Vyshinsky accused Lemkin of proposing
ideologically and politically motivated laws to target the Soviet Union under the pretense of
creating a neutral, apolitical body of uni ed international laws. The uni cation movement that
Lemkin was part of never mentioned actual struggles “with international crooks and charlatans
of any stripe, not the ght with the bandits like Al Capone,” Vyshinsky wrote, but instead
focused on abstract concepts like “terrorism.” The concept of terrorism these Western liberals
claimed to be ghting, he continued, “turned into the central problem of the bourgeois
uni cation [of international law] movement” because it created the basis for limiting state
sovereignty and “removing the state from its pedestal.” Vyshinsky went on to add that “no
evasions and intricacies of such uni ers as Lemkin, who tried again to disguise the true purpose
of the criminal interventionists with references to ‘vandalism’ and ‘barbarism,’ can mislead
anybody” because “the true meaning of the uni ers’ efforts is to legally and politically justify
the right of the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie to intervene in the internal affairs of any state,
under the pretext that they are concerned for the fate of ‘culture and civilization.’”44
In 1946, Lemkin found himself squaring off against Vyshinksy again, who was now the
Soviet ambassador to the UN. Lemkin primarily used the Czechoslovakian diplomat Jan
Masaryk, whom he befriended early on, as an intermediary between himself and Vyshinsky. But
that line of communication breaks down around 1947 when con icts between the Czechs and
41

Raphaël Lemkin, Valutareglering och Clearing: Bearbetat efter Författarens Föreläsningar vid Stockholms Högskola Hösten
1940 (Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt & Söner, 1941); also see Mark Klamberg, “Raphaël Lemkin in Stockholm—
Signi cance for his Work on “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 1 (2019), 64–
87.
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Soviets emerge over the Czech government’s announcement it would join the Marshall Plan
(that is when I stopped nding letters between Czech and Soviet diplomats on behalf of
Lemkin). And, in March 1948, Masaryk mysteriously fell off a balcony at the Czech foreign
ministry.45 Did Lemkin and Vyshinsky ever speak or communicate directly? I am not sure. The
Soviets had just assassinated his friend and made it look like a suicide—and now Lemkin had to
engage with a Soviet delegation at the UN whose lead ambassador had already denounced him
as a bourgeois enemy of the Soviet state.
This is what makes Penksy’s conversation on Lemkin’s marginality at the UN so
fascinating. Weiss-Wendt’s work has shown that the Soviets in 1946 saw Lemkin as an
unemployed has-been who could be ignored. Lemkin had slipped from being a central gure in
the realm of Eastern European international lawyers during the interwar years, to a marginal
gure at the UN where he did not represent a government—he just showed up and hung out by
the couches. But this marginality, as Pensky called it, turned out to be his greatest asset.
Norms & The Purpose of the Law
I want to use this to transition to Pensky’s comments about the norms of international law.
Lemkin was right about the importance of norms, and the Soviets should have taken him more
seriously. Pensky writes:
The legal route toward a global norm restraining sovereign
attacks against a state’s own domestic population never lost
sight of the fact that norms … only exert an effect on would-be
perpetrators … if the norm succeeds in catalyzing an
international political shift of values, priorities, and interests
strong enough to change potential genocidaire’s calculations of
cost and bene t … As a marginal gure, Lemkin was also
marginalized from the kind of political engagement that would
no doubt have proven useful once his plan for legal protection
of vulnerable groups had to go through the sausage factory of
international political bargaining.
I think this is a fantastic argument to make, which is why I quote it at length. I would
love for someone who is an expert on Russian schools of international law and legal practice to
take up this question. There is a dissertation hiding in plain sight here, which can link Lemkin’s
legal training to the Russian tradition of legalism, legal practice, and international law.
I am thinking now of Peter Holquist’s excellent work on what he calls “The Russian
Empire as a Civilized State,” which explores the paradox that the Russian empire was
domestically not even close to being governed by the rule of law; yet, from 1870 to 1917, it was
the Russian government that most championed the cause that states be brought under a system
of codi ed international law.46 Holquist has a brilliant analysis of how Russia conducted the
1877–79 Russo-Turkish War against the backdrop of their contemporaneous efforts to codify the
laws of war, and the curious ways norms of conduct make their way into state practice. In my
book, I wrote about how Lemkin was in uenced by of a number of Russian-led efforts in
international law (admittedly, without the sophistication of an expert on Russian legal
traditions). And I would make the argument (capriciously maybe) that, as a lawyer and jurist,
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The Marshall Plan was the US’s multimillion-dollar aid program for postwar Europe. Masaryk was the one who
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February 1948, the Soviets were widely suspected as orchestrating a communist coup in Czechoslovakia, deposing
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Lemkin was more indebted to Russian traditions of the law and legal practice than he was to
Western European traditions, especially British and American.
Lemkin viewed all law as intertwined with politics and power, so he did not see the
point in pretending the law could be independent. He also believed the power of the law was
that it was a pedagogical vector for inspiring critical re ection across a society (from common
folk to the rulers of states, and everyone in between), and thus the law was an agent for
provoking change to a society’s moral fabric. Lemkin explicitly compared international law in
the 20th century to poetry, literature, drama, paintings, sculpture, dance, music, the Jewish,
Christian, and Islamic holy texts, and religion more generally. The classes he taught at Yale
University law school drove his dean and his colleagues nuts, who complained in their
evaluations of his teaching that his law syllabus was mostly literature, history, and shallow
moral theory (they also complained that he spent more than an average professor’s annual
salary making international calls from the department telephone).
International law was no different than novels and the Bible, Lemkin believed, in the
sense that they were the creative products of humanity which people imbued with powerful
symbolic value. As such, religion, art, and international law did not re ect prior existing
universal moral truths, Lemkin wrote. They created them. So, if people create their own moral
systems, why not attempt to change the world’s moral system by creating a law that says
genocide is bad?
Lemkin is very clear that genocide was something that had been celebrated as
something good. It was not called genocide in the past—it was called victory, heroism, progress.
Lemkin even went so far as to argue that the Hebrew, Christian, and Islamic texts created
justi cations for genocide when it came to the elimination or destruction of god’s enemies or
non-believers. He saw international law, accompanied with anti-genocide movements in the
arts and literature, as the starting point for efforts to cause a normative shift against genocide in
world society. That was Lemkin’s theory of change.
In this sense, Lemkin had a lot in common with Vyshinsky, who was a great 20th
century innovator of murderous show trials, which were never supposed to be fair, but rather,
were highly choreographed dramatic demonstrations for public consumption. If Vyshinksy
wanted to use domestic law to teach Soviet functionaries, communist party members, and the
general population to never go against Stalin, then Lemkin wanted to use international law to
teach people around the world that genocide was a bad thing and should never be committed. I
think these two adversaries shared a legal theory—that the law’s one and only power was its
ability to create and reify norms.
Lemkin might have had a point. Between 1946 and 1947, the South African delegation
warned that the convention was “dangerous” where “backwards people” and “uncivilized
people” were concerned because it would acknowledge that the systems of government of
African peoples had an equal right to exist. The New Zealand delegation brought to the oor
their concerns that the genocide convention would criminalize the only appropriate way of
dealing with “cannibals.” The Brazilian delegation said outlawing genocide would be a
genocide against Latin Americans because it was Latin American culture to mass murder
political opponents. All of this can actually be found in the interstices of the UN travaux
préparatoires.
They said this stuff in committee meetings, openly. Why? Because there were no norms
in place against saying things like this. To some degree, this illustrates Lemkin’s point. In polite
society, you cannot say such things anymore. It is considered crude and rude, and one is
shunned. The only political gures who utter such statements, some 80 years after the passage
of the UNGC, are professional provocateurs who use these statements to create a sense that they
are alternatives to the status quo. Norms matter. Clearly, though, the UNGC did not exactly
create the kinds of world-wide anti-genocide norms that Lemkin thought it would. Pensky’s
observation here sets the stage for Straus’ question on whether Lemkin can help genocide
studies solve these and other problems with genocide.
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Response to Professor Scott Straus: On Culture and the Place of Lemkin in Genocide Studies
The legal de nition of genocide is so convoluted and narrow that it is almost impossible to
de ne anything, legally, as genocide, Pensky writes. Yet, the common uses of genocide are so
broad that anything can be a genocide. This opens the door for what Moses described as
victims’ groups appropriating the word genocide to present their experience of oppression as
serious and a legitimate concern for global civil society. “What’s increasingly hard to locate in
this bipolar development,” Penksy concludes, “is precisely the sane and motivating middle
ground, the promise of law as both expression and enforcement of a global consensus that
demands enforceable limits on state power, that motivated both Lemkin and the rest of his
cohort in the rst place.”
I think one possible option for a “sane middle ground” is Straus’ formulation of group
selective mass categorical violence, which (I think) he most clearly articulates in The Making and
Unmaking of Nations: War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa.47
The Problem of Violence
Straus’ concept allows us to connect genocide to other forms of group-selective violence and
think more broadly about genocide in a way Lemkin rst imagined. Lemkin was serious when
he told reporters during interviews that he is a member of many nations. Let me say this again,
Lemkin believed his de nition of nations would include social groups such as people who liked
playing particular card games, or belonged to labor unions, or liked certain kinds of art and
poetry. I think Straus’ conceptualization of group-selective categorical mass violence would
correspond almost directly to Lemkin’s notion in Axis Rule that genocide was the destruction of
nations (where nations basically signi ed any social group). Lemkin’s and Straus’ formulations,
therefore, allow us to talk about genocides of people with disabilities and genocides against
political parties, whereas the UNGC does not.
That is important. Today, none of the following would be genocide, legally, because the
targeted social groups are not one of the four protected groups:
• An attempt by a state or non-state actor to eradicate LGBTQ+
people from society;48
• An attempt by a political party in power to commit mass
murder against opposition party members and eliminate the
party;49
• A counter insurgency campaign against terrorists that
includes the disappearance, mass torture, and murder of
peasants;50 or,
• A campaign by national police to eradicate a country’s drug
addicts.51
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While there is no international law against “selective mass categorical violence,” readers who are interested to see
how Straus operationalizes his concept in the practice of genocide prevention can check out Scott Straus,
Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention (Washington, DC: US Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2016),
accessed September 30, 2022, https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/reports-and-resources/
fundamentals-of-genocide-and-mass-atrocity-prevention.
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The scholars I cited for each of these bullet points either bend over backwards to make
their case “ t” the legal de nition, or they simply use a different de nition of genocide. I think
“group-selective mass categorical violence” gets us to a better place than the legal de nition of
genocide because it would let us bring together all these cases.
There is another area where Straus and Lemkin come together. When I re-read The
Making and Unmaking of Nations before teaching it this summer, I noticed how Straus’ rich
descriptions of founding narratives resembled Lemkin’s discussions of the importance of
political language in his draft of his un nished manuscript Introduction to the Study of Genocide in
the Social Sciences—especially when Lemkin writes about how a population can come to view
genocide as a moral good when everyday people start incorporating into their own speech the
derogatory language of elites and leaders, who use this language to create support for the wars
they want to ght.
Still, there are two areas where Straus departs from Lemkin. The rst has to do with
what amounts to destruction. Straus considers genocide to be a type of violence—violence that
is group selective (as opposed to indiscriminate killing), group-destructive (rather than
coercive), and large-scale and sustained. Lemkin considers genocide to be a type of con ict that
does not necessarily have to include direct violence. Straus, therefore, is able to zero-in on the
way leaders and elites, who direct group speci c mass violence, pursue genocide as a policy
choice, targeting speci c groups whom they view as dangerous, unable to coopt, or
uncontrollable. Lemkin is not able to do this. Genocide, for Straus, is therefore an outcome of an
escalatory process, which is intertwined dynamically with countless other con icts in a society
or polity. It would follow that genocide prevention, in Straus’ thinking, is about nding
openings for de-escalation in the context of these other con icts.52
When you read Lemkin’s draft manuscripts on genocide and the social sciences, you get
the sense that Lemkin would have de ned as genocide everything that Straus refers to as the
escalatory con icts that set the stage for genocide. This is a consequence of Lemkin’s notion that
genocide was not a type of violence aimed at the destruction of social groups, but a type of
con ict aimed at the destruction of social groups that sometimes was violent. Therefore, when
Lemkin talks about genocide prevention, he is talking about preventing things like mass
murder and, at the same time, preventing things like the destruction of a group’s artistic
creations and the banning of books. The upside of Lemkin’s formulation of genocide is that it
lets us contemplate the wide breath of repression and violence that are involved in long-term
systems of oppression, spanning what Johann Galtung termed direct violence, structural
violence, and cultural violence.53 The downside is that it makes it extremely dif cult to think
about preventing violence, speci cally, because Lemkin presents the causes of genocidal
violence as the same as the causes of other forms of genocidal oppression—such as the changing
of street names, the expropriation of wealth, the use of derogatory names, or the banning
wedding ceremonies.
The Problem of Culture
Finally, Straus points out, one of the fundamental issues that divides genocide studies is the
question of culture. I would agree that Lemkin “was not always a clear thinker,” and we are not
going to resolve this problem by a deep dive into his thinking. So, let us take a deep dive into
his thinking—and let us see how many readers I manage to confuse.
There is this idea out there that the UNGC is important because it protects “culture
bearing groups.” But this phrase was not used by the UN delegates and advocacy NGOs until
late 1947, when it was used to justify one of many compromises to the de nition of genocide. At
the time, the UK was close to successfully killing the entire idea of a genocide convention, and
the US had just succeeded in establishing a narrative that there were two types of genocide,
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physical genocide and cultural genocide, so they could excise the “cultural” bit from the text of
the UNGC under the pretext that “cultural genocide” was less important than “physical
genocide” (and thus prevent the UNGC from applying to the forced assimilation of American
Indians).
As with most things in politics, philosophical justi cations are invented after decisions
have been made. The idea that the UNGC should only protect so-called “culture bearing
groups” turned out to be a convenient excuse that many delegations used to explain why they
cut political groups and economic groups from the list of protected groups. For the US
delegation, it was a handy way of justifying why they wanted to remove things related to
“cultural genocide” from the UNGC—arguing that if “culture bearing groups” were protected,
then there was no need to protect culture.
At the same time, the term “culture bearing groups” allowed humanitarian advocates to
also claim victory in what was otherwise a defeat. Lemkin went along for the ride and adopts
this phrase “culture bearing groups,” using it in his writings between 1947 and 1948 (we can
still nd it in Lemkin’s writings published in 1949). This phrase then gets locked into received
scholarship, especially by scholars who take the travaux préparatoires at face value. From here,
the phrase “culture bearing groups” takes on a life of its own in genocide studies. It is likely
here to stay. I think this is unfortunate.
If Straus is asking me, personally, if political groups (or other so called “non-culture
bearing groups”) should be considered within a rubric on genocide—then my answer is “yes.”
Let me explain. I do not think there is such a thing as culture-bearing groups because I do not
think there is such a thing as “cultural groups” in the rst place. Likewise, I do not think that
any particular group can have one culture, nor do I think individuals can be reduced to culture,
and I certainly do not think “a culture” can be represented by any individual.
If readers are now accusing me of obliterating the concept of culture and turning it into
a completely meaningless word, that would be a fair but inaccurate accusation. I think the
concept of culture, as with the concepts of race and ethnicity, and even the concept of identity,
are steeped in the history of Western modernity. These are not universally accepted or
transhistorical ideas (even though scholars who use these concepts apply them universally and
transhistorically in their academic work). This is why, during genocide prosecutions the ICTR,
the Cambodia war crimes tribunal, and national courts of Argentina all had to try and gure out
what really makes a group an ethnic, national, or religious group. These ideas have histories,
and I am always suspicious of attempts to naturalize these concepts and turn them into
universal human categories.54
Our word “culture” in contemporary English comes from the Middle English usage
denoting the cultivation of land. Middle English borrowed it from the Latin verb cultura,
meaning “to grow” (which is why we use the word culture to describe the growing of bacteria
in yogurt and lab plates). This turned into our current understanding of culture—in the sense of
“manifestations of human intellectual achievement regarded collectively” especially in “the
customs, arts, social institutions, and achievements of a particular nation, people, or other social
group”—because of the in uence of the German Romantic philosopher, Johann Gottfried
Herder. Herder viewed human societies as having their own unique transhistorical traits, or
cultures, that could grow and ourish over time if nurtured properly, or wax, then wane, and
die but never mix (Herder was reviled by Lemkin, who accused the 19th century philosopher of

If I were challenged on this, I would cite Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2006). Yes, Straus uses the category of ethnic group to describe Hutu and Tutsi groups,
when the term doesn’t t neatly into the schema of Bantu languages. However, Straus shows us that what he calls
“ethnicity” or “ethnic con ict” is different in Rwandan local contexts than “ethnicity” and “ethnic con icts”
elsewhere. This is what allows Straus to demonstrate quite clearly that ethnicity drops into a background condition
of the genocide, even though Western observers are primed to see ethnicity as the primary condition. For Straus,
fear, insecurity, and intra-ethnic intimidation (and their local variations) matter much more—and even here these
are conditioned by Rwanda’s state effectiveness, geography, and population density.
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setting the stage for Nazism, despite having some good ideas such as cultural tolerance that the
Nazis ignored).
If I am forced to associate myself with a de nition culture, then I will pick what Clifford
Geertz termed the “webs of meaning” in which we are all suspended. But if we de ne culture
the way Geertz de nes culture, then “destroying” a culture is impossible and the entire logic of
genocide as cultural destruction is non-sensical (however, that does not stop the perpetrators of
genocide from thinking that they want to destroy a culture, and then causing a whole bunch of
suffering and harm as they try to carry out this non-sensical task).
Straus thus asks me: “Should groups marked by a disability be considered protected
groups under the Convention? Should regional groups or gender groups? Do these groups have
a culture? I conclude from the book that Lemkin was not clear on these questions.”
My responses: Yes, I think they should be included. Do they have “a culture”? Maybe,
but that should not matter. And, nally, yes, Lemkin was not clear.
I would advocate for any group-speci c categorical violence to be considered genocide.
This frees us from the symphisian task of trying to gure out what groups are truly human
universal types of groups, and it saves us from the yucky project of trying to rank groups in
importance. Given the diversity of human social life across time and around the world—from
hunter-gather societies and nomads to whatever you would call the global network of pre-teens
who play Minecraft—I do not think we can actually name any kind of social group that is truly
universal. But we know that humans do form social groups. So, why not just say, as Straus and
Lemkin do, that genocide is an attempt to destroy any social group? That way we can be sure
our concept of genocide would also apply to some hellish hypothetical attempt to obliterate
video game players as a group.
The Problem of Culture in Lemkin’s Thought
If we are talking about culture in Lemkin’s thought, things get messy. First, Lemkin did see
cultural destruction as integral to genocide. But he did not call the destruction of culture
genocide, except when cultural destruction was used as a means of destroying a nation. Why?
Because he thought culture was the thing that held nations together.
Confused yet?
Let us go deeper. Lemkin also says the loss of a culture can be a good thing if the
culture is antiquated and does not meet the needs of a nation in the modern world. Across his
writings on Latin American and African cases, Lemkin often considers the disintegration of
culture as progress, not genocide, because he thought cultural change was necessary for saving
nations that were colonized. In fact, Lemkin says, the point of preserving the basis of cultural
diversity is so we can allow people to experience different cultures and therefore be inspired to
change their own nations’ cultures.
Confused yet?
Now, at the same time, Lemkin does not consider it a bad thing if national groups cease
to exist either. Remember, he de nes nations as just about any social group we can think of.
Therefore, nations are always coming and going and changing. What Lemkin wants to prevent
is intentional efforts to destroy nations, because he sees this type of oppression as an assault on
the world’s cultural diversity, and a lack of cultural diversity leads to depravations, hardships,
and suffering of all kinds.
Confused yet?
Lemkin clearly understood, as Straus writes, that perpetrators destroyed groups, or
attempted to, in part through the destruction of intellectuals, religion, language, arts, and
symbols. But, as Straus points out, a central argument for the need for a UNGC concerned the
intrinsic value of groups as expressed through culture. However, Lemkin never offers a
de nition of culture—besides saying that culture is what holds nations together.
Then, Lemkin gives us a pastiche of popular anthropological theories of his day to
explain how culture holds nations together (without ever de ning culture). He starts off
borrowing from the Polish Anthropologist Bronisław Malinowsky, then slowly borrowing from
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Ruth Benedict. But he does not seem to understand these two Anthropologists have very
different understandings of what culture is, what it does, and how you can know culture. This
is a problem if culture rests at the center of your theory of genocide, and you are arguing that
nations should be protected in order to protect their unique culture. It is an unworkable system.
What is more, this makes Lemkin feel like a conservative communitarian, reducing individuals’
selves to the sum of their identities, and locating the good of individuals lives in cultural
communities (which he cannot de ne, by the way, but he still feels it is there). I think this speaks
to Moses’ point that Lemkin repudiated the Nazi biological conception of race only to have
embraced a cultural version of this same idea.
Things get even more confused when Lemkin allows his de nition of nations to blend
into his de nition of culture. This prevents Lemkin from thinking clearly about the relationship
between social groups and culture. As a result, Lemkin cannot articulate a clear theory of why
he thinks genocide is such a bad thing—beyond self-evident claims that genocide causes people
to suffer and destroys cultural diversity. Straus asks, therefore: “At one level, the point resonates
—cultures are a source of diversity. But what does this really mean? What is a group’s culture?
Can a group be said to have a culture? Lemkin’s views continue to strike me as being not being
especially sophisticated on this question.”
I think Straus’ point is the right point to make. Let me sketch out Lemkin’s system. Pay
attention to the circular logic that arises in points 5 and 6:
1. Nations are basically any social group.
2. Culture is what holds the nation together.
- Lemkin talks about the culture of lawyers, the culture
of the ancient Assyrians, the culture of gamblers, the
culture of magazine readers, and so forth.
3. Destroying culture is one way you destroy a nation
(because a nation needs a culture to be held together).
4. Destroying a nation always results in the loss of that
nation’s culture.
- i.e., a genocide against the Jazz nation results in the
destruction of Jazz culture.
5. Destroying culture is bad because it causes individuals
from targeted nations much suffering, as their social world
becomes more and more impoverished.
- i.e., the destruction of Jazz culture deprives people of
the Jazz nation of Jazz culture.
- Did you spot the circular logic right there? Lemkin’s
system is a closed loop, which any social scientist or
theorist will tell you results from an inability to create
clear de nitional boundaries between key concepts.
6. Destroying nations is bad because it causes cultural loss,
and cultural loss impoverishes world civilization (our
collective humanity) of that culture’s gifts.
- More circular reasoning.
7. Therefore, nations should be protected so we can preserve
cultural diversity and thereby give every individual in the
world an opportunity to join new nations, if they want, or
enjoy the fruits of their contact with other nations, which
can inspire new ideas and new ways of looking at the
world.
8. Genocide, by destroying nations, makes the world less
culturally diverse, and therefore leads to intellectual and
artistic stagnation and prevents cultural change.
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- Points 7 and 8 are self-evident, and implied by the
circular logic of points 5 and 6.
As Max Pensky said on a Zoom call with me a few weeks ago, Lemkin was most
certainly not a philosopher and constantly tied himself into knots when he tried to wade into
theory. This is one such knot. There is no getting out of this one (it is circular logic after all!).
What Place Should Lemkin Have in Genocide Studies?
Lemkin certainly belongs in the pantheon of major 20th-century human rights gures. But
Lemkin should not be turned into a sacred founder- gure of genocide studies. I think we can
look to Lemkin to understand what was at stake as the meaning of genocide changed. For
example, Daniel Feierstein has used Lemkin’s ideas to place genocide into a sociological
framework that is sensitive to the relationship between group speci c mass violence and other
social con ict processes.55 I nd that a fruitful endeavor.
Relatedly, I think that reading Lemkin can help genocide scholars understand what is at
stake if we adopt the legal de nition of genocide without understanding how the UNGC
drafting process changed the meaning of the term. And, Lemkin’s writings can be a source of
critical re ection, pointing genocide scholars towards new lines of research. For example,
genocide scholars have all but forgotten Lemkin’s writings on economics and con ict. Reading
Lemkin’s writings before Axis Rule can help us ask why genocide studies has ignored questions
of economics for decades. I think one possible reason is that any hint of a connection between
economic con ict and group destruction was scrubbed from the UNGC, as the Soviets and
Americans wanted to reserve a right to wage war on economic groups and to conduct economic
warfare. This set in motion a long pattern of genocide scholars overlooking the intersection of
economics and group destruction, under an assumption that genocide was a national, racial,
ethnic, religious, social, cultural, and even political phenomenon—not economic.56
Final Thoughts
I have gone on too long. In my defense, I needed to reply thoughtfully to four provocative and
careful reviews of my work—in a way that would allow people who have not read my book to
follow along.
Sarah, Dirk, Max, and Scott: I have read and admired your work over the years. Thank
you for all your contributions to our eld. I have appreciated this opportunity to take up your
questions, and I hope our readers nd this exchange worthwhile.
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Introduction
Krikor Haitaian survived the Hamidian massacres hiding in a chicken coop.1 He was just four
years old in 1895 when the violence swept through his village of Göydün in Ottoman Turkey.
Ninety years later, he recalled how the Turkish perpetrators were allowed three hours in which
to pillage and plunder, seizing Armenian goods and livestock with impunity. The men of his
village ed to the elds and hid. Haitaian recounts: “When the Turks rushed into our village my
mother took the axe and sent us to the henhouse. She was standing behind the door to protect
us, to kill any Turk that might approach us. Then the Turk saw the axe…he left and ran away.
He couldn’t rob anything.”2 In this extraordinary act of bravery, Haitaian’s mother may very
well have saved his life. Her erce determination to resist the massacres was clear. “If any Turk
came in to hurt us,” Haitaian recalled, “she was going to knock him, and chop him up.”3
Haitaian’s incredible tale highlights the determination of one Armenian family to survive,
despite the desperate circumstances that prevailed. Such tenacity was widespread. In villages,
towns, and cities through Anatolia, Armenians did whatever they could to resist the onslaught.
The Hamidian massacres, also known as the Armenian massacres, were a series of
massacres that swept through Ottoman Turkey between 1894 and 1896. In many respects, they
were the culmination of longstanding discrimination and persecution experienced by
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.4 The Armenians were considered giaours, or in dels, of
inferior status and subject to of cial discrimination. As the empire declined in the nineteenth
century, tensions grew between the Armenian population, and the Turkish and Kurdish
populations with whom they were closely intermingled. By the early 1890s, many Armenians
were experiencing increasing persecution and hardship. In Sassoun, local events led to an
outbreak of massacres in 1894, which claimed approximately six thousand lives.5 British,
French, and Russian outrage at the atrocities led to a Scheme of Armenian Reforms being agreed
upon between the Great Powers and the Ottoman government.6 Yet, a year after the Sassoun
massacres, the reforms—which included such major changes as proportional representation for
Armenians amongst administrators, police, and gendarmerie in six provinces—were still
awaiting Ottoman government signature.7 In the capital Constantinople, an Armenian protest
at the delay was set upon by the gendarmerie, leading to riots.8 The violence escalated into
massacres throughout much of the empire between October and December 1895. With the
1
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Present, Including Chronicles of the Caliphs from Mahomet to Abdul Hamid II (London: H.S. Nichols, 1895), 281–282. The
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coming of the new year, they largely abated; but the situation remained extremely tense,
and there were sporadic outbursts of violence. In August 1896, the seizure of the Imperial
Ottoman Bank in Constantinople by the Dashnaktsutiun Armenian revolutionary party
sparked a further massacre, claiming approximately 6,000 lives.9 This, and a massacre
shortly thereafter in Egin, were the final large-scale massacres in what became known as the
Hamidian massacres; however, Armenians continued to experience persecution and
violence. Altogether, the Hamidian massacres claimed between 100,000 and 200,000 lives.10
Hundreds of thousands more were left destitute.
The Hamidian massacres have received quite limited attention in the literature. As
terrible as they were, they were quickly overshadowed by the subsequent Armenian
genocide. More than one million Armenians were killed in the Young Turks’ attempt to
annihilate the Armenian population in Turkey from 1915 onwards. Scholarly attention has
focused predominantly on this genocide, not least because of the Turkish government’s
ongoing campaign of denial. Within the scholarship on the massacres, the topic of
Armenian resistance has attracted little attention. Although some key incidents have been
detailed, as far as is known, there has been no study dedicated to examining the occurrence,
prevalence, and types of resistance employed during the massacres overall. The present
study seeks to address this gap through an exploratory analysis of resistance. After
conceptualizing resistance and outlining the research design, the study examines the
Armenian capacity for resistance, and the contours of that resistance—including scope,
organization, and strategies employed. It then examines the boundaries of Armenian
resistance, before reflecting on its outcomes. Finally, the article concludes by considering
how an analysis of resistance can contribute to our understanding of the massacres more
broadly, and particularly the vexed question of the role of the Ottoman government in their
perpetration.
Conceptualizing Resistance to Mass Violence
The concept of resistance to mass violence gained considerable scholarly attention in the
aftermath of the Holocaust. Raul Hilberg, in The Destruction of the European Jews—widely
regarded as the first comprehensive historical account of the Holocaust—considered the issue
of resistance as part of his analysis. Hilberg defined resistance as “opposition to the
perpetrator,” which in practice, he conceptualized narrowly, as armed, group resistance.11
Taking issue with Hilberg’s definition, a number of scholars subsequently proposed a more
inclusive understanding. Yehuda Bauer defined Jewish resistance to the Holocaust as “any
group action consciously taken in opposition to known or surmised laws, actions or
intentions directed against the Jews by the Germans and their supporters.”12 Bauer’s
definition of resistance included forms of unarmed resistance, such as smuggling food into
ghettos to avoid starvation, and activities taken to improve morale and maintain cultural
practices. Spiritual resistance became accepted as a component of resistance to the
Holocaust.13 Later, Bauer reflected that perhaps individual acts of resistance also merited
inclusion, although he perceived this as a “slippery and awkward topic,” as “what to include
9
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of Chicago Press, 1992), 46.
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1897), 320–331; and Louise Nalbandian’s estimate of 50,000–300,000, Louise Nalbandian, The Armenian
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University of California Press, 1963), 206.
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and what to exclude is difficult to determine.”14 Roger Gottlieb further explored the concept
of resistance, highlighting the importance of intention. He defined resistance as “the attempt
by the oppressed to limit, thwart, or end that oppression.”15 Gottlieb also highlighted the
importance of identity within both the processes of oppression and resistance. Importantly, he
questioned whether there is “a distinction between resistance and simply trying to stay
alive?”16 An act to transfer oppression away from oneself to another member of the oppressed
group may not be resistance, as “the goal of resistance must be to lessen the total quantity of
oppression.”17 Yet, in circumstances in which the perpetrators seek the total annihilation of
the oppressed, this distinction may not be valid. In these circumstances, simply choosing life
becomes an act of resistance.18
This scholarship provides important insights into conceptualizing resistance. Its
utility is somewhat limited, however, by its heavy contextualization within discussions of the
Holocaust. The very different circumstances of the Holocaust and the Hamidian massacres
meant that possibilities and strategies for resistance within each were quite different. Many
examples used to define the boundaries of resistance during the Holocaust do not have ready
parallels in the massacres. Turning to scholarship on resistance to the Armenian genocide,
there is a similar evolution from narrow conceptions of resistance as armed resistance, to
more inclusive definitions that include civilian and nonviolent resistance. While earlier
authors on the genocide, such as Vahakn Dadrian, concentrated heavily on armed resistance,
recent contributions have recognized a wider range of activities as constituting resistance.
Raymond Kévorkian, for example, has discussed Armenians burning their harvests prior to
deportation as an act of resistance.19 Khatchig Mouradian has defined resistance as “actions
carried out illegally, or against the sanction and will of the authorities, to save Armenian
deportees from annihilation.”20 This includes nonviolent acts of humanitarian resistance.
Importantly, such a more inclusive definition also allows for greater recognition of the
contributions of women to resistance.21 To incorporate the insights offered by the scholarship
on resistance to the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide, while recognizing the unique
circumstances of the Hamidian massacres, the current study avoids a rigid definition of
resistance. Resistance is broadly defined in accordance with Gottlieb’s definition, as an
“attempt by the oppressed [individual or group] to limit, thwart or end that oppression,”
where such an attempt seeks to “lessen the total quantity of oppression.”22 A certain leniency
has been accorded to consider specific actions as potential acts of resistance on a case-by-case
basis, and to facilitate analysis of grey zone activities that may or may not be considered as
resistance.
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Resistance during the Armenian Genocide
Armenian resistance to the 1915 genocide has been well-documented, with many important
scholarly contributions in recent years.23 Major sites of resistance are well-known. Perhaps the
most famous—later becoming the subject of a novel and lm—occurred at Musa Dagh, in the
province of Aleppo.24 There, more than four thousand villagers, after being given the order to
prepare for deportation in July 1915, chose instead to retreat up a nearby mountain and attempt
self-defense. After battling Turkish attacks for several weeks, they were rescued by French
forces and evacuated to Egypt. In Van, thirty thousand Armenians sought to defend themselves
from the genocidal campaign. They survived constant attacks and a siege, to ultimately be
saved by the advance of the Russian army into the city. Other attempts at armed resistance were
unsuccessful, such as those in Ourfa, Sassoun, and Zeitoun. Scholars have also examined cases
of rescue. Several thousand Armenian refugees who reached Sinjar, for example, were taken in
and protected by the local Yezidi population.25 Many other cases of smaller-scale rescue in a
range of circumstances have been documented, although undoubtedly others will never be
known.26 Historians have recognized, however, that a combination of Turkish planning, the
powerlessness of the Armenians, and a hostile Turkish population made resistance impossible
in most circumstances during the genocide.27 Whereas there is good knowledge of the contours
of resistance during the genocide, much less is known about that during the Hamidian
massacres, to which the article now turns.
Methodology
In order to elucidate key facets of resistance to the massacres, this research adopts an
exploratory research design. This design was chosen due to the very limited amount of previous
research on the topic. An exploratory approach enables the researcher to investigate a
phenomenon not yet well understood. It allows for a certain uidity in de nitions and
boundaries that can accommodate unexpected discoveries. A dynamic and dialectic inferential
process can be utilized to progress the research, developing insight into the phenomenon under
study without preset hypotheses limiting scope. Nonetheless, a clear structure guides the
research. A four-tiered framework provides the analytic lens through which resistance is
examined, incorporating the following:
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1. Consideration of the circumstances in which resistance was
possible.
2. Exploration of the contours of resistance, including the
strategies employed, scope, and organization of resistance
efforts.
3. Examination of the boundaries of resistance, and grey-zone
activities.
4. Analysis of the outcomes of the resistance, and the resulting
impact on the Armenian people.
Additionally, the research ndings with respect to resistance will be discussed in light
of their implications for our understanding of the massacres overall.
Careful selection of appropriate sources is critical for research on the Hamidian
massacres. There is widespread evidence of a “pattern of of cial misrepresentation” within
of cial Turkish sources concerning them.28 Death tolls, and estimates of those wounded, for
example, appear to vastly and systematically underrepresent true gures.29 Furthermore,
Turkish of cials have “sanitized the archives so that researchers today will nd almost no
documentation incriminating Ottoman Turkish leaders in the ethnic cleansings between 1894
and 1924.”30 By contrast, European diplomatic and consular records are widely regarded as
offering more impartial accounts.31 Written for internal consumption, rather than publicity or
propaganda purposes, their accounts also align with those of other witnesses to the massacres,
including travelers, Western journalists, and missionaries. Protestant missionaries left extensive
records, written at the time for internal communication purposes, that provide an invaluable
source of information regarding the massacres. This research utilizes a wide selection of these
archival and contemporary sources. Additionally, it incorporates relevant testimony from
victims of the massacres, from the Shoah Visual History archives. Collectively, these sources
allow for the construction of a representative depiction of Armenian resistance to the Hamidian
massacres.
There are a number of limitations to the methodology that must be acknowledged.
First, the research did not include material from Ottoman archives, although a wide range of
representative sources were used. Second, most of the information available about resistance to
the massacres comes from witness accounts. Only rarely do we hear directly from resisters
themselves. While a diversity of witness testimonies provide for triangulation and veri cation
of reports, the immediacy and directness of rst-hand accounts is lost. Finally, the exploratory
approach portrays a representative depiction of resistance, rather than a comprehensive one.
Further research is required to delve more deeply into the many aspects of Armenian resistance
to the Hamidian massacres.
It is also important to acknowledge the position of the author with respect to the
research. I approach this study as a genocide studies scholar and historian. I have long been
interested in how vulnerable populations respond to mass atrocities. While targeted groups are
often presented as passive victims in scholarship, my research has found—across multiple case
studies—that such groups often display incredible agency in the pursuit of self-protection.
Armenian Capacity for Resistance
Any examination of resistance must occur within the context of an understanding of the
capacity for such resistance. In the case of the Hamidian massacres, such capacity was very
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limited. Evidence indicates that in many—if not most—circumstances, resistance was
exceedingly dif cult or impossible. Armenians were typically a minority in any given town or
village, surrounded by a largely hostile local population. In addition, Ottoman authorities made
concerted efforts to forestall the possibility of resistance. Several speci c strategies were
employed to this end. Perhaps the most common, and effective, was that of con scating all
rearms from Armenians in anticipation of the violence. As tensions rose, local of cials would
demand that Armenians surrender their weapons, often on the imsiest of pretexts. In October
1895, for example, the authorities at Birejik ordered the Armenians to surrender their arms,
because “the Moslems were afraid of them.”32 Soldiers ostensibly sent to protect the disarmed
Armenians then instigated a massacre in early January, which completely destroyed the
Christian population there.33 In Kesserik, when a massacre threatened, the Armenians
“defended themselves energetically,” believing the attack was the “sole initiative” of the local
population.34 The Turks, however, informed provincial authorities, who sent soldiers and an
Armenian delegate to the village in response. The Armenians were persuaded to surrender their
weapons as a “sign of their submission to the government.”35 Once they had done so, however,
the soldiers withdrew, and the Turks attacked. Some of those trying to ee were killed by the
soldiers in the area.36 Similar records of Armenians being required to surrender their weapons,
from months to even just hours in advance of a massacre, are widespread.37
A second strategy commonly employed to prevent resistance was that of surprise.
While the situation in a given area might be tense for weeks or months, often it was unclear that
a massacre was imminent until its eruption. The massacre in Trezibond provides a case in point.
As one contemporary account put it:
For a week prior to the outbreak on October 8, there was great
excitement in Trebizond, and the consuls called in a body upon
the Vali, and urged him to arrest those who were exciting the
populace to deeds of violence. Matters apparently quieted
down for a few days, when, suddenly, like a clap of thunder in
a clear sky, the assault began. Unsuspecting people walking
along the streets were shot ruthlessly down.38
In Sivas, the violence was similarly unexpected. There, “suddenly at noon, as if at a
given signal” the massacre commenced.39 An eyewitness account noted: “No resistance was
made by the Armenians, who seemed overpowered in the suddenness of the onslaught, the
number of their armed assailants and the relentless ferocity with which they were pursued to
their death.”40 These examples highlight that in many cases, Armenians had nothing with which
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they could defend themselves, and no opportunity to prepare in advance of a massacre. In such
circumstances, resistance was simply not an option.
The Contours of Armenian Resistance
In circumstances in which Armenians were able to resist the massacres, they employed a
diverse range of strategies and approaches to doing so. Armed resistance varied from largescale, coordinated attempts to defend a city or region, to small-scale and individual efforts to
protect homes and lives. Armenians also widely employed a range of non-violent resistance
measures. These included attempting to purchase their safety or protection, seeking sanctuary
in places perceived as safe, and hiding from perpetrators. In some cases, communities worked
together in pursuit of such strategies, while in other cases, families or even individuals
attempted to resist on their own. The following section explores a representative cross-section of
the strategies, scope, and organizational characteristics of Armenian resistance.
Armed Resistance
During the course of the massacres, there were three large-scale, organized attempts at armed
resistance by the Armenians, in Zeitoun, Van, and Ourfa. The variable circumstances in which
each occurred, and their contrasting outcomes, offer substantial insight into the contexts of
resistance, and the factors that rendered successful resistance so dif cult. The failure of most
smaller-scale attempts at armed resistance reinforce these ndings.
In Zeitoun, a remote town located in a deep valley surrounded by mountains, the
Armenians decided to resist by launching a pre-emptive attack. Zeitounlis had a erce
reputation as a mountainous people with a history of attempting to defend themselves from
Ottoman encroachment.41 In October 1895, as reports reached Zeitoun of massacres in the
surrounding areas, and of a planned massacre for the town itself, the Zeitoulis decided to take
the offensive.42 They commenced an insurrection, besieging, and then seizing a Turkish garrison
on the outskirts of the town, along with establishing a defensive perimeter.43 In response,
government forces repeatedly attacked Zeitoun, leading to a series of ferocious battles. Tens of
thousands of Turkish soldiers and Kurkish and Circassian irregulars fought 1,500 or so
Zeitounli resisters but were unable to penetrate their defenses.44 In one battle to the east of the
city:
The Zeitounlis made a stand at a stone bridge which there
spans a rushing torrent. But after holding it bravely for awhile
they slowly retreated up a steep hill until almost the entire
Tukrish army had crossed the bridge, when suddenly the
bridge was blown up and the Zeitounlis turning, hurled down
from the hills above great rocks and poured upon them a most
destructive re. Hemmed in as they were the loss was very
great.45
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The Ottoman advantage of numbers was outweighed by the Zeitounlis’ topographical
advantage, local knowledge of the terrain, excellent marksmanship, and desperate
determination to succeed.46
As news of the insurrection spread, the Zeitounlis had to contend with thousands of
refugees from massacres in the surrounding areas seeking safe haven in the town, along with
multiple requests for assistance from nearby villages under attack.47 While the Zeitounlis had
been well prepared, conditions began to deteriorate, with growing shortages of food and
ammunition.48 The Armenian death toll, from the ghting and the privations, reached several
thousand.49 At the same time, Turkish forces also took heavy losses. British Consul Barnham
estimated that by early January at least 5,000 soldiers had been killed, and possibly up to
10,000.50 In late December, the Armenian, Gregorian, and Catholic Patriachs, recognizing the
potential for wholesale slaughter in Zeitoun should the insurrection fail, requested the
assistance of the Ambassadors of the Great Powers to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the
violence.51 The Sultan initially rejected the Ambassadors’ offer, hoping for outright victory.
Continued attempts to defeat the Zeitounlis were unsuccessful, however. As January
progressed, thousands more troops perished in battle, as well as due to the freezing winter
conditions. Both the Sultan and the Zeitounlis agreed to negotiations, and by the end of January
an agreement was reached. Christian and Moslem inhabitants in the region would surrender
their weapons; there would be a general amnesty and the expulsion from the empire of leaders
of the insurrection; a Christian governor would be appointed for the region; and there would be
relief for the Zeitounlis from excessive taxes.52 The agreement represented a major victory for
the Armenians of Zeitoun. Indeed, this became the most successful example of resistance to the
massacres.
In Van, too, Armenian resistance had some success. Armenians in the city there formed
the majority of the population, and there was some organized Armenian political activity, led by
three groups of revolutionaries. The proximity of Van to the Russian border, moreover, meant
that Armenians had easier access to arms in this region than elsewhere. For these reasons, it was
clear that Van would not be an easy target for massacre. Due to this, and the opposition of local
authorities to violence, it largely escaped the wave of massacres that swept through the empire
in late 1895.53 By June 1896, however, ongoing tensions—fermented by the government—
reached boiling point, and a massacre erupted. The three Armenian parties formed a Joint
Directorate of Defense, deploying 500 men in strategic positions around parts of the city.54 A
erce battle took place for control of the streets. Armenians in mixed areas were early targets,
and those unable to get to the Armenian quarters were massacred.55 Within the defended areas,
however, Armenian positions stood rm. They were aided by British Vice Consul Williams, who
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worked to protect the Armenians and negotiate a peaceful end to the violence.56 After nine days
of battle, agreement was reached whereby the revolutionaries would be allowed to leave the
country, and all weapons would be surrendered in exchange for a promise of protection. As the
revolutionaries were on route to Iran, however, the Turkish authorities abrogated the deal, and
most of those escaping were slaughtered.57 In the city itself, the promise of protection was
honored, with the many thousands of Armenians who had survived the battle thereby escaping
massacre. In the outlying regions of Van, largely unable to resist, it is estimated that around
20,000 Armenians were killed.58 Thus, the resistance in Van can be regarded as having
signi cant, albeit partial, success. The numerical strength of the Armenians, their ability to
access arms, and the mediation of British Vice Consul Williams all played a critical role in this
success.
In Ourfa, too, the Armenians attempted to defend themselves from the massacres. The
rst massacre there began in earnest on October 28, after a period of raised tensions. Expecting
the violence, many Armenians had remained at home. A “determined resistance” was made at
the entrances of the Armenian quarter.59 Armenian shops were looted, and Armenians found
outside the quarter attacked, but attempts to penetrate the quarter itself were unsuccessful.
Thereafter, the quarter was placed under siege, and several weeks of great tension ensued.60 The
government demanded the Armenians surrender all their weapons, promising protection if they
did so and threatening to attack the quarter with cannons if they did not.61 In November, the
Armenians reluctantly surrendered their weapons, and soldiers conducted extensive searches of
the quarter. Tensions did not ease. In December, rumors swirled of an imminent attack. When
the Armenians approached the government for the promised protection, several thousand
soldiers were dispatched to the Armenian quarter.62 Rather than offering protection, however,
they instigated renewed violence. A brutal massacre ensued against the now defenseless
Armenians.63 Men, women, and children were slaughtered, with entire families being killed in
some cases. Rape and torture were widespread. Thousands ed to the Gregorian Cathedral
seeking refuge. A Turkish mob attacked and began killing those inside before setting it alight.64
Those trying to ee were murdered by the crowd, while most perished in the ames. “The air of
the city was unendurable” from the stench of burning bodies, according to the lone American
missionary in the city.65 Altogether, several thousand Armenians perished in the massacre,
which many observers regarded as one of the most severe in the series. Armenian attempts at
resistance, successful at rst, ultimately led to terrible retribution and mass killing.
There were numerous other places where the Armenians took up arms to resist the
onslaught, albeit on a smaller scale. In the large Armenian village of Guermuch, near Ourfa, the
villagers took an extraordinary approach to try and prevent a massacre. As Kurds and Arabs
approached to attack, the Armenians pitched tents in front of the village, red off as many guns
as they could, and sent word that the tents were those of soldiers, sent by the government to
protect the village.66 Confused and deceived, the attackers withdrew. Later, the authorities in
Ourfa demanded the Armenians surrender their arms. Instead of doing so, they came in a group
to Ourfa, declaring that if the “government wished them to be massacred, they had better do so
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at once and on the spot in Ourfa, as they (the Armenians) were completely at their mercy, but
that they would never surrender their weapons, which were their only protection against the
surrounding armed and hostile Kurdish and Arab tribes.”67 After paying a ransom to keep their
weapons, they survived unmolested. In places like Aintab, Chemchem de Lidjé, Gurun,
Boussou, and elsewhere, Armenians mounted armed resistance for as long as they could, but
were overcome in a matter of days.68 In Diarbekier province, Armenians from three villages
close to the Magapavetzvotz monastery sought refuge there and resisted for six days, but were
ultimately overrun.69 In Andakh, Armenians resisted for six days with little more than stones
and daggers.70 When it became clear that further defense was hopeless, many threw themselves
into a ravine.71 These many accounts highlight the determination of the Armenians to resist
wherever and however possible, even in almost hopeless circumstances.
There are also recorded incidents of individual Armenians violently resisting the
massacres, like that of Krikor Haitaian’s mother, as described in the introduction. In GumushHane, the wealthy Armenian notable Nichan Israelian was threatened by a horde of seven to
eight hundred Turks, attracted by the prospect of plunder as the massacre got underway there.72
He managed to defend his property for three hours, before the Turks used petrol to set his
house alight.73 He then attempted to ee to the government buildings for protection, but was
shot dead on the way. Despite Israelian’s resistance being unsuccessful, a witness noted that it
prevented greater atrocities in the Armenian quarter of Gumush-Hane, as it occupied many
perpetrators for much of the period of the massacre.74 Such individual attempts at violent
resistance were even more likely to fail than coordinated attempts, and it is likely that most of
such attempts went unrecorded. Indeed, many Armenians, recognizing the likely futility of
violent resistance, utilized a range of non-violent strategies in attempting to survive the
massacres. The following section turns to examine these approaches.
Non-Violent Resistance
A major non-violent strategy employed by Armenians was that of attempting to purchase
immunity from the massacres. The most signi cant, and perhaps telling, example of this
occurred in the town of Egin, in the province of Harput (also referred to as Mamuret-Ul-Aziz),
in Eastern Turkey. Egin was described by missionary Emma Barnum—passing through in 1892
—as “a wonderful city.”75 Situated on a steep mountainside, with the Euphrates owing at its
base, it was green and picturesque. Barnum described the people as “aristocratic and formal,”
“re ned and neat.”76 “The houses are built of stone, are large and airy, and most of those I
visited were beautifully furnished. Egin was a wealthy city, but the people there as well as in
other places, are growing poor.”77 Estimates as to the number of Armenians, and Armenian
households, in Egin are variable. There were perhaps 1,100 households, and around 6,000
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Armenians in total.78 The city was intermingled, with approximately equal numbers of Moslems
and Christians. In 1895, as massacres threatened, the Armenians of Egin collectively decided on
a non-violent resistance strategy—that of purchasing immunity from the violence. They paid a
Kurdish chief 1,500 Turkish pounds to secure protection.79 At something like $200,000 US
dollars today, this equates to a payment of around $2,000 from every household. At the same
time, they also surrendered all their arms to the Turkish government.80 Their strategy proved
successful, and they were able to avoid being targeted in 1895, even as the violence spread with
great severity throughout the remainder of Harput.81
The reprieve proved not to last, however. In August 1896, when a massacre erupted in
Constantinople, the situation in Egin rapidly deteriorated. Local of cials seemed to perceive the
renewed unrest as an opportunity to target one of the very few places in Harput that had
escaped the violence and looting of the previous year.82 On September 15 at noon, a single
gunshot was red—the signal for the massacre to commence.83 For three days, the Armenians
were targeted in a massacre of particular severity. Estimates suggest that close to 2,000
Armenians were killed, including the majority of adult males.84 Women and children were also
targeted. Many women and girls committed suicide by throwing themselves into the Euphrates
river, to avoid being raped or killed.85 According to one report, “not one house was left
unplundered.”86 The vast majority of Armenian houses were then set alight, as were the
Armenian churches in the city.87 The evidence indicates that the massacre was of cially
sanctioned, and perpetrated by soldiers and local Turks rather than Kurds.88 In its aftermath, the
survivors in Egin were left destitute and homeless.
Attempts to purchase immunity from the massacres also occurred in numerous smaller
villages, with mixed results. In the Vilayet of Erzeroum, the village of Kamazor paid a ransom
in grain from the harvest and ten Turkish pounds; Dodoveran paid a ransom in grain; and
Ishgon paid a ransom of thirty Turkish pounds.89 Souk Chermak escaped attack by a payment
of 120 Turkish pounds.90 In this area, it seems likely that news of this strategy spread from one
village to another as a possible means of resistance. Abu-Sheikh, in the Egin district in Harput
province, paid 200 Turkish pounds in ransom.91 In the province of Diyarbekir, the inhabitants of
Tel-Arman also attempted to purchase their safety. Here, a Kurdish leader demanded payment
of 90 Turkish pounds for protection.92 After the Armenians paid, however, he increased his
demand to 400 pounds. This further payment did not protect the Armenians. The Kurds
78
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attacked and plundered Tel-Arman, and many Armenians were massacred.93 Occasionally,
individuals also sought to purchase their safety. In the village of Tevnik, in Erzeroum province,
an Armenian priest was attacked, and his house looted.94 To save his life, he promised his
attackers a payment of 100 liras. As soon as he escaped, he traveled to Erzeroum to lodge a
complaint about the matter but was shot dead in the violence there. This story highlights the
precarious position of the Armenians during the massacres. Attempts to purchase safety were a
high-risk strategy that often failed.
A second common non-violent strategy employed by the Armenians was to seek
sanctuary in places perceived as safe. The most effective of these proved to be consulates or
mission compounds. In Trezibond, for example, 150 Armenians took refuge at the Russian
consulate when massacres erupted in the town.95 All the consulates there “gave refuge to the
fugitives pursued by the assassins.”96 When the massacres reached Diarbekir in November
1895, more than 700 Christians took refuge at the French consulate.97 Kurdish desires to attack
the Consular building were repeatedly thwarted.98 In Trezibond, the Christian Brothers
establishment provided refuge for more than 2,000 Armenians during the massacres there,
while in Cesarea, missionaries managed to protect over 100 Armenians on their premises.99
During the massacres in the city of Harput, hundreds of Armenians sought refuge in the
missionary complex. As the attack progressed, however, the complex itself became a target.
Homes and buildings that were part of it were plundered and set alight. Eventually, the
missionaries and Armenians sought refuge in the college building. “At one time it looked as if
we should all go up in a ery chariot together” wrote missionary Susan Wheeler, “We shall
never forget this day the 12th and the night with the ames and clouds of smoke so dense about
us.”100 Some 450 Armenians and missionaries survived several extremely tense days in the
building, before the danger eased.101
In Van, the missionary station and the British Vice Consul worked together to protect
Armenians from the massacre there. Up to 15,000 Armenians sought shelter as the British Vice
Consul raised the Union Jack at the American mission, along with making “herculean efforts” to
save Armenians in the small Armenian quarter of the city.102 Not all those who sought refuge
survived the massacre—while the Mayor, Ghalib Pasha, initially received several hundreds of
Armenians, he later turned them out, and more than one hundred men and boys from the
group were then killed.103 In Erzeroum, attempts were made to prevent Armenians seeking
refuge in the consulates. In the street where the American Mission House and several consulates
were located, a patrol hid behind a woodpile in front of the French consulate and kept the area
under re to prevent Armenian access.104 The English consul stopped this by threatening to re
on the patrol if they continued.105 For those Armenians able to reach consulates or missionary
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complexes, this often—but not always—proved an effective way in which to survive the
massacres. However, the vast majority of Armenians, scattered in hundreds of towns and
villages throughout the empire, were unable to access these places of refuge.
Many Armenians attempted to survive the massacres through seeking refuge in
churches and cathedrals. This strategy often proved fatal. There are multiple accounts of
churches in which Armenians were sheltering being set alight, as in Ourfa. In Boussou, in
Harput province, for example, the Armenians successfully defended themselves from attack for
three days, before the attackers were reinforced with soldiers.106 The Armenians then took
refuge in their church. The attackers formed a cordon around the church to prevent escape, and
then set the church on re.107 In Edessa/Urhoy, west of Diyarbekir, Armenians also sought
refuge in their church. There they were attacked, and according to a Catholic priest from the
region, “blood owed in streams, covered the church and ran between the walls.”108 The church
was then set alight.109 In Shabin-Kara-Hissar-Sharki district in Sivas province, more than 2,000
persons took refuge in the Gregorian-Armenian church.110 After being forced to surrender, they
were massacred.111 In Malatia, in Harput province, the Armenians gathered in two churches and
attempted to defend themselves, until they had no choice but to surrender. In one of the
churches, the Armenians gave up their arms in exchange for protection, but were then
surrounded, with many of them killed.112 In some places, by contrast, churches were not
attacked. In Aintab, for example, they provided a place of refuge for an extended period.113 In
Constantinople, the Ambassadors of the Great Powers were disturbed to learn that Armenians
taking refuge in the churches there had been surrounded by police, who were preventing
supplies of food from reaching the refugees.114 More than 2,000 Armenians sought refuge in this
way, but ultimately, the Ambassadors negotiated their peaceful departure from the churches.115
In most cases, Moslem attackers demonstrated no respect for the sanctity of churches, and they
did not prove a safe haven.
When the massacres erupted, many Armenians tried to hide in order to save their lives.
Vahram Eretzian survived the massacres as a young child in Aghen, in Harput province, when a
local Turk hid 13 Armenians in a dark, secret room at his home.116 But his survival came at a
terrible cost. Just as an armed mob was approaching the home, a two-year-old boy hiding with
them began to cry, but then suddenly fell silent. After the danger passed, someone lit a match,
and it became clear that the boy had been strangled. Vahram recalled: “Nobody asked anything,
but that child saved 12 Armenians with his death.”117 E atoon Elmajian also survived the
massacres by hiding, aged just ve years old.118 E atoon’s parents wanted to escape and hide
from an impending massacre, but with two other young children, they could not take him with
them as well. Before eeing their home, they put him in a bread box, a large round box about 90
centimeters in diameter, which was usually used to store the family’s bread supply. Told to pray,
he repeated the Lord’s Prayer in his hiding place even as the house was plundered.
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Miraculously, his hiding place was not discovered. In the evening, his parents were overjoyed to
nd him still alive.119
Armenians hid anywhere they could to survive. This included in garrets under straw,
under manure heaps, under piles of charcoal, and in wells.120 For some, “their shelters proved to
be a living grave.”121 Armenians in rural areas were sometimes able to take advantage of their
surroundings in order to hide. Five Armenians escaped the massacre at Schepik, near Arabkir,
by hiding in a cave for twelve days.122 Another survivor, writing of his experiences escaping the
massacres, commented that “for eight days, the brambles of the desert were our bed and the
stones our pillow.”123 Many such hiding places were highly precarious. In one case, three
brothers hiding amongst some trees were caught by soldiers and brutally murdered, while their
mother, hiding nearby, could do nothing but watch.124 Others survived by hiding amongst rocks
and thickets, moving about as they could, lacking even the most basic necessities.125 While
many were caught and murdered, the relatively short duration of the massacres in most places
meant that for some, these strategies enabled them to survive.
Some Armenians sought assistance from local Turks or Kurds to survive the massacres.
While the evidence suggests that most of the Moslem population was hostile to the Armenians,
in a small minority of cases, Armenians were hidden or protected from the violence by their
neighbors or friends. In Erzeroum, for example, many Turks hid Armenians in their homes or
shops while the massacre raged.126 In one case, a Turk saved an Armenian by telling the soldiers
that wanted to kill him that he would march him off to the Government House to be hanged.
Once out of the soldiers’ sight, he then took the Armenian to a safe place, before later enabling
him to return home.127 In Aintab, British Consul Barnham reported that “some of the Moslem
inhabitants behaved with great humanity in protecting Christians, and it is said that nearly
2,000 Armenians took refuge in their houses.”128 Many of those who sought assistance from
Turks or Kurds, however, found themselves cruelly betrayed. In Sassoun province, a group of
one hundred or so refugees who had ed the massacres appealed to the local Hinatsee tribe of
Kurds for protection. The Kurds seemed to promise protection, but after luring the group to a
ravine, proceeded to rape, plunder, and murder them.129 In another case, an Armenian woman
was discovered hiding in a straw bin as her house was plundered. The Kurd who discovered
her demanded her shoes; after surrendering them, she begged he take her and her small son to a
place of refuge. Somewhat surprisingly, he did so. When she exclaimed “Glory to thee, Jesus!”
however, the Kurd remarked that her misfortunes were because of such beliefs.130 As soon as
the opportunity presented itself, the woman ed, fearing again for her safety.131 As is the case
with other episodes of mass violence against speci cally targeted groups, only a tiny minority
of the wider population offered assistance to the victims.
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Resistance to Forced Conversion
During the massacres, thousands of Armenians were confronted with the terrible choice of
converting to Islam or being killed. A remarkable number chose to resist by refusing to
convert.132 The clergy were a speci c target of the perpetrators for forced conversion. For
example, the preacher Hanna Sedha was caught by Kurds while trying to ee but refused to
accept Islam to save his life. According to the missionary records: “The last seen of him by one
of his church members as he looked back in his ight, he was extending his arms to ward off the
sword blows which hewed him down after which a gun was discharged into his body.”133 In a
seven-page tribute to the “noble army of martyrs,” Protestant missionary Carrie Bush outlined
the stories of many preachers and pastors similarly killed for refusing to convert.134 Often the
clergy were tortured, prior to being killed, for refusing to accept Islam. In Zileh, in Sivas
province, the priests Der Arisdakes and Der Megherditsch were killed for refusing to convert:
“the former was previously blinded, the latter was skinned.”135 At Tadem, the Archimandrite
(monastic priest) Ohannes Papizian had his hands cut off for refusing to convert, and then his
arms at the elbow. When he still refused, he was beheaded.136
Entire communities faced similarly stark choices. In Harput, many Armenians sought
refuge from the massacres in a church. Induced to come out, they were allowed to pass through
the door only one at a time. “Each one, as he came out of the church, was invited to embrace
Mohammedanism. All who refused were killed on the spot. Fifty-two thus accepted
martyrdom, among them the venerable Protestant Pastor Krikor.”137 At Schepik, near Arabkir,
almost all the young men of the village—along with two priests—were killed for refusing to
convert.138 In Birejik, soldiers appeared to systematically search for men, killing all those they
found who refused to accept Islam.139 One “old man” was tortured with hot coals, “and as he
was writhing in torture they held a Bible before him and mockingly asked him to read them
some of the promises in which he had trusted.”140 In another case, a survivor reported his “old
Aunt Eva” as having been “cut to pieces before our eyes” for refusing to embrace Islam.141
Resistance through refusing to convert, even in the face of certain death, was a signi cant and
widespread form of resistance during the massacres.
Questioning the Boundaries of Resistance: Forced Conversion and Suicide
Armenians during the Hamidian massacres took two further courses of action to attempt to
alter their fate, which may arguably be considered forms of resistance. The rst was to convert
to Islam in order to save their lives. Tens of thousands of Armenians converted during the
course of the massacres. Evidence indicates that in a great number of cases such conversion was
insincere and undertaken purely to avoid being killed. There is no doubt that huge pressure was
placed on Armenians to convert.142 In places like Birejik, about half the adult Christian men
were killed, while “the other half have become Mussulmans to save their lives, so that there is
not a single Christian left in Birejik today.”143 In Harput, “two hundred families had to profess
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Islam under threats of death.”144 Forcible conversion was extensive throughout the regions
impacted by the massacres, with innumerable similar accounts. Arguably, as an “attempt by the
oppressed [individual or group] to limit, thwart or end that oppression,” forced conversion may
be considered as a form of resistance.145 Yet, there are also persuasive arguments against this
position. To convert to Islam was to effectively surrender Armenian identity, meeting a key goal
of the perpetrators.146 Moreover, Armenians were likely aware that this was potentially an
irrevocable decision, with the punishment for apostasy in Islam being death. Thus, while it is
clear that many Armenians converted to Islam to save their lives, it is less clear the extent to
which these actions should be regarded as resistance.
Suicide was perhaps the most desperate strategy utilized by Armenians during the
massacres. In many cases, suicide was undertaken as a group. Predominantly women and
children appear to have committed suicide, often to escape sexual violence and slavery. In the
village of Ozoonovah/Ozunonah in Harput province, for example, 55 Armenian women and
girls were “carried off” by Moslems.147 While being transported along the Euphrates river, “by a
swift decision, they all jumped into the river and drowned themselves to escape a life of
Mohammedan slavery and bestiality.”148 As the massacre in Egin was underway, many women
and girls similarly threw themselves in the Euphrates and drowned.149 In the villages around
the town of Baiburt, “about fty young women threw themselves into the wells, and thus met
death, to escape dishonor.”150 Reports of women and girls committing suicide to escape rape
and forced marriage come from a wide range of regions.151 Considering whether such suicides
constitute a form of resistance, however, raises complex issues. While suicide may indeed
thwart or limit the oppression that would otherwise be experienced by the victim, it also
effectively meets the murderous goals of the perpetrators. Yet, some have argued that suicide
amidst mass violence should be considered an act of resistance. This perspective sees suicide as
an act of de ance—one “made to rob a perpetrator of an opportunity to kill and allow a victim
to meet death on her own terms.”152 In Nazi concentration camps, suicides “often had an
extremely important function as a dramatic protest against the idea and ideology of the
camp.”153 In the Hamidian massacres, they allowed Armenian women to preserve their dignity,
even when faced with death.154 In many cases, perhaps suicide was the only way in which
Armenians could resist the massacres, and therefore should be considered as such.
Resistance and Survival
Several ndings can be made with respect to Armenian resistance to the Hamidian massacres.
First, the sheer prevalence of resistance is a notable feature. In many cases, resistance was not
possible; but when it was possible, it appears to have been widespread. Armenians
demonstrated tremendous agency in seeking to ameliorate their circumstances however they
could. Agency, that is “the choices individuals have, take or don’t take, the decisions and actions
of individuals, and the consequence of these actions,” has been widely recognized as playing an
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important role in the dynamics of survival during mass atrocities.155 As Frédéric Mégret has
noted, “of all those who escaped atrocities while atrocities were being committed, a very large
proportion owed their rescue to themselves, the courage of ordinary strangers or resistance
movements.”156 For the Armenians, agency involved deploying any potential asset that might
prove helpful for survival. This included everything from utilizing advantageous topography to
the assistance of foreign diplomats. Intracommunal cooperation was critical to large-scale
attempts at resistance, including armed resistance in Zeitoun, Van, and Ourfa, and the nonviolent resistance in Egin. Evidence indicates that intracommunal cooperation and resistance are
strategies that can facilitate communal self-protection during mass violence.157 Also clear,
however, is the hostile environment that surrounded the Armenians. There are only a small
number of cases of Turks or Kurds offering genuine assistance to save or protect Armenians
from the violence. It appears that the Armenians tried everything possible to resist the
Hamidian massacres, within the con nes of the dire circumstances in which they found
themselves.
Despite these extensive efforts, the vast majority of resistance attempts had poor
outcomes. This is a consistent nding across multiple parameters. With the exception of Zeitoun
(and the partial exception of Van), attempts at armed resistance were largely unsuccessful. In
many cases, the perpetrators exacted terrible vengeance once the resistance had been overcome.
Successful armed resistance appears to have required an exceptional circumstance: in Zeitoun,
where the Turkish army simply could not defeat the Zeitounlis; in Van, where the external
intervention of British Consul Williams tempered the outcome; and in Guermuch, where
incredibly, the Armenians bluffed their way to survival. Most other attempts at armed
resistance, whether large-scale or small, were crushed. Unarmed resistance was similarly
unlikely to succeed, with the exception of exceptional circumstances. Here too, external
involvement, either from diplomatic of cials or missionaries, often tempered the outcome, as in
the city of Harput. Communal attempts at non-violent resistance, such as purchasing immunity
or seeking sanctuary in churches, often proved ineffective. Some individuals and small groups
were able to successfully evade the massacres through hiding wherever they could, but many
more, it seems, could not. Despite the agency of the Armenians in attempting to protect
themselves, and despite the diversity of strategies and approaches, resistance proved largely
futile.
This study of resistance enables broader re ection on a key issue long debated in
studies of the Hamidian massacres—that of the role of the Abdul Hamid II regime in their
perpetration. As Boris Adjemian and Mikaël Nichanian have noted, “interpretations deeply
diverge on this matter.”158 Taner Akçam, for example, has asserted: “it is clear that the massacres
of 1894–96 were centrally planned.”159 Ronald Suny similarly adopts this position, declaring
“blame for the mass killing of Armenians in the mid-1890s must fall on the highest levels of the
state.”160 By contrast, Robert Melson did not come to a rm conclusion on the matter, suggesting
only that the sultan “initiated or tolerated” the massacres.161 Abdul Hamid’s biographer,
François Georgeon, contends that to ascribe the massacres to the Sultan would be to ignore “the
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extreme prudence in foreign and domestic policy that he manifested during his long reign,”
emphasizing the responsibility of local authorities for the massacres.162 A multitude of Turkish
sources also deny any of cial sanction of the atrocities.
The present study provides strong evidence in favor of the central organization, and
orders, for the massacres. The overall failure of Armenian resistance, despite all efforts, is
telling. Armenians were repeatedly disarmed by Turkish soldiers prior to the onset of
massacres, such as in Birejik and in Ourfa (as they were under siege). Those that attempted
armed resistance often found themselves ghting against government forces.163 In Zeitoun,
literally thousands of Turkish soldiers were brought into the region to try and defeat the
Zeitounlis. In Ourfa, the government promised protection to Armenians even as it demanded
their disarmament. When the Armenians sought such protection, however, soldiers instigated a
massacre that killed several thousand. These events indicate a pattern in which Armenian
resistance was repeatedly crushed by government forces. Similar inferences regarding
government involvement can be made with respect to the complete failure of government forces
to curb the violence or protect Armenians from it. While accounts abound of the role of of cials
in instigating massacres and tolerating the violence, there is a conspicuous absence of accounts
in which of cials acted to forestall or curb massacres. Foreign diplomats and missionaries,
despite their small number and very limited capacity, were able to save literally thousands of
lives, but there is no record of Ottoman government intervention similarly providing protection.
Collectively, the evidence demonstrates a high degree of culpability of the Ottoman government
in the perpetration of the massacres.
Conclusion
This study provides strong evidence that Armenian resistance to the Hamidian massacres was
widespread. Everywhere they could, Armenians sought to survive and resist the violence, using
a wide range of strategies. In places in which they had a numerical or topographical advantage,
such as Zeitoun and Van, armed group resistance was the preferred strategy. In other locations,
Armenians chose to violently resist even when prospects of survival seemed bleak. In many
communities, non-violent strategies such as attempts to purchase immunity, to seek sanctuary,
or to hide seemed to offer the best prospects of success. Armenians used their local knowledge,
ingenuity, and determination to survive in whatever ways they could. It is dif cult to assess the
impact of Armenian resistance to the violence. In Zeitoun and Van, it unquestionably saved the
lives of thousands of Armenians. In other places, like Egin, it appears to have only delayed the
violence. Moreover, in many places in which resistance was defeated, the perpetrators appear to
have sought retribution through more extreme acts of violence, that entirely destroyed the
communities involved. Ultimately, the ferocity of the massacres, and the powerlessness of the
Armenians, overwhelmed attempts to ameliorate the impact of the violence. While some
individuals, such as Krikor Haitaian, survived due to acts of resistance, more than 100,000
Armenians perished in the massacres.
The impact of Armenian resistance to the Hamidian massacres goes well beyond a
reckoning of lives saved, however. The many acts of resistance—those successful and those
defeated—stand as a testament to a proud people. Armenians were determined to maintain
their identity in spite of the oppression they experienced, a determination that continues today.
There is every reason to suggest some of the courageous acts of resistance during the massacres
may have inspired Armenian resistance during the subsequent genocide. The Armenians of
Musa Dagh were undoubtedly aware of the resistance of the Zeitounlis in the massacres when
they chose to resist during the genocide. Van, which had some success in resisting the
massacres, also mounted a resistance to the genocide that saved many thousands of lives.
Perhaps this legacy of resistance continues to inspire the Armenian people today, as they now
battle against genocide denial.
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Introduction
Including survivor voices and testimony in classroom conversations about genocide, its impact,
its representation, and the possibilities for its prevention, is crucial to a holistic and ethical
pedagogy. However, instructors who wish to include rst-person accounts of genocide in the
classroom are faced with a number of practical, conceptual, and ideological decisions in how
the material is presented and contextualized for their students. The use of survivor testimony as
historical data raises questions about the relationship between memory and experience, and the
authority of historical scholarship. In each encounter with testimony and with an individual
survivor sharing their traumatic experience (even when recorded or mediated, but especially
when physically present in the classroom), there is an implicit con ict between the authority of
the historical archive, and the experiential and testimonial authority of the survivor.1
In addition, as if this were not enough to negotiate, instructors are also faced with the
loaded and complex moral imperative that often accompanies the teaching of genocide. In the
case of the Holocaust, which will be the primary focus of this article, these issues are made even
more prominent by the long and complex history of the reception of the Holocaust in the United
States, including its public memory and memorialization, and the ways in which it has been
utilized as a moral touchstone in the decades since the end of WWII.2 Thus, the use of testimony
in our Holocaust and Genocide Studies courses carries with it the need for a careful balance of
critique and analysis, while respecting the autonomy and traumatic reality of the survivor’s
own experience.
These dif culties motivated much of the conversation on teaching Holocaust and
Genocide Studies during the 2021 Curt C. and Else Silberman Faculty Seminar offered by the
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Jack, Joseph and Morton Mandel Center for
Advanced Holocaust Studies. Seminar participants came from a wide range of disciplinary

1
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York Press, 1982). On the other hand, Berel Lang argues that historicity ought to be the benchmark against which
all representations, even the highly subjective (such as memoirs), ought to be measured. See Berel Lang, Holocaust
Representation: Art within the Limits of History and Ethics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). Of
particular note is James Young’s discussion of the reception and treatment of literary testimony (including wartime
diaries) as history, and the tendency of readers, scholars included, to overlook the constructed and self-aware
nature of the literary composition of such texts. James E. Young. “Interpreting Literary Testimony: A Preface to
Rereading Holocaust Diaries and Memoirs.” New Literary History 18, no. 2 (1987), 403–423, accessed August 1, 2022,
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rst-person accounts of genocide differ from other kinds of historical data, see Samuel Totten and William S.
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specializations, including Genocide Studies, History, International Relations, Jewish
Studies, Religious Studies, and others. Over the course of the seminar, the participants
continually expressed concern for, and discussed the difficulties of balancing their courses,
such that voices of victims and witnesses were given space to be heard, while maintaining a
level of scholarly rigor that would allow students to leave the course familiar with historical
data, legal histories, and a broad set of tools for engaging in independent research. At the
close of the seminar, groups of participants were tasked with developing classroom
activities or exercises that engaged with a pressing pedagogical issue they had identified
over the course of the seminar. This article presents one of these classroom activities and
contextualizes it within the field of Holocaust Studies.3 This exercise is a scaffolded
examination of video clips of survivor testimony that focuses on a different element of the
filmed testimony at each stage. It proposes an approach to the critical analysis of filmed
testimony that is not interested in collecting from its historical data, or evaluating its
historicity, but rather in engaging with the constructed, performative, and experiential
nature of the testimonial act.4
Although the classroom activity was designed as a general framework that could be
applied to clips of survivors of any genocide, because of its distinctive place within the
public memory of the United States, this article will focus on how this activity might be
understood in the context of Holocaust Studies. I will begin by discussing some of the
conceptual and epistemological issues that have emerged in scholarship on the place and
role of survivor testimony (and survivor memory) within the study of the Holocaust. There
is a vast amount of scholarship in Holocaust Studies that engages with the historiographical
place of survivor testimony. For the purposes of this article, in order to highlight the central
issues that motivated the development of this classroom activity, I will be drawing
primarily on Paul Ricœur, whose inquiries into the relationship between memory and
history mark the Holocaust as having special significance, and Annette Wieviorka, whose
2006 The Era of the Witness offers a conceptual history of how the figure of the Holocaust
survivor came to occupy its distinctive epistemological position in the decades after the
trial of Adolf Eichmann.
From there, I will present the classroom activity, which takes a constructed
approach to the study of (filmed) survivor testimony. The critical approach modeled in this
activity offers a framework for classroom discussions of the testimonial act itself, and for
reflecting on the act of viewing, witnessing, or listening to testimony. The conclusion of this
article reflects on the value of helping students to recognize the constructed and mediated
nature of filmed testimony as a generative source of meaning, rather than a barrier to
historicity or historical data.
Testimony as History
Paul Ricœur argues that the vast collection of oral testimony that emerged from the Holocaust
complicates the writing of its history. Ricœur claims that the emotional intensity of the personal
narratives these testimonies recall, and of the experience of the Holocaust, are at extreme odds
with anything its audience might relate to. As such, oral testimony, (“even when written”):
poses a problem of reception that being placed in an archive
does not answer and for which it even seems inappropriate,
even provisionally incongruous. This has to do with such
literally extraordinary limit experiences—which make for a

3

Harry Merritt et al., “Assignment: Survivor Testimony” (Pedagogy Presentation presented at the 2021 Curt C. and Else
Silberman Faculty Seminar offered by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Jack, Joseph and Morton
Mandel Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, Online, June 2021).

4

See especially Paul Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2004), 176.
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dif cult pathway in encountering the ordinary, limited
capacities for reception of auditors educated on the bases of a
shared comprehension.5
Ricœur, here, writing in 2000, echoes an assumption that was central to the early
scholarly discourse of Holocaust representation in the United States, and which has formed one
of the core debates in the eld since: whether the Holocaust is in some way distinctively
(perhaps “uniquely”) unrepresentable or inaccessible to those who did not experience it.6 As
Holocaust survivor, Elie Wiesel remarked in a lecture in 1990: “The survivor speaks in an alien
tongue. You will never break its code. His works will be of only limited use to you. They are
feeble, stammering, un nished, incoherent attempts to describe a single moment of being
painfully, excruciatingly alive.”7 This claim in its most common form asserts that the Holocaust
is strictly beyond the understanding of anyone who did not experience it directly, and in its
more radical forms, that the Holocaust is fundamentally unrepresentable.8
When Ricœur speaks of a “crisis of testimony”9 resulting from the incongruity between
survivors’ experience and recollections of concentration camps and what their audience is able
to imagine and relate to, he is simultaneously enshrining “comprehension” as the necessary
condition for testimony to be received, and denying the possibility of that comprehension.10
Wiesel seems to be a hidden interlocutor of the epistemology of testimony Ricœur describes
above. In addition to echoing Wiesel’s impassable division between the survivor and the reader
or audience, Ricœur also claims for the witness an identical authority from which testimony is
delivered: “I was there.’”11 The ability to utter this statement, and thus to displace oneself from
the present into memory and distant space is what characterizes the function and authority of
testimony for both writers.
For Wiesel and Ricœur, this authority is grounded in the implicit claim to a continuity
of subjectivity, an unbroken connection between the now and then, the here and there:
“Memory implies personal witness,” wrote Wiesel a decade prior to Ricœur, citing the opening
lines to Lamentations 3, “‘Ani hagever’—I am the man, I was there.”12 Finally, for both writers, a
survivor’s testimonial authority is evinced by both their words and by their physical existence
itself: “Look at the [memorial] stones. They are testimonies, as are our lives,” Wiesel said in a

5

Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 175.

6

The two most consistent proponents of the notion that survivor testimony provides information that cannot be gleaned
from archival data, and which is to a greater or lesser extent inaccessible to those who did not experience the
Holocaust, are Lawrence L. Langer and Alvin H. Rosenfeld. See, especially, Lawrence L. Langer, The Holocaust and
the Literary Imagination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975) and Alvin H. Rosenfeld, A Double Dying:
Re ections on Holocaust Literature (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980). See also Susan Gubar, Poetry After
Auschwitz: Remembering What One Never Knew (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003).

7

Elie Wiesel, “The Holocaust as Literary Inspiration,” in Dimensions of the Holocaust, annot. Elliot Lefkovitz, 2nd ed.
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990), 8.

8

In addition to these scholars, Berel Lang’s 1988 edited collection includes essays from a dozen or so scholars and
writers of Holocaust literature, all of whom uphold this position. See Berel Lang, ed., Writing and the Holocaust
(New York: Holmes & Meier, 1988). As I will note brie y below, this notion of unrepresentability found in uential
proponents among scholars in uenced by psychoanalysis, most notably Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, who
extend this assumption to the claim that even survivors cannot fully understand their experiences. See Shoshana
Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (New York:
Routledge, 1992).

9

Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 176.

10

Ibid., 175.

11

Ibid., 148.

12

Elie Wiesel, “Looking Back,” in Lessons and Legacies III: Memory, Memorialization, and Denial, ed. Peter Hayes (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1999), 14.
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lecture delivered at Yad Vashem in 2002.13 The living body, Ricœur notes, “the body, the
absolute here, is the landmark for any there,” is the ultimate authorization for a survivor’s or
witness’ claim to having been present elsewhere, and the resultant claim to authenticity and
authority of the testimony.14
The centrality of survivors and survivor testimony to both history and public
memorialization of the Holocaust in the United States was closely tied to hierarchies that
emerged among survivors themselves in the immediate postwar years.15 As historian Raul
Hilberg notes, there was an entrenched hierarchy among survivors of the Holocaust, grounded,
essentially, in their proximity to the gas chambers and sites of mass killing:
There is an unmistakeable rank order among the Jews who
lived through the wartime Nazi years. In this hierarchy, the
decisive criteria are exposure to risk and depth of suffering.
Members of communities that were left intact and people who
continued to live in their own homes are hardly considered
survivors at all. At the other end of the scale, individuals who
emerged from the woods or the camps are the survivors par
excellence.16
Consequently, physical sites of memorialization, notably museums, that were
established in the decades that followed similarly privilege survivors’ voices.17 This hierarchy,
transformed into a seemingly impassable barrier symbolically represented by the walls and
gates of the concentration camp, entered into the general and scholarly lexicon of the Holocaust

13

Elie Wiesel, “Whoever Listens to a Witness, Becomes a Witness,” (closing remarks at the closing session of the
International Conference “The Legacy of Holocaust Survivors,” Yad Vashem, April 2002), accessed October 1, 2022,
https://www.yadvashem.org/holocaust/elie-wiesel.html.

14

Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 149. Giorgio Agamben takes up this binary as a conceptual touchstone in his
analysis of the gure of the Muselmann, and its metaphysical implications for our understanding of the Holocaust,
grounding his argument in Primo Levi’s assertion that the survivor speaks for the dead and only because the dead
cannot, that the dead are the “true witnesses.” See Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the
Archive (New York: Zone Books, 2002); Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, 1st ed. (New York: Vintage
International, 1989), 84.

15

For examples of the ways in which this manifested in scholarship, see George Steiner’s Language and Silence, which I
will discuss below, in which he asserts the incomprehensibility of the Holocaust in several essays. George Steiner,
Language and Silence: Essays On Language, Literature, and the Inhuman, 1st ed. (New York: Atheneum, 1967). Among
historians, see in particular the work of Steven T. Katz, Historicism, the Holocaust, and Zionism: Critical Studies in
Modern Jewish Thought and History (New York: New York University Press, 1992). For a more recent anthology
generally critiquing of the notion of uniqueness and its implications, see Alan Rosenbaum’s edited collection. Alan
S. Rosenbaum, ed. Is the Holocaust Unique?: Perspectives on Comparative Genocide, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 2009).

16

Raul Hilberg, Perpetrators Victims Bystanders: The Jewish Catastrophe 1933–1945, 1st ed. (New York: HarperPerennial,
1993), 187.

17

For a close case study of this phenomenon, see Edward Linenthal’s history of the United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum. Edward Tabor Linenthal, Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create America's Holocaust Museum (New
York: Viking, 1997); for a comparative study of how the privileging of survivor voices shapes the experience of
several Holocaust memorial museums, see Avril Alba, The Holocaust Memorial Museum: Sacred Secular Place
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). Survivors continue to be given primacy in much public memorialization
practice: see, for example, the recent special issue of Holocaust Studies on teaching the Holocaust in the postpandemic world, and especially Marcus et al., “Holocaust Education in Transition from Live to Virtual Survivor
Testimony: Pedagogical and Ethical Dilemmas,” Holocaust Studies 28, no. 3 (2022), 279–301, accessed September 26,
2022, https://doi.org/10.1080/17504902.2021.1979176. Marcus et. al examine museums that are speci cally
responding to the absence of live survivor voices, operating under the explicit assumption that rst-person
accounts are the best way of presenting the history of the Holocaust. Literary scholar Gary Weissman even goes so
far as to argue, as discussed below, that the experience of surviving is a crucial part of the “full experience” of the
Holocaust. See Gary Weissman, Fantasies of Witnessing: Postwar Efforts to Experience the Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2004), 92, emphasis in original.
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in metaphors for absolute otherness of the Holocaust experience, such as “the other kingdom,”
“l’univers concentrationnaire” (“concentrationary universe”), or Wiesel’s “the kingdom of
night.”18
The 1960s was a watershed moment in the public memory of the Holocaust in the
United States.19 The Eichmann trial, in combination with the rising publication and popularity
of survivor memoir in the late fties and early sixties, enshrined what Annette Wieviorka has
called “the era of the witness” in post-war remembrance, concretizing the survivor as witness to
the Holocaust.20 This moment in the reception and legal history of the Holocaust, Wieviorka
claims, had the remarkable effect of turning the survivor into “the bearer of history:”
And the advent of the witness profoundly transformed the
very conditions of writing the history of the genocide. With the
Eichmann trial, the witness became an embodiment of memory
[un homme-mémoire], attesting to the past and to the continuing
presence of the past. Concurrently, the genocide came to be
de ned as a succession of individual experiences with which
the public was supposed to identify.21
Part of prosecutor Gideon Hausner’s strategy was ooding the courtroom with an
abundance of witness testimony. In stark contrast to the Nuremberg trials, in which the focus
was on the perpetrators, here, the public story of the Holocaust was told through the voices of
its victims, and individual victims at that. There was a distinct didactic aim to this method: “For
the rst time,” writes Wieviorka, “a trial explicitly set out to provide a lesson in history. For the
rst time, the Holocaust was linked to themes of pedagogy and transmission.”22 Hausner was
aiming, it seems, to affect the viewing public emotionally, such that they might begin to
comprehend the depths of the victims’ suffering, more than gleaning historical data, to identify
with those testifying victims.23 In the wake of the Eichmann trial, as Wieviorka describes it, this
became a model for the way in which the Holocaust was presented, both in popular culture and
in public discourse surrounding Holocaust remembrance, thus laying the conditions for
Ricœur’s “crisis of testimony,” in which the central mechanism through which the public can
18

“The other kingdom” is Guthrie’s broad translation of the title of Rousset’s memoir, “L’univers Concentrationnaire,”
which rst appeared in English in 1947. Though it had negligible impact on the reading public when compared to
Anne Frank’s diary ( rst published in English in 1952) and Wiesel’s Night ( rst published in English in 1956), it has
served as a critical and comparative touchstone for much of the early scholarship on Holocaust literature, and as
an early model for the kind of ontological othering of the concentration camp that we see above. Interestingly,
scholars such as Lawrence Langer and Alvin Rosenfeld tended to employ the French phrase, “l’univers
concentrationnaire,” as their primary referent, perhaps because of its further alienating quality for an Englishlanguage readership. See David Rousset, L’univers Concentrationnaire (Paris: Éditions du Pavois, 1946); David
Rousset, The Other Kingdom, trans. Ramon Guthrie (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1947); Anne Frank, The Diary of
a Young Girl (New York: Modern Library, 1952); Elie Wiesel, Night, trans. Stella Rodway (London: MacGibbon &
Kee, 1960); Langer, Literary Imagination; Rosenfeld, A Double Dying; Elie Wiesel, “Acceptance Speech” (speech, Oslo,
December 10, 1986), NobelPrize.Org, accessed September 25, 2021, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/
1986/wiesel/acceptance-speech/.

19

For a detailed study of the post-war decades in broad US reception of the Holocaust, see Kirsten Fermaglich, American
Dreams and Nazi Nightmares: Early Holocaust Consciousness and Liberal America, 1957–1965 (Waltham: Brandeis
University Press, 2006).

20

Annette Wieviorka, The Era of the Witness (Ithaca: Cornell University Pres, 2006). For an examination of the impact of
Holocaust memoirs on the public perception of the Holocaust, see Alvin Rosenfeld, The End of the Holocaust
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011). For studies that engage survivor memoir alongside other popular
culture representations of the Holocaust, see Alan Mintz, Popular Culture and the Shaping of Holocaust Memory in
America (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), and Jeffrey Shandler, While America Watches: Televising the
Holocaust (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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Wieviorka, The Era of the Witness, 88.
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Ibid., 57.
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relate and respond to the Holocaust is one that presents an experience beyond their ability to
even imagine.24
Wieviorka argues that a number of major institutions in the United States consciously
adopted a similar approach (that is, identi cation with survivors) to relaying information about
(and creating emotional response to) the Holocaust.25 The method developed by the Fortunoff
Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies for interviewing and collecting testimonials from
survivors, which places a primary emphasis on unearthing ostensibly repressed memories, has
had a signi cant in uence on other testimony collection and oral history projects that have
emerged in the last fty years.26 These are characterized, according to Wieviorka, by taking
place in a space separate from the survivor’s normal environment, “so that nothing will distract
him or her from delving deeply into memory and the past,” and with an interviewer whose
primary role is to encourage, perhaps comfort, and aid the survivor in telling a singular and
deeply individual memory-narrative.27 “The interviewer is not supposed to comment on or
correct the narrative.”28 The survivor’s voice, and their recollection of the Holocaust as they
experienced it, is granted absolute authority.
The Fortunoff archive, in this way, stands as an exemplar of the commitment to the
memory and authority of the survivor as a critical and authoritative source for the historical
archive. The question of historicity, that is, of the relationship between a survivor’s memory and
the documentable data of the Holocaust, seems to lie outside of the concern of the Holocaust
testimony.
Before turning to our classroom activity, I want to rst draw out some of the conceptual
and epistemological implications of this use of testimony as history. First, in a persistent refusal

24

Ibid., 88; Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 176. See also Mintz, Popular Culture, 85–124; Shandler, While America
Watches, 85–154. Shandler’s chapters are a particularly careful history of the presentation of the Holocaust on
broadcast televisions in the United States in the years between the Eichmann trial and the 1978 miniseries
Holocaust, and the ways in which the trial shaped the iconography of the Holocaust in the US.

25

Wieviorka, The Era of the Witness, 56–57, 70–71, 108–110. Wieviorka primarily cites Geoffrey Hartman, a literary
theorist who was one of the founders of the Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, now housed at
Yale University, as one of the foremost proponents of this approach to testimonial collections. See also Geoffrey
Hartman, “Learning from Survivors” in The Longest Shadow: In the Aftermath of the Holocaust (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1996). Jovan Byford notes that, while this is not uniquely American, it is an approach closely
linked to the Fortunoff archive and characterizes the approach testimony collections that developed in the US from
the 1970s onward. Jovan Byford, “Remembering Jasenovac: Survivor Testimonies and the Cultural Dimension of
Bearing Witness.” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 28, no. 1 (2014), 62–67, accessed September 26, 2022, https://
muse.jhu.edu/article/543474. This article is particularly interesting insofar as it contrasts US institutions, notably
the Fortunoff archive and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and institutions in other nations
conducting testimonial collection projects in Serbia.

26

Hartman’s full quotation: “The open-ended interview used at Yale is supposed never to interrupt an ongoing train of
thought in order to pursue set questions, except to make sure that the time before persecution and after liberation
is covered as well as the persecution itself. The aim is to release all memories, including those latent or dissociated
(my emphasis).” Geoffrey Hartman, “The Humanities of Testimony: An Introduction,” Poetics Today 27, no. 2
(2006), 254–255, accessed September 226, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1215/03335372-2005-002. See also, Felman and
Laub, Testimony, 57–74; Hartman, Learning from Survivors; Byford, Remembering Jasenovac, 64–65. Other projects that
modeled themselves on the Fortunoff Archive include, for example the University of Southern California (USC)
Shoah Foundation: The Institute for Visual History and Education, founded by Steven Spielberg, which, in contrast
to the Fortunoff collection, strives to emphasize the post-Holocaust reclamation and continuation of life that has
been achieved by these survivors. This may be further evidence to Weissman’s claim, discussed below, that the
“full experience” of the Holocaust, as it is understood in the United States, belongs to the survivors, not the dead;
Wieviorka is particularly critical of the Shoah Foundation on these grounds. Weissman, Fantasies of Witnessing, 92;
Wieviorka, The Era of the Witness, 110–120. In contrast, the interviews contained in the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum’s Jeff and Toby Herr Oral History Archive seem to take pains to make those they interview
comfortable, most often conducting the interviews in the survivor’s own home. See, for example, United States
Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), Oral History Interview Guidelines, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: USHMM,
2007).
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Wieviorka, The Era of the Witness, 109; Hartman, Humanities of Testimony, 250–255.
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or even active hostility toward any critique or analysis of the survivor’s testimony or written,
published memoirs (as if they, too, are not carefully constructed, reviewed, and edited literary
creations); and second, the broad and gradual reduction of the public understanding of the
Holocaust and the survivor’s experience to a singular narrative trajectory through the ghettos,
camps (and speci cally Auschwitz) and nally to liberation, that is not representative of the
varied experiences of the Holocaust, its victims, or its survivors.
Critique as Denial
The complex relationship between history and memory that troubles the place of testimony as
historical data is not limited to the elevation of the survivor as the keeper of that memory, nor as
a primary source of historical data. Much of the scholarship in Holocaust literature and
representation, especially during the late 1970s and into the early 1980s, insisted on maintaining
a sense of phenomenological and even ontological otherness to the Holocaust and the
concentration camp experience in particular.29 This position was motivated, in part, by a
moralizing and protective instinct toward the survivors and their memories, an attempt to
construct or reinforce a bulwark against silence, denial, and even revisionist narratives that had
begun during the war and persisted in the postwar decades.30
In early scholarship on written Holocaust testimony (memoir, in particular), this
occasionally took the extreme form of a refusal of critique itself. This position is epitomized by
George Steiner in the early 1960s, who broadly asserts in several of his essays that: “The world
of Auschwitz lies outside speech as it lies outside of reason.”31 Steiner would step back from this
position as time passed, but his moral certitude that literary criticism and Holocaust testimony
(particularly survivor writing) ought to be mutually exclusive remained assertive: “These books
and the documents that have survived are not for ‘review.’ Not unless ‘review’ signi es, as
perhaps it should in these instances, a ‘seeing-again,’ over and over.”32
Although by the time he was writing in the 1980s, Alvin Rosenfeld had recognized that
Steiner’s position was “impossible to sustain in an extended study of the literature,”33 he
nevertheless asserts strongly that one ought to approach Holocaust documents as if they carry
“the aura of a holy text,” and (though he refrains from saying how it should be read) that we
cannot “take it in our hands and read it as we do those books that reach us through the normal
channels of composition and publication.”34 We must, rather, suspend our critical impulse in
order to take Holocaust literature at its word, to recognize the historical truth that is implicit in
each text. In doing so, we maintain both the inaccessibility of the Holocaust for ourselves, and
concretize the place of the survivor (and their testimony) as singular authoritative source
through which we might access the Holocaust.
This moral positioning, the sancti cation, we might say, of survivor memory and its
forti cation against moral critique, reached a notable apex in the late 1990s when Elie Wiesel,
responding to a critique made by literary critic Alfred Kazin about the literary realism of a
particular passage in Night, suggested that for Kazin to doubt the “unvarnished” truth of
29

See Langer, Literary Imagination; Rosenfeld, A Double Dying; Lang, Writing and the Holocaust. Even Alan Mintz and
David Roskies, writing separate but parallel projects in the early eighties, seems committed to this notion, even as
they construct their histories of catastrophe literature around the notion that the mechanisms available for
individuals to respond to destruction are anything but unique. See Alan Mintz, Ḥurban: Responses to Catastrophe in
Hebrew Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); David G. Roskies, Against the Apocalypse: Reponses
to Catastrophe in Modern Jewish Culture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).

30

This was in part a direct response to a broader process in US public memory and discourse especially, in the wake of
the Eichmann trial, by which the Holocaust became entrenched as the moral benchmark for historical events, the
Nazis as absolute evil, and the Jewish people as their primary and direct victims. See also Alexander, Social
Construction; Kaplan, Universalisation.
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Steiner, Language and Silence, 123.
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Ibid., 168.

33

Rosenfeld, A Double Dying, 9.
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Wiesel’s memoir is tantamount to approving of Holocaust denial.35 Kazin had previously
written, in an essay that purported to recount the impact that Wiesel and Primo Levi had had
on his career and his own literary thinking, a relatively mundane comment on the relationship
between Wiesel’s memorial writings and historical fact: “The more I learned about him, the more
I pursued the vast literature about Auschwitz, the less surprised I would have been to learn that the
episode of the boy struggling on the rope never happened.”36 By bringing into direct con ict the
memory of the survivor (and this survivor, no less) and the “vast” literature available to Kazin
about the Holocaust—though whether he refers to historical scholarship, other survivor
writing, or both is unclear—Kazin, and Wiesel’s subsequent response, draw our attention to the
stakes of the epistemological con ict enacted by the con ation of, and continuing uncritical use
of survivor memory as history.
Narrative Normativity
The centrality of the survivor to discourse about the Holocaust, and their continued elevation as
the primary, and in some cases, sole source of knowledge about the genocide has led to a
particularly narrow understanding in the minds of much of the public of what the Holocaust is,
and what it means to have experienced the Holocaust.37 The reception history of the Holocaust
in the United States played a crucial role in shaping this narrow public understanding of the
Holocaust. It is still the case, as David Shneer points out, that “most people in the west imagine
the [concentration] camps through the literary representations written by survivors of
Auschwitz-Birkenau, because most survivors of the Holocaust found themselves in Auschwitz
at one point in their tragic narratives.”38 As such, and given the strong survivor activism in the
years and decades after the war, the proliferation of survivor narrative, both literary and
archival, and especially the teaching of texts like Anne Frank’s Diary of a Young Girl (albeit its
famously edited published versions) and Elie Wiesel’s Night in schools, the broad US public has
developed a limited sense for what it meant to have experienced the Holocaust.39 This goes
partway to explain why the gates of Auschwitz, despite the camp being liberated by the Red
Army, has become one of the foremost images of the Holocaust in the visual representative
landscape of the US.40
This need not have been the case, of course. The US military liberated Buchenwald and
Dachau, and although photos of the mass graves and victims of those sites remain touchstone
images, they certainly do not have the ubiquity or imagistic force of the “Arbeit Macht Frei” that

35

Elie Wiesel, All Rivers Run to the Sea: Memoirs (New York: Schocken Books, 1996), 336; Wiesel, Night [1960]; Elie Wiesel,
Night, trans. Marion Wiesel, 1st ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006).

36

Kazin, here, refers to a famous passage from Wiesel’s Night in which he witnesses a young boy being hanged between
two other men, and undergoes a crisis of faith, of sorts. Ironically, Wiesel himself would call into question the crisis
of faith that most readers and critics inferred from this scene, in a chapter of his later memoir All Rivers Run to the
Sea that recounts moments within Auschwitz in which the inmates prayed or performed other religious
ceremonies. Alfred Kazin, “My Debt to Elie Wiesel and Primo Levi,” in Testimony: Contemporary Writers Make the
Holocaust Personal, ed. David Rosenberg (New York: Random House, 1989), 123, my emphasis; Wiesel, Night [2006],
61–65; Wiesel, All Rivers Run to the Sea, 51–100.
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Linenthal quotes from interviews with Michael Berenbaum, who had been Deputy Director of the President’s
Commission on the Holocaust and then Project Director for the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum up to
its opening in 1993. See Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 44–45, and throughout.

38

David Shneer, Through Soviet Jewish Eyes: Photography, War, and the Holocaust (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 2011), 153.

39

See especially Rosenfeld, End of the Holocaust, 14–31; see also Mintz, Popular Culture, 9–17.
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Barbie Zelizer, in her extensive study of Holocaust photographs and their relationship to collective memory and
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hangs over the gates of Auschwitz. We might argue that these images offer a universalized and
relatable icon of the Holocaust, far less alienating than the “piles of bodies and emaciated
survivors, whom American journalists photographed extensively [at Dachau and
Buchenwald];” yet, it is dif cult to ignore the connection between the proliferation of
testimonial and memoiristic representations and the centrality of Auschwitz to the public
imagination of the Holocaust that Shneer highlights above.41 As Shneer discusses at length, the
example of the Soviet Union demonstrates the extent to which the elevation of particular
symbols for the Holocaust was directly tied to the histories of reportage and public discourse
within given nations during and after the war. Despite having liberated Auschwitz and
Majdanek, among the largest concentration or extermination camps, it was the mass killing site
at the ravine of Babi Yar, just outside of Kyiv, that “became the biggest and most lasting symbol
of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union . . . as the largest burial pit, ravine, and trench, Babi Yar,
more than Auschwitz, Majdanek, or other concentration camps came to symbolize the Soviet
experience of Nazi atrocities.”42 That the concentration camp at all became the central image for
the Holocaust in the mindset of the US public, though unsurprising to us now, was equally tied
to the centrality of survivors to the Holocaust narrative as it was constructed and received in the
United States.43
This process, sometimes critically referred to as the “Americanization” of the Holocaust
—that is, the entry of the Holocaust into the broader landscape of US public memory and
history, both as a speci c historical event and as a symbol for absolute evil—further centralized
the survivor and imbued this narrative with a sense of progression and hope.44 For Wieviorka,
this is one of the criteria that distinguishes the Shoah Foundation and the United States
Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) as pedagogical institutions and spaces from those
such as the Fortunoff archive: the latter, she claims, centralizes “the person of the survivor,” the
former institutions focus on the “issue of transmission.”45 In other words, Fortunoff archive
looks more to the past for its own sake, whereas the Shoah Foundation and USHMM aim to
present the past as lessons for the future.46 In addition, the USHMM seems less committed,
given its pedagogical mission, to the notion that the experience of the Holocaust was
unknowable to anyone who was not there, though the institution has grappled with this
question for most of its history.47
On the other hand, there are those who assert that the experience of the survivor is the
only knowable experience of the Holocaust. Gary Weissman, for example, argues that:
This term [the Holocaust experience] refers not to the
experiences of the millions who died of starvation, disease,
beating, hanging, bullets, or gassing, but rather to the wartime
experiences of individuals who survived the Holocaust.
Survival is a necessary part of the Holocaust experience when
the full experience of the Holocaust is implicitly understood to
include not only wearing the yellow star and starving in the
ghetto, but learning that most or all of one’s family has been
killed; not only deportation to the camps, but liberation and
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emigration; not only being engulfed in the catastrophe, but
bearing witness to the catastrophe in its aftermath.48
Here, Weissman argues against the con ation of two objects of inquiry, “the Holocaust,”
which he takes to mean data-driven knowledge, and “the Holocaust experience,” which he
understands as phenomenological knowledge that he argues can only come from survivors.
Weissman seeks to reclaim a space for the legitimacy of survivor’s experience as a form of
knowledge not judged on the ground of empirical, historical data.49 Weissman’s position seems
to be re ective of the ubiquity of that singular and selfsame narrative that we described above,
in which the experiential knowledge of the survivor comes not so much to count as historical
data, but to serve as a symbolic representation of what is otherwise unknowable for those of us
who were not there. Insofar as the survivor themselves comes to embody the Holocaust as a
historical event, then the testimony, in which the survivor must also reckon with the time
between the end of the Holocaust and the moment of testifying, becomes symbolically part of
the Holocaust experience in the act of testifying.50
Critique and Judgment
Both the tendency toward treating critique as denial, and the normative representations of the
Holocaust and its survivors, emerge from the con ation of survivor memory with history and
the epistemological confusion that ensues. There is a clash, as Kazin alluded to, between the
history of the Holocaust as understood by scholars, and the history as understood by the
broader public, survivors included. It is the latter that has informed the shape of the Holocaust
narrative as it entered the wider sphere of US public memory, including in uencing the
direction of such critical (simultaneously) memorial and historical spaces as the USHMM, as
well as the way the Holocaust is taught and presented in secondary education throughout the
United States.51 As such, we can return here to Ricœur, to recognize that what he identi es as a
“crisis of testimony,” in the inability of an audience to “comprehend” the experience of the
survivor recounted in testimony, might be better understood as a crisis of historical authority.
That is, the result of two competing forms of knowledge vying for authority in the construction
of both Holocaust history and public Holocaust memory, borne of the attempt to integrate
testimony, unquali ed and unexamined, into the historical archive (thus, again, con ating
memory and history in the process).
Ricœur’s most speci c claim about the result of this “crisis of testimony,” and its
requisite barrier to comprehension, is that the “expected comprehension must itself be a
judgment, a judgment on the y, a judgment without mediation, absolute blame.”52 In this short
pronouncement, Ricœur neatly captures the concerns that motivate both those who seek to
protect the authority of the survivor, and those who seek to highlight the uniqueness of the
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experiential knowledge gained from receiving testimony. Judgment, in this case, is gured as
the negative outcome of critical engagements, and calls into question the authenticity and
authority of the survivor to speak.
For judgment, in this sense, to take place, however, in particular the kind of unmediated
and absolute judgment of which Ricœur is so wary, one must assume that a testimony is a
closed, static, and complete record of an individual’s experience and memory, and that to
critique a testimony is to call into question the very authenticity of the witness’ experience itself.
Such judgment collapses the necessary distance “between a survivor’s memory and its
re ection in words, his own included” that Wiesel himself was so insistent upon.53 Memory,
though, is a product of the conditions under which it is recalled as much as the events being
recalled, and testimony is equally and directly shaped by the contexts in which it is uttered.54
We have understood this feature of memory since Augustine, and outside of the continuing
desire to preserve the centrality of the survivor to the history and historiography of the events,
it remains unclear why it is really only in the case of the Holocaust that scholars seem to forget
this quality of memory.55
It is with this understanding, both of judgment and of memory, that I want to turn to
our classroom exercise. The use of testimony in the classroom as historical data presents a
crucial challenge to the instructor aiming to balance the desire for historical insight with the
need to recognize the individual survivor whose voice is being heard. Testimony is always
mediated, and a critical engagement with the mechanisms of that mediation can be valuable
tools for aiding students in understanding the history and experience of the Holocaust, the
nuances of the testimonial act itself, and the complex mediated contexts in which every act of
testifying takes place.
Video Testimony: A Constructive Approach56
Developed during the 2021 Silberman Seminar, the classroom exercise presented below offers a
guided and scaffolded introduction to video testimony that emphasizes the complex interplay
of text, context, performance, and media that shapes both the testimonial act and its viewing or
reception by students and broader public audiences.57 The exercise asks students to watch and
respond to a short clip, of two or three minutes in length, such as those collected on the publicfacing pages of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s website. The length of the
clips was speci cally chosen to highlight the mediated nature of the testimony, and to ease
students' transition into the close reading and media analysis techniques that the assignment
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intends to teach them.58 In this exercise, students watch a short clip of a video testimony given
by a witness to or survivor of the Holocaust. Over the course of the activity, students view and
discuss a single clip three times, each time given a set of questions to help guide their viewing.
Each set of questions focuses on a different aspect of the video and its presentations within its
contexts: rst, how the video is presented within the context of a website or archive, and their
initial impressions of the clip itself; second, the technical and lmic aspects of the clip, including
how and where it begins and ends; third, the content of the testimony itself, and the way in
which the individual giving the testimony presents it.
Objectives
Broadly speaking, this exercise aims to challenge the assumptions noted above that the
testimony is a singular, complete, and unmediated recollection of the survivor’s experience of
the events. Rather, it is designed to grant students insight into the plethora of factors that
in uence and affect both the performance or delivery of testimony and its reception by even
generous and empathetic audiences. In addition, by focusing on paratextual features of the
setting and context, and lm techniques in play prior to discussing the content of the testimony
itself, this exercise aims to delimit any sense that critique of the testimony is equivalent to
judgment of its truth value, or critique of the survivor and their experience. Through the
scaffolded questions and multiple viewings of a single clip of testimony, students will develop
the analytical skills necessary to contextualize these primary sources, and to identify the
different paratextual, media, lmic, and performative aspects that make up each of these
testimonial clips.
Samuel Totten identi es three signi cant issues that face instructors wanting to
incorporate testimonial accounts of genocide into the classroom:
a) the critical need to provide contextualization of the account;
b) the need to help students understand the distinction
between various types of sources (i.e., accounts written
during the genocide versus those recollected in the
aftermath—and then how long after the aftermath, and the
impact that might have had on one’s memory, etc.); and
c) the need to avoid over-generalizing based on one, two, or
three accounts.59
This exercise aims to accomplish all three of these goals, while simultaneously
providing a framework for later engagement with other, or longer, lmed testimony. The
primary goal of the exercise is contextualization, not only of the account itself and its recording,
but also of the presentations of that account for the viewing public, drawing attention to what, if
any, additional contextual information is provided by the virtual space that houses the clip, as
well as the choices involved in extracting a short clip from a larger testimony. Moreover, the
exercise is designed to highlight the ways in which the distance between the recording/giving
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of the testimony and the experience being recounted shapes the presentation of that testimony,
noting physical location, time, and the conditions under which the testimony is given.
Pre-Viewing Questions
Prior to viewing the video, students are asked questions about how the video is accessed, and
what information is presented surrounding the video by the institution that hosts it, such as a
museum or archive. Example questions include:
• What would you like to know before viewing this clip?
• How is the video presented on the website?
• What descriptive, contextual, or historical information is
available?
• Is there a link to a larger interview or project that this clip
was taken from?
Class discussion between these questions and the rst viewing of the clip would focus
on historical background and contextual information, helping to address answers to the above
questions, and to provide any background that the instructor deems necessary for
understanding the clip. This is particularly dependent on the placement of this activity within
the semester or module.
The method of testimony collection developed at Yale for the Fortunoff archive (which
has become commonplace among testimonial projects) aims, explicitly, to limit the presence of
the interviewer; they are “supposed never to interrupt an ongoing train of thought in order to
pursue set questions, except to make sure that the time before persecution and after liberation is
covered as well as the persecution itself.”60 Even the physical location of the testimony, a studio,
was chosen speci cally to be, as Wieviorka notes, “closed off from the normal environment of
the person, so that nothing will distract him or her from delving deeply into memory and the
past.”61 This method aims to centralize the voice and gure of the survivor and, it seems to limit
the mechanism of the interview (physical space, interviewer, etc.) from drawing attention to
themselves and away from the experiences being shared. That is, it aims to make less visible the
constructed and performative nature of the testimony, such that viewers might connect
emotionally with, even identify with the speaker and, in doing so, become somehow implicated
in the event of testimony itself.62
Several elements of this exercise are speci cally designed to highlight features obscured
by this method of testimony collection. In the rst instance, selecting short clips excerpted from
longer interviews makes it near impossible to overlook the presence of editing; drawing
students’ attention to the ways in which the clip is embedded in a webpage or website prior to
its viewing further emphasizes that each of these testimonial excerpts is presented with
particular educational aims in mind. Testimonial clips often recount only single, notable events
(such as a moment of rescue, or a particularly traumatic experience), implicitly inviting viewers
to seek out the full testimony, bolstered by the contextual information supplied on the webpage.
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Each of these elements shapes the encounter with testimony, limiting students’ ability to, as
Alvin Rosenfeld described it, suspend the critical impulse in order to discern the truth behind
the words.63 Instead, utilizing short clips, paired with pre-viewing questions, requires re ecting
rst and foremost on the performative and constructed elements of the testimonial act and its
subsequent presentation within an archive, or educational website.
First Viewing
In this rst viewing, the students are encouraged to watch closely and, considering the
contextual and website information, identify what stands out as important to them, and to
re ect on their emotional responses, if any, to the video itself. This is simultaneously a
diagnostic exercise, as well a guide for further discussion following subsequent viewings,
ensuring that the discussion remains signi cantly in uenced by the students’ own interest
impressions, and observations, particularly during the nal discussion on content.
The rst viewing also offers a chance for re ection on students’ assumptions about the
survivor and their experiences. In my experience, regardless of the pre-viewing questions that
may be posed to students, their initial responses to lmed survivor testimony tend to re ect
dominant cultural norms about the Holocaust and its representation, mirroring the kind of
deference that is intended by the Fortunoff method of interviewing, often to the point of
hesitance to discuss the clip, and certainly, reluctance to do so critically.64 At this stage of the
exercise, there is a risk of reinforcing encoded responses to the Holocaust, insofar as these rst
stages af rm the centrality of survivor voices in telling the history of the Holocaust and,
moreover, utilize excerpts from longer testimonies that are often chosen by websites and
archives for their affective intensity, rather than because they serve as representative of the
broader experience of the individual or of the event. Totten’s warning against over-generalizing
from a single example is perhaps ampli ed by the short and piecemeal nature of these lmed
excerpts. The focus of the second viewing on technical aspects of the clip, apart from the
survivor and the events they are recounting, aims to lessen this risk by foregrounding the
constructed nature of the clips themselves.
Second Viewing
The second viewing asks students to focus on the setting of the interview, the mise en scene, and
asks them questions about the medium itself. A supplementary handout might be provided that
explains critical lm terminology, such as lighting, different kinds of camera movements,
angles, or shots, editing techniques, mise en scene, etc. Example questions include:
• What is visible on screen? Are there other people besides the
survivor/witness?
• Can you tell where the video was lmed? Are they, for
example, at home, on a stage giving a lecture, or in a studio?
• Is the survivor/witness speaking as if responding to
someone off-camera? How can you tell? Is this clip excerpted
from a larger or ongoing conversation?
• Where is the camera positioned in relation to the survivor/
witness? Are they looking directly at the camera, or
somewhere else?
• What is the lighting like?
• Are there subtitles or captions? Where and how are they
displayed?
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• Is the testimony the only thing you hear during the clip? Are
there ambient sounds, like wind, or an audience? Is there a
soundtrack or music?
With each subsequent viewing, the students are asked to examine the video in more
detail, as their familiarity with the clip grows. Following this second viewing, there is an
opportunity for breakout or small group discussions, in which the students are encouraged to
share their various observations; different students are likely to observe and focus on different
aspects of the media, thus supplementing each other’s viewing. This is particularly useful at
this stage of the exercise, when the questions are still broadly descriptive.
It is worth, at this stage of the exercise, to revisit the Fortunoff method described above,
perhaps even introducing the quotation from Hartman above, to re ect on the role of the
interviewer and production team in shaping the delivery of the testimony, even before the
process of selecting and editing a single clip.65 Primarily aimed at allowing the survivor’s voice
to be heard, the absence of the interviewer from the frame of the testimonial video implicitly
claims to offer an unmediated glimpse into the memory of the speaking survivor.66 Hartman,
elsewhere, describes these lmed testimony as “a representational mode with a special countercinematic integrity:” in contrast to cinema (meaning ctional lm) and documentaries, Hartman
claims, “in video testimonies (or “testimonial video” generally) there is nothing between us and
the survivor; nor, when an interview really gets going, between the survivor and his/her
recollections.”67 And yet, each of the elements gestured to in the questions above mark a critical
point of intervention between the viewer and the survivor, and several of the lmic elements
noted (camera positioning, lighting, physical location, to whom the survivor is speaking
directly, etc.) necessarily play a role in the performance that occurs in recollecting their
memories on lm, for the purposes of a testimonial archive.
Third and Final Viewing
For the nal viewing, having already discussed the presentation of the clip and its technical
aspects, students are asked to use this knowledge to help them understand the content of the
testimony. The example questions below ask for detailed responses, and, as such, a second
round of small group or breakout discussions may prove particularly useful here as well.
Example questions include:
• How would you describe the survivor/witness’s facial
expressions and/or body language? What might this tell you
about their state of mind, or their emotions as they speak?
Does this change throughout the clip?
• Does the survivor/witness tell a story? If so, what is it about?
If not, what do they talk about?
• Do they recount speci c events? What kinds?
• Do they mention other people?
• Do they describe perpetrators?
• Do they describe rescuers?
• Do they describe other victims?
• Do they describe bystanders, or others who don’t t into one
of the categories above?
• What details do they provide about these people? What are
they doing?

Ibid.
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• Is there some speci c takeaway, lesson, or piece of
information in which you get the sense that the survivor/
witness wants the audience to know? Do they re ect on the
broader moral or political implications of their experiences?
• Where in their story does this clip take place? Is it the
beginning of the genocide? Somewhere in the middle? Is it a
story of escape or rescue?
• How does the video clip end? Why might it stop here?
There are a number of possible directions this activity can take following the nal
viewing. In particular, students should be encouraged to share and compile their responses with
each other, as well as to consider if there is other information that they would have liked to
know more about. This is also a valuable opportunity for the instructor to clarify speci c details
by asking students whether there were terms, phrases, references, or descriptions that they did
not understand, and how clari cation might have helped deepen their understanding of the
clip. As with similar activities, students should be invited to answer each other’s questions
before the instructor provides answers, thus further encouraging a communal and cohesive
discussion environment within the classroom and creating a space in which students feel
comfortable asking clarifying questions.
As the Holocaust entered into the public media landscape in the United States, certain
kinds of representations came to dominate the symbolic landscape: I mentioned the gates of
Auschwitz above, but we can also see shoes, glasses, hair, of course the railway cars used to
transport inmates.68 Oren Baruch Stier refers to such images as “Holocaust iconography” to
capture the ways in which singular objects and images can come metonymically to represent the
entirety of the event of the Holocaust.69 Certain kinds of narratives, certain patterns of
experience have come to function in a similar way: as Shneer notes, most people in the west
imagine concentration camps “through the literary representations written by survivors of
Auschwitz-Birkenau, because most survivors of the Holocaust found themselves in Auschwitz
at one point in their tragic narratives,” often re ected in the most prominent literary
representations to reach the English language, foremost among them Elie Wiesel’s Night.70
This nal viewing presents the opportunity for students to re ect on their initial
responses to the video itself, and to examine the ways in which their understanding of, or
response to the clip has changed in light of subsequent discussions, and to re ect on the
assumptions that students may have brought with them into the classroom and into the
exercise. The events recounted, whether of capture, transport, incarceration, or liberation, offer
only a moment in a longer implicit history, which the questions outlined above aim to guide
students toward considering. If there is a risk in the rst viewing, as mentioned above, in
students over-generalizing the ability of a given clip or testimony to represent the Holocaust as
a whole, this nal viewing aims to counter that possibility by focusing intently on the speci c,
individuated experience, and the subjectivity of the chosen clip. Moreover, following on from
the technical discussion after the second viewing, there is space in this nal discussion to revisit
the clip in its virtual contexts, and to re-engage with the speci c didactic choices that were made
by a given website, archive, or museum, in selecting and presenting this clip in this particular
way.
Possible Continuations and Follow-Ups
This scaffolded exercise might, for example, be embedded in a larger assignment structure,
introducing the students to primary source analysis, either of their own choosing or of an
assigned set of class resources. It may also serve as a basis for a comparative assignment in
68
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which students analyze multiple clips and compare the representational, media, and
compositional choices made in the presentation of those clips. In a composition course, or one
focused on writing, the exercise itself might serve as a model for constructing analytical
arguments or claims, not only by introducing them to a critical vocabulary for studying
audiovisual media, but also by offering them several perspectives from which to approach lm
clip and testimony analysis. Additionally, this might serve as the basis for re ective
assignments. One might, for example, ask students to consider why certain representational or
media choices were made, and the effects of very speci c decisions—such as the placement of
captions or subtitles, the use of scoring or soundtrack, or the moments in which an interviewer
is seen or heard—on the presentation of the individual and the reception of their testimony. An
instructor might take that re ection one step further, by asking students to interrogate their own
position as viewers, returning to their answers to the pre-viewing questions and describing
their own incremental experience of viewing and re-viewing the testimony, as well as how their
understanding of it has changed.
Conclusion
There is always a chance, in the encounter with survivor testimony, that students will be
dismissive or judgmental toward the testimony, especially when it deviates or departs from an
established or normalized narrative of the particular genocide or set of events (or, even, if the
student has some pre-existing familiarity with the events, from personal experience or media
representations). The prevalence of easily accessible information, and the increasing dif culty of
distinguishing demonstrable historical fact from opinion and assertion, especially online, only
adds to this risk. Fear of this judgment is, in part, what motivates the protective instinct evinced
by Wiesel, Hartman, and others, and precipitated the “crisis” described by Ricœur. The goal of
this exercise, ultimately, is to engender in students encountering video testimony, and perhaps
even encountering the study of the Holocaust for the rst time, the recognition that testimony is
not the same as experience, that to speak about an event is to do so always in a speci c context
and for a speci c purpose, and as such, it cannot be understood through the same interpretive
frameworks through which we encounter historical fact.
“Every testimony,” writes Wieviorka, “is recorded at a precise moment in time, and as
such may be instrumentalized in political and ideological contexts that, like all such contexts,
are bound to change.”71 Yet, further contexts play critical roles in shaping the form and content
of a given testimony: the age of the survivor; the location of the testimonial act; the identity,
presence, and comportment of the interviewer; the organization for whom or in which the
testimony is being made; the contemporaneous discourse of public memory, and, of course; the
survivor’s own continually changing relationship to their own past and memories. We can add
additional complications to the reception of the testimony, by acknowledging the framing power
of paratext, for example: the context in which the testimony is being viewed; the previous
knowledge of the viewer about the events; the layout and makeup of the website, archive, or
location the testimony is housed; lmic or literary qualities such as type, copy, score, sub- or
super-titles, editing and lighting. All of these criteria are critical features of the experience of the
testimonial act, and we cannot, as educators and scholars, ignore these in favor of focusing only
on the content of the testimony in terms of its truth value. To do so would be to implicitly claim
that the individual survivor and the speci city of their experience is to be read through in order
to mine their testimony for data about the a genocidal event, when, rather, the critical value of
bringing testimony into the classroom is precisely in its ability to ground the data in human
gures, and to provide an additional entry point, in conversation with data and statistics,
toward understanding and recognition of the human cost and experience of the Holocaust.
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Arts & Literature: Looking Back at the Roots
of Genocides in Ex-Belgian Africa
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University of Florida
Gainesville, Florida, U.S.A.

Introduction
As one who spent much of his professional life trying to elucidate the contrasting trajectories of
Rwanda and Burundi—two small Central African republics that have more in common than
any two other states in the continent—I never cease to be puzzled by the paradox of the
proverbial “false twins.” Both were once archaic kingdoms ruled by pastoralist oligarchies; both
were strati ed societies held together by an underlying “premise of inequality,” where Tutsi
minorities enjoyed a monopoly of power over the majority of the Hutu masses, and their
languages, though distinct, were (and are) mutually intelligible. Most dramatically, they both
experienced ethnic violence on a genocidal scale, with representatives of the victimized group
now solidly entrenched as the ruling elites. Rwanda, despite having abolished all references to
ethnic identities, is for all intents and purposes, a Tutsi-dominated autocracy, while in Burundi,
the opposite is true, with Hutu elements holding unfettered control over the institutions of the
state.
Burundi as an Outlier
As a point of entry into this discussion, it may be useful to re ect on the images that stick in my
mind when I recall the days I rst came in contact with what was still of cially known as the
Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi. The year was 1960, two years before their independence as
Rwanda and Burundi. I was, at the time, a graduate student at UCLA, working on a doctoral
dissertation on the Congo, and while traveling through the Kivu province, I was fortunate
enough to be the guest of the Institut pour la Recherche en Afrique Centrale (IRSAC) near Bukavu.
This was where I ran into a couple of Belgian colleagues who kindly offered me to join them on
a brief trip to Rwanda. The offer was hard to resist. As it turned out, it was from this impromptu
foray into the early phase of the Hutu revolution, when we became witness to scenes of extreme
violence, that I rst became aware of the chasm separating the two states just as they were about
to cross the threshold of independence.
As we drove south from Kigali on our way back to Bujumbura, we suddenly ran smack into a
group of Hutu insurgents trying to set a ame Tutsi huts (rugos). I still remember two Tutsi
children lying dead near their hut, reduced to ashes, the long lines of Hutu assailants crouching
alongside the road under the casual watch of Belgian paratroopers, the smoke rising above the
hills.
The contrast with Burundi couldn’t have been greater. While Rwanda was in the throes of a
brutal uprising, with the Hutu and Tutsi engaged in a violent struggle for supremacy, Burundi
was relatively peaceful. Signs of Hutu-Tutsi enmities were nowhere to be seen. Although the
country was by no means free of con ict, its epicenter revolved around dynastic tensions
between descendants of pretenders-to-the-throne, collectively referred to as ganwa. One group,
the Bezi, was identi ed with the recently created nationalist Union pour le Progrès National
(Uprona); the other, the Batare, with the pro-Belgian Parti Démocrate Chrétien (PDC).
What is one to make of such strikingly divergent pathways to independence?
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This is the question that I would ponder off and on over the following years as I turned my
attention away from the Congo to its minuscule neighbors. The answer, in part, came in the
form of a heavy tome published in 1970 under the uninspiring title of Rwanda and Burundi.1 In
the ten years that elapsed between my rst trip to the region and the publication of my book, a
sea of change had taken place in the political con gurations of each state. By 1970, Rwanda was
a Hutu-dominated republic, with a substantial segment of its Tutsi population forced into exile.
Burundi, which I had known as an oasis of relative calm, was in the grip of a growing HutuTutsi con ict that would split the Uprona party into rival factions, bring the monarchy to the
edge of collapse, and pave the way for a Tutsi-led military coup. All this made it imperative to
rethink the theoretical model initially envisaged to make sense of the two states’ diametrically
opposed trajectories.
The Decoupling of the False Twins
In retrospect, my perception of Burundi as a model of stability compared to Rwanda was not so
much erroneous as it was all too rei ed, xed in time and space, indifferent to its wider regional
context. Much of my understanding of their divergent responses to their approaching
independence was unduly in uenced by what I had been witness to in August 1960.
Sameness does not mean carbon copy similarity. For all their shared characteristics, Burundi
society emerges as a distinctly more complex entity, signi cantly less vulnerable to ethnic
tension than Rwanda. What at rst was little more than a hunch, on closer scrutiny would soon
crystallize as undeniable evidence. For one thing, the presence of rival ganwa elites at the top of
the social pyramid stood as a major complicating factor. So is also the division of the Tutsi
population in two culturally and politically distinct aggregates, the Tutsi Hima, concentrated in
the south and central regions, traditionally looked upon as supposedly low caste, and the Tutsi
Banyaruguru, whose geographical and social proximity to the crown implied higher status.
Finally, the ethos of the monarchy had little in common with its counterpart in Rwanda, where
the king (mwami) was both the symbol and the instrument of Tutsi domination. There was
nothing in Burundi comparable to the dynastic poems, historical traditions, secret codes of
succession, and mythical representations surrounding the royal drum, said to contain the
genital remains of Hutu kinglets killed in battle.
The contrast between the two kingships is perhaps best illustrated by a photograph dating back
to the 1920s: Mwambutsa, the king of Burundi wearing an open shirt in an ill- tting cotton suit
and a bush hat, and Musinga of Rwanda, ramrod straight, resplendent in his colorful regal
attire. The asymmetry was hardly diminished by Musinga’s successor, the seven-foot sphinxlike Mutara Rudahigwa, his face sometimes hidden by a row of beads hanging from his
headdress.
I tried to pin down the signi cance of such differences in a paper presented in 1966 at a
professional meeting, in which I underscored Burundi’s capacity to meet the challenge of
modernization with relative success, in stark contrast with Rwanda. This theme was later
picked up by Samuel Huntington, who tersely summed up the gist of his argument: “The
inability of Tutsi and Hutu to live together in peace in Rwanda’s centralized system was
de nitely established. Their ability to coexist in Burundi’s decentralized system remained
unproven but still possible.”2
By 1972, his cautiously upbeat (and somewhat misleading) assessment of Burundi’s capacity to
manage a peaceful coexistence of its ethnic communities had been proven tragically wrong. In
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what turned out to be the rst genocide ever experienced in independent Africa, anywhere from
200,000 to 300,000 Hutu were massacred in cold blood by a Tutsi-dominated army acting in
response to a localized Hutu-led insurrection.3
By what combination of circumstances could Burundi, a decade after independence, end up as a
Tutsi-dominated ethnocracy, a mirror image of its neighbor to the north?
Rwanda’s Hutu Revolution: A Colonially Manipulated Game Changer
To this question, the most obvious answer is to point to the intense fears instilled in the minds
of the Tutsi minority of Burundi by the spinoffs of the Hutu revolution in Rwanda. This is the
argument I have made on a number of occasions and in several publications. Nonetheless, a
great deal more could have been said of the causes and consequences of this pivotal event. A
more convincing interpretation would have paid greater attention to the role played by the
departing colonizer in preparing the ground for a Hutu-led seizure of power in Rwanda. What I
had seen during my trip to Rwanda in the summer of 1960 was only the tip of the iceberg. Only
years later did I take the full measure of the underhanded maneuverings and manipulations
orchestrated by Belgium’s Résident Militaire, Col. Guy Logiest. In his preface to Logiest’s apologia
pro vita sua, Professor Stengers draws an intriguing comparison with the role of King Leopold in
the Congo: “If we are to understand why there has been a Congo we need to understand
Leopold’s psychology; in order to understand why there is a Hutu-dominated Rwanda you
have to understand Colonel Logiest.”4 However overdrawn, the parallel brings into focus the
crucial role played by the Belgian proconsul in handing the levers of power to the nascent Hutu
elites.
His critical rst step in November 1959 was to dismiss all Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs and replace
them with appointed burgomasters (the equivalent of mayors). In anticipation of Tutsi unrest,
units of the Congo-based Force Publique were called to join the Belgian paratroopers already on
the ground. The Hutu revolution, still in the initial phase of peasant jacquerie, broke out on
November 1, 1959, a day remembered as All Saints Day, and later referred to as the Hutu
uprising, La Toussaint Rwandaise.5 This is how a UN report described the scenes of arson ignited
by Hutu extremists: “The incendiaries set off in bands of ten. Armed with machetes and
paraf n… they pillaged Tutsi houses as they passed on their way and set re to them… Day
after day res spread from hill to hill.”6 Apparently, little was done to stop the arsonists. What
followed can best be described as a case of systematic ethnic cleansing resulting in the forced
exodus of thousands of Tutsi families with no other option than to seek asylum in neighboring
territories.
The nal blow delivered against the Tutsi monarchy came in January 1961 with the so-called
coup d’Etat of Gitarama. Organized in great secrecy in the city of the same name by a group of
Hutu leaders acting in connivance with the military resident, it took the form of an improvised
gathering of some three thousand burgomasters and municipal councilors, of cially rumored to
have come together to discuss security issues. The reality turned out to be vastly different. Once
assembled, the participants sitting as a constituent assembly proclaimed high and loud the
abolition of the monarchy and all its symbols, including the royal drum, and the birth of the
democratic and sovereign republic of Rwanda. After nominating a provisional prime minister,
Grégoire Kayibanda, later to become the rst president of the rst republic, the 3,126
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burgomasters and councilors co-opted among themselves the members of a legislative assembly
and a ten-member cabinet. Thus ended the centuries-old monarchy—not with a bang but with a
secretly planned regime change that left many wondering how it all happened. One such
skeptic was none other than the Belgian Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Paul-Henri Spaak. After inviting Logiest to his home after his mandate as military resident, the
latter was asked point blank: “Colonel, how did you manage to organize a revolution in
Rwanda? I’ve always been curious to know how some revolutions succeed and others fail.”
Predictably, Logiest gave full credit to the weight of the oppressed Hutu population.7 Without
trying to underplay the growing popular pressures for a change of regime, one wonders
whether they could have given rise to a full- edged republican regime prior to independence
without the decisive push offered by the military resident.
What Logiest was unable to achieve was a transformation of grassroots attitudes among the
Hutu, including their inability to take effective control of their political destinies.
On a trip back to Rwanda in 1967, I was struck by the sense of incompetence on display among
local of cials. One of them, after being asked to let me have access to the communal archives,
handed me the keys to the room where they were housed, with no other instructions but to
hand them back when I was done. The debates going on in the legislative assembly were often
conducted in Kinyarwanda, but this was hardly enough to conceal the internal discords among
legislators or, for that matter, among the members of the government. Few Tutsi were seen in
the streets of Kigali, and those bold enough to be seen kept a low pro le. What I remember most
vividly was the atmosphere of sullen resignation hovering over the country, a kind of global
psychological letdown, as if the revolution had left the country with deep wounds. Not only
was the complementary “other” missing, but he was now actively engaged in retaliatory raids
to bring down the fragile republic.8 If it hadn’t been for the timely intervention of Belgian
military advisers, the December 1963 raid on Kigali, organized by Tutsi refugees from Rwanda
operating from Burundi, would have probably sealed the fate of the Kayibanda government.
With the bene t of hindsight, I also wonder whether Burundi’s plunge into the abyss in 1972
could have happened in the absence of the huge out ow of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda into
Burundi, for which Logiest also deserves considerable credit.
Refugee Flows as Vectors of Con ict
In a context as thoroughly politicized as the Great Lakes, refugees are never neutral. Fearful one
day, fearsome the next, they stand as a force to be reckoned with. “Brutality,” Michela Wrong
observed, “passes like a virus from one community to another.”9 Where ethnic identities cut
across geographical boundaries, all that’s needed for a virus to spread is a carrier. This is where
refugee ows help us understand how killings in one state can pave the way for genocide in
another.
Consider the case of Burundi, where on the eve of independence, the country offered asylum to
some 40,000 Tutsi refugees from Rwanda.10 From all the evidence, the presence in the country of
such a staggering number of Tutsi, many of whom stood as witness to the horrors they and their
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kinsmen had endured at the hands of Hutu revolutionaries in their homeland, served as a
powerful stimulus to the rise of ethnic hatreds in their country of asylum.
I remember the 1972 bloodbath as one of the most painful moments of my early years as an
Africanist. I was forty at the time and had just returned from weeks of eldwork in and around
Bujumbura, in the hope of producing the de nitive comparative history of Rwanda and
Burundi. What few bits of information which had ltered through the media left me in a state of
shock. I had lost a number of Hutu friends who, days earlier, had spent time with me trying to
educate me on the history of their country. As the horri c scale of the carnage nally came into
view, I found myself utterly unable to make rational sense of what had happened. It took me
awhile to put these events in the perspective of a self-ful lling prophecy: the warnings issued
by Tutsi refugees did not fall on deaf ears; as fears of a Hutu republic became more prevalent,
their originally false imputations became part of the real world.
As I re ect on this long-ago tragedy, I am still at a loss to gure out why it attracted so little
attention from the scholarly community. Equally puzzling is why the consensus of opinion that
eventually emerged among some well-informed observers appeared so overwhelmingly
re ective of the government White Paper that put the onus of responsibility on the Hutu.11
I take no little pride in having written one of rst accounts of the 1972 killings in a report to the
London-based Minority Rights Group (MRG).12 Though by no means beyond criticisms, it was
quite favorably reviewed by Bernard Levin in the London Times (under the title “The Blood on
the Flag of Burundi”) and received positive comments from Jan Vansina and other colleagues in
the US. Only in France did it fail to meet with the approval of what few Africanists had worked
on the Great Lakes, with Jean-Pierre Chretien—who had declined my invitation to do a joint
report for the MRG—asserting himself as my most acerbic critic; he later admitted, so egregious
were the errors contained in the report, that he had no other choice but to turn down his
thumbs. A more candid response would have underscored the risks of being declared persona
non grata at a time when conducting eld work in Burundi was his rst priority. At any rate,
the mixed reviews received by my MRG report made clear to me the risks involved in taking up
positions deemed too controversial.
Blaming the Victims
Seen through the prism of the government White Paper, issued immediately after the
restoration of “peace and order,” the post-genocidal landscape that comes into view is surreal.
In a stunning exercise in role reversal, the Hutu are cast as the génocidaires, and the army-led
repression as the God-sent intervention that happened in the nick of time to prevent the worst
from happening. An exceptional threat required an exceptional response: “The sheer number of
victims, 50,000 (sic), the scale of the means deployed, the plans, maps and documents seized,
convincingly demonstrate that the aggressors did not simply aim at the overthrow of republican
institutions but systematically planned the elimination of an entire ethnic group, the Tutsi…
This is why the Burundi authorities felt obligated to in ict a severe punishment on those
responsible for this genocide.”13

11

See the summary of the White Paper in Le Monde. See “Un livre blanc af rme la responsabilité des Hutu dans les
récents massacres,” Le Monde, June 9, 1972, accessed September 28, 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/
article/1972/06/09/un-livre-blanc-reaf rme-la-responsabilite-des-hutus-dans-les-recentsmassacres_2392629_1819218.html; see also International Court of Justice (ICJ), Case Concerning Armed Activities on
the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda): White Paper (Vols. I and II), court reproduction,
June 23, 1999, accessed September 28, 2022, https://www.icj-cij.org/public/ les/case-related/116/13458.pdf.

12

René Lemarchand and David Martin, Report No. 20: Selective Genocide in Burundi (London: Minority Rights Group,
[1974] 2016), accessed September 28, 2022, https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/SelectiveGenocide-in-Burundi-english.pdf.

13

See René Lemarchand ed. Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial and Memory (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2011), 47.
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Coming from the Tutsi-dominated government of President Micombero, this travesty of reality
is not surprising. What makes it unusual is how far this fantasy has been endorsed in one form
or another, not just by historians but a number of high-pro le international personalities who
should have known better. Remarkable by its fawning sycophancy was the statement issued by
the notoriously compromised UN Secretary Kurt Waldheim, expressing his “fervent hope that
peace, harmony and stability can be brought about speedily and successfully and that Burundi
will thereby achieve the goals of social progress, better standards of life and other ideals and
principles set forth in the UN Charter.”14 Even more astonishing was the comment of the
Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (now African Union), Diallo Telli: “My
presence here in Bujumbura signi es the total solidarity of the OAU Secretariat with the
President of Burundi and with the government of the fraternal people of Burundi.”15
No matter how outrageous, such statements evoked little or no reaction from the international
community.
Not until the publication in 2007 of Burundi 1972 au Bord des Genocides, co-authored by JeanPierre Chrétien and Jean-Francois Dupaquier, was a serious effort made to break the conspiracy
of silence surrounding the 1972 bloodbath. Astonishing as it may sound, however, out of the
mass of documentation assembled by the authors, came the conclusion that the mass murder of
hundreds of thousands of Hutu civilians stemmed from their well-corroborated genocidal
intentions against the Tutsi. There is no need here to reiterate the criticisms I made elsewhere
about the authors’ clunky methodology, the slender evidence on which they base their
conclusions, and their uncritical interpretation of the statements made by former of cials, such
as Emile Mworoha, who once served as of the president of the Jeunesses Révolutionnaires
Rwagasore (JRR), the sinister organization in charge of rounding up Hutu victims and delivering
them to their graves.16 Suf ce it to note that for all its aws, their argument is not a unique or
aberrant case. It echoes the views advanced by a number of Barund intelligentsia, including
Evariste Ngayimpenda, whose outrageously revisionist thesis, Histoire du con it politico-ethnique
Burundais (2004) sets forth the view that the killings of Tutsi by Hutu qualify as genocide, while
the mass extermination of Hutu can only be described as a legitimate repression.
The persistence of the “blaming the victims” argument was brought to my attention more
recently in the context of an international conference on Burundi organized in April in Ottawa
by my colleague Paci que Manirakiza. Undaunted, Evariste Ngayimpenda reiterated his
familiar thesis, only to be followed by another “blame the victim” ideologue, by Emmanuel
Nkurunziza. Honored though I was to have been invited as the keynote speaker, I must admit
feeling somewhat uneasy having to listen to a concerted defense of mass killings in the name of
a genocidal intent unsupported by any shred of evidence.
Tortuous Pathways to a Similar Destination
In November 1993, re ecting on Burundi’s blood-stained trajectory, I wrote: “Nowhere else in
Africa has so much violence killed so many people in so small a place as in Burundi during the
years following independence.”17 That statement proved sadly premature. Five months later,
Rwanda suffered an even more terrifying genocide with an estimated half a million Tutsi
victims. No other event has played a more decisive role in propelling the two states along
divergent pathways, later to converge as ethnic dictatorships.

Lemarchand, Forgotten Genocides, 43.

16

Ibid., 37–50.

17

Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Con ict and Genocide, preface.
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All genocides are alike in the horror they evoke, but on closer inspection, they each stand out as
unlike any other. The identity of the victims is not the only trait that distinguishes the mass
murder of Tutsi in Rwanda. In retrospect, the really critical difference with Burundi lies in the
huge outpouring of popular sympathy for President Kagame for having brought the killings to
an end, and, as a gesture of self-redemption for its failure to intervene, the international
community’s generous nancial assistance to his government. Over the years, tens of millions of
dollars found their way into the coffers of the Rwandan state. Never mind that some nagging
questions remain about Kagame’s responsibility in the crash of President Habyarimana’s plane
(the triggering factor that set off the killings), about his direct involvement in the invasion of the
Congo in 1996, and the subsequent “cleaning up” of Hutu refugee camps, later described by the
UN as a conceivable act of genocide. None of this went unnoticed by outside observers.
Nonetheless, the support of the international community for Kagame remained undiminished.
His regime’s reputation of incorruptibility and outstanding performance in terms of economic
and social development trumped all other reference points, including, of course, his utter
disdain of the most elementary democratic rights and unswerving commitment to eradicating
all references to ethnic identities. Especially revealing of his warped personality are the
devastating exposes by two talented prize-winning female journalists, whose strictures leave
little doubt about his personal involvement in the killing of his political enemies, not to mention
his responsibility in the cold-blooded murder of thousands of Hutu civilians.18
Burundi’s trajectory is more complicated. But if we take 2005 as a reference point, when the new
constitution was adopted, based on a power-sharing formula, the contrast with Rwanda is
blindingly clear: rather than eliminating ethnicities at the stroke of the pen, the constitutional
recognition of their existence served as the building block of a multi-ethnic democracy. The
result made Burundi one of the rare examples in the continent of a functioning pluralist
democracy; although the experiment proved short-lived. In de ance of the constitutionally
sanctioned two-term limits of his presidency, Nkurunziza (who died in of ce a few years later)
insisted on staying in of ce, only to trigger an abortive Hutu-led coup in 2015. Repression
ensued. Three years later, after proclaiming himself the “eternal supreme guide” of his people,
the constitutional provisions that once guaranteed a meaningful sharing of power between
Hutu and Tutsi were dismantled bit by bit, giving the former almost unlimited control over the
government. But the most effective source of Hutu power stemmed from the growing
hegemony of the ruling Conseil National de la Défense de la Démocratie-Front pour la Défense de la
Démocratie (CNDDFDD). Buttressed by the rise of parallel organizations, including the allpowerful intelligence agency (Service national de renseignements) and jeunesse groups, such as the
so-called imbonerakure (“those who see from afar”), of sinister reputation, high-ranking army
bigwigs are in charge of running key ministries. Under Nkurunziza’s successor, Evariste
Ndayishimiye, the evangelist streak that once loomed so large across the government has
largely disappeared. What remains unchanged is the relentless trend towards a Hutu-led
dictatorship and growing marginalization and persecution of the Tutsi minority.
Both states are ethnic dictatorships, yet nuances are in order. There is nothing comparable in
Burundi to the extreme centralization of power embodied in Rwanda’s Directorate of Military
Intelligence (DMI), perhaps the most sophisticated killing machine anywhere on the continent.
The record of abominations, credited to the DMI, suggests a mix of the USSR Politburo and
Cosa Nostra, with Kagame acting as the orchestrator. Power in Burundi is no less repressive for
being more diffuse, fragmented as it is among different organizations swirling around the
ruling party apparatus. Who really holds power at any given time is anybody’s guess. What
emerges, then, is a curious reenactment in the guise of modern dictatorships of the traditional
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pattern that distinguished one kingdom from the other—a highly centralized, all-powerful
monarchy at loggerheads with a deeply fragmented false twin.
In suggesting a new way of thinking about the signi cance of tradition, I am not dismissing the
role of political actors. Agency is sometimes inseparable from political institution. Just consider
the ceaseless recourse to violence associated with the reign of mwami Rwabugiri in the late
nineteenth century—ably discussed by Jan Vansina as “the nightmare of violence as a political
tool”19—so strikingly reminiscent of Kagame’s reliance on brute force, including murder, to stay
in power. What comes into focus in Rwanda is the joining together of strong rulers and a
centralizing and expanding power structure. In Burundi, the dominant pattern is precisely the
opposite—that of weak rulers hemmed in by local satraps. The contrast between Rwabugiri and
Mezi Gisabo, whose reigns coincided, is familiar to historians of the region, and so, also, the
different power structures associated with each monarch. Personal pathologies are not
necessarily the stuff of comparative historical analysis, but in some cases, their resonance is
dif cult to ignore.

Jan Vansina, Le Rwanda ancien. Le royaume Nyiginya (Paris: Karthala, 2001), 227.
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